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My dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance and corporate 
governance. The first essay studies the effect of information frictions across 
corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions, using the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. SOX requires firms to enhance 
their internal controls to improve the reliability of financial reporting across 
corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in 
conglomerates is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business 
segments. The effects are most pronounced when conglomerates are prone to 
information problems within the organization and least pronounced when they 
still suffer from internal control weaknesses after SOX. Moreover, conglomerates’ 
productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. 
These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation 
process are partly due to information frictions. My findings also shed light on 
some unintended effects of SOX on large and complex firms. 
The second essay is co-authored with Yaniv Grinstein and investigates how firms 
tie CEO compensation to performance. We take advantage of new compensation 
disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
 2006. Firms vary in their choice of performance measures and horizons, and in 
their reliance on pre-specified goals. Consistent with optimal contracting 
theories, we find that firms choose performance measures that are more 
informative of CEO actions, and rely less on pre-specified goals when it is more 
costly to contract on CEO actions. 
The third essay investigates the design of division managers (DMs) incentive 
contracts again taking advantage of the disclosure requirements. I find that firms 
do not use relative performance evaluation across divisions and that in general 
most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance 
instead of division performance. Furthermore, division performance-based 
incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when within-organization 
conflicts are potentially more severe. I also find that when the probability of 
promotion to CEO is lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and 
DM compensation incentives are greater. These results support notions that 
influence costs as well as promotion-based incentives are important 
considerations in designing DMs contracts. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
IN THE CAPITAL ALLOCATION DECISION: EVIDENCE FROM SOX 
 
 
“Once they have stopped fulminating, many bosses privately admit that SOX 
has brought benefits. Managers are now far more confident about the 
quality of the numbers they get from their business units.” 
The Economist, Smelly Old SOX, July 26, 2007 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In his presidential address to the American Finance Association, Jensen (1993) 
underlines the failure of firms’ internal control systems and the presence of 
information problems that lead firms to adopt sub-optimal corporate policies. 
Indeed, the efficiency of one of the most important corporate decisions, how to 
allocate resources within the organization, is predicted to be particularly 
sensitive to information quality and reliability (see, e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1996).1 
Yet there is little empirical evidence on the importance of information frictions in 
the internal capital allocation process as well as on the effects of internal control 
systems on internal capital allocation decisions.2 
                                                 
1 Most previous findings suggest that internal capital allocations are inefficient: conglomerates 
tend to over-invest in their weakest divisions at the expense of under-investing in their strongest 
divisions (e.g. Shin and Stulz, 1998, Scharfstein, 1998, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000, and 
Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010), and there exists some rigidity in the process of allocating resources 
across divisions (Ozbas and Zelvili, 2009). 
2 Schoar (2002) underlines the needs for further exploration on the interaction of internal 
corporate governance and corporate decisions. 
 2 
This paper aims to examine the effect of information frictions across corporate 
hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions. I exploit the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment of a shock to the level of information 
frictions across corporate hierarchies. The Act was enacted on July 30th, 2002, 
after a sequence of high-profile corporate scandals (Enron, Worldcom etc.). SOX 
requires firms to enhance their internal control systems in order to improve the 
reliability of financial reporting within the organization.3 Section 404 requires 
firms to adopt procedures to test internal controls over their financial reports as 
well as to employ an independent auditor to assess the effectiveness of these 
procedures and the firm’s internal controls. Section 302 increases the 
responsibility of signing officers with respect to the accuracy of financial reports 
and the effectiveness of internal controls. Section 906 allows criminal charges in 
case of misleading or fraudulent reports. SOX also created the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) which oversees auditing firms. 
I conduct my analysis in a number of steps. First, I study how internal capital 
allocation decisions change after SOX in a sample of conglomerate firms.4 I find 
that after SOX there is less rigidity in allocating resources within the organization 
                                                 
3 In the context of SOX, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines internal controls 
as a set of procedures that provide reasonable assurance that financial reporting is accurate. 
These procedures, for instance, include the maintenance of records that accurately and fairly 
reflect a firm’s transactions. 
4 In this paper, a firm is classified as a conglomerate if it has multiple business segments, while it 
is classified as a stand-alone firm if it has only one business segment. When studying the internal 
capital allocation decision per se, I restrict my sample to only conglomerates (I need firms with at 
least two business segments to identify how firms allocate capital within the organization). 
However, when studying the efficiency of the internal capital allocation process, I include both 
conglomerate and stand-alone firms in my sample. 
 3 
– the dispersion of investment across business segments within the firm 
increases after SOX. In addition, top executives rely more on internal financial 
reporting in their capital allocation decisions. I find that the allocation decision is 
more responsive to performance as reported by the business segments. Before 
SOX, the sensitivity of investment to segment performance is not significant, 
while it is after SOX. After SOX, firms tend to invest more in their best-performing 
segments while before SOX they were more inclined to subsidize their worst-
performing segments. In other words, as illustrated in the quote above from The 
Economist, after SOX top executives are more confident about the quality of the 
numbers they get from lower-level managers and thus will rely more on them 
when making their capital allocation decisions. 
Second, I study whether these changes of behavior vary across conglomerates 
based on their tendency of having information problems across corporate 
hierarchies. I find that conglomerates with more business segments are more 
affected by SOX: their sensitivity of investment to segment performance 
increases significantly more than conglomerates with fewer segments. Due to 
limitation in acquiring specific knowledge (Jensen and Meckling, 1992), 
information problems within the organization are conjectured to be more severe 
for firms with more business segments. These firms tend to be more complex and 
require more information gathering than firms with fewer business segments. It 
is also more costly for firms with more segments to audit and verify numbers 
from segments as well as to monitor them (Stein, 1997). In addition, 
 4 
conglomerates that had restated their financial reports in the past also exhibit 
large increase in sensitivity of investment to performance. Restatement is a signal 
of less reliable internal financial reports and weaker internal controls; therefore, 
I expect these firms to be more affected by SOX. 
I also collect information about the auditor’s opinion on the effectiveness of 
firm’s internal controls. For conglomerates, the auditors of which report material 
weaknesses in their internal controls, I find no significant change in allocation 
behavior after SOX. In addition, these conglomerates exhibit a negative sensitivity 
of investment to segment performance in the all sample period, which confirm 
the importance of internal controls: when internal controls are weak, firms tend 
to not rely on internal financial reporting in their capital allocation decisions. 
These results across conglomerates suggest that the effects of SOX are most 
pronounced in conglomerates that are prone to information problems across 
corporate hierarchies and least pronounced in conglomerates that still suffer 
from material weaknesses in their internal controls after SOX. 
Third, I study the impact of SOX on the efficiency of the internal capital allocation 
process by investigating how conglomerates’ operating performance and market 
value relative to stand-alone firms change after SOX.5 Consistent with Schoar 
(2002), I observe that, on average, conglomerates exhibit better operating 
                                                 
5 Giroud (2010) shows that information within the firm is important in a firm’s productivity and 
the investment decision. However, the scope of his study is different than this paper. He focuses 
on the role of soft information (in his framework, SOX would represent a shock on “hard” 
information) and investigates the effects of the introduction of new airline routes on the level of 
investment and productivity of firms’ plants. 
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performance than stand-alone firms. Using a difference-in-differences 
methodology, I find that this productivity advantage of conglomerates over 
stand-alone firms significantly increases after SOX and is more pronounced for 
conglomerates with more segments. In addition, the effects of SOX on 
productivity also vary within the conglomerate. Smaller segments within the 
organization tend to be more affected by SOX. To the extent that smaller 
segments in the firm are likely to be younger ones and that the CEO has less 
knowledge about them; I expect that information problems should be more 
severe for smaller segments and, thus, these segments should be more affected 
by SOX. Moreover, due to limitation in acquiring specific knowledge, CEOs are 
likely to focus on the core-business of the firm, that is, the larger segments (Ozbas 
and Selvili, 2009).6 
Consistent with past findings, conglomerates tend to be traded at a discount 
compared to stand-alone firms (e.g. Lang and Stulz, 1994, Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
However, I find that the conglomerate discount decreases significantly after the 
announcement of SOX and remains at a lower level in the following years. These 
results regarding conglomerates’ operating performance and market value 
relative to stand-alone firms support the notion that internal capital allocation 
process is more efficient after SOX. To the extent that information about segment 
performance improves as a result of SOX, one should observe more efficient 
                                                 
6 Some recent papers show that social ties matter in the capital allocation decision. While Duchin 
and Sosyura (2011) find that segment managers with social ties to the CEO tend to receive more 
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allocation of capital across business segments and, by the same token, the value 
conglomerates’ internal capital markets should increase. 
Since these new internal control systems improve firm efficiency, it is puzzling 
that firms did not adopt them on their own prior to SOX. The most plausible 
explanation is that these internal governance mechanisms were not available 
(e.g. increased penalty if caught, auditors are now more risk averse and will 
scrutinize more carefully accounting reports, etc.). These new mechanisms 
improve the effectiveness of internal control systems and, thus, mitigate 
information asymmetry across corporate hierarchies. The fact that firms were 
not able to alleviate these information problems and needed new incentive tools 
supports the argument that inefficiencies in the allocation process are partly due 
to the presence of information and agency problems within the organization. 
My findings support predictions from the theory. A model by Harris and Raviv 
(1996) suggests that one should observe less rigidity in the capital allocation 
process and higher reliance on information reported by the division managers 
following improvements in the effectiveness of internal auditing procedures and 
an imposition of a higher level of auditing (which grant to the management 
greater ability to verify information received from their divisions and more 
reliable information). As a result, internal capital allocation decisions should be 
more efficient (i.e. closer to the first-best solution). My findings are also 
                                                                                                                                            
capital, Xuan (2009) shows that CEOs favor segments in which they do not have strong 
connections to enhance their influence over them. 
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consistent with Scharfstein and Stein (2000), who show that lobbying activities 
among division managers would lead to inefficiencies in internal capital markets. 
After SOX, the firm has access to a stronger set of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms that aim to mitigate information problems and conflicts of interest 
within the organization. After SOX it is more difficult for the division managers to 
create opaque accounting systems and to hide information (i.e., the costs of 
lobbying increase) and, thus, internal capital allocations should be more efficient. 
I employ various empirical tests to check the robustness of my results. Recent 
studies show that economic activities and access to external capital influence the 
performance and behavior of conglomerates firms relative to stand-alone firms 
(Dimitrov and Tice, 2006). It is therefore possible that my results are driven by 
changes in the economic activity in the United States around SOX. To address this 
issue, I check whether the business cycle influences my results by using different 
control periods (i.e., period before SOX) and selecting a pre-SOX period similar to 
the affected period (i.e., the period after SOX) in terms of business cycle. I find 
similar results as for my baseline specification test. I also run a placebo test using 
only the period before SOX and find no change in the capital allocation decision. 
My results, therefore, are robust to variations in the business cycle. 
SOX and concomitant governance regulations in the New York Stock Exchange 
and NASDAQ are also likely to change the external monitoring environment and 
the transparency of publicly traded firms, and thus my results could be driven by 
the mitigation of agency conflicts between the management and the investors (or 
 8 
board of directors). As shown in the model by Scharfstein and Stein (2000), both 
layers of asymmetric information problems and conflicts of interests (first layer: 
between top executives and investors (or board of directors); second layer: 
between the division managers and top executives) could influence the budgeting 
decision.7 It is therefore possible that my results are driven by changes in the 
agency conflicts between management and shareholders. To address this 
concern, I check if variation in board composition and ownership structure 
across conglomerates can explain my results. I find that conglomerates for which 
board composition does not satisfy the board independence requirements before 
SOX do not exhibit significant changes in their capital allocation process 
compared to firms with complying boards. In addition, there is no significant 
influence of executive ownership or block ownership on the change of 
responsiveness of investment to performance. These results suggest that my 
results are not driven by changes in the external monitoring environment. 
Methodologically, my paper circumvents endogeneity and self-selection 
problems.8 Most previous empirical works base its analysis on cross-sectional 
variations and compares the investment behavior of conglomerates and stand-
alone firms, whereas, I focus on the change of behavior within the conglomerate 
                                                 
7 Previous findings suggest that when executive and block ownership are larger, internal 
allocations tend be more efficient (Scharfstein, 1998; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; Sautner and 
Villalonga, 2010). 
8 See, for instance, Campa and Kedia (2002) and Graham, Lemmon, and Wolfe (2002) for 
evidence about the importance of these problems in studying the diversification discount. 
 9 
around an exogenous shock.9 In addition, past studies ground their conclusions 
on the relation between the allocation decision and Tobin’s Q of the industry, 
whereas I base my analysis on the link between the allocation decision and past 
performance. Hence my conclusions are not affected by any potential 
measurement error in Q.10  Furthermore, by basing my analysis on past 
performance across divisions, instead of industry Q, my empirical specification 
better captures actual business practices. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2010) show 
that a large proportion of CEOs rely on past accounting return and divisional 
manager reputation, which to some extent is built on past performance, as well as 
on relative performance evaluation with respect to their capital allocation 
decisions. In addition, the focus on past performance (instead of industry Q) is 
also better suited to study the effects of SOX (i.e., it captures the change in the 
quality of internal financial reporting) as well as to test the theory (e.g., Harris 
and Raviv, 1996). 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, my results 
suggest that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to 
information frictions across corporate hierarchies. To explain inefficient internal 
capital allocations, one general theme in the theoretical literature is to emphasize 
the presence of within-firm frictions in the allocation decision, such as 
information asymmetry and conflicts of interests across corporate hierarchies 
                                                 
9 Among notable exceptions are Lamont (1997), who uses the 1986 oil price shock; Campello 
(2002), who investigates the effects of the Fed monetary policies on the internal capital markets 
of financial conglomerates; and Sautner and Villalonga (2010), who use a tax change in Germany. 
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(e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1996, and Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). However, few 
empirical papers have looked into the link between internal capital markets and 
within-firm frictions and thus it remains debatable whether these frictions have 
an important effect on internal capital allocation decisions.11, 12 Therefore, the 
results of this paper confirm predictions from a wide range of models that use 
within-firm frictions to explain inefficiencies in internal capital markets. 
Second, consistent with the arguments in Jensen (1993), my findings shed light 
on the importance of internal control systems in the efficiency of corporate 
decisions. In addition, this study is one of the first attempts to investigate the 
effects of internal corporate governance on capital allocation decisions. 
Finally, this paper complements our understanding of the costs and benefits of 
SOX. By focusing on the effects of SOX within the firm and identifying the channel 
of value-creation, this paper reveals the impact of SOX from a new perspective. 
Since large firms are more likely to have multiple divisions and, thus, are more 
prone to information problems within the organization, this study provides 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Whited (2001) shows that internal capital allocations are no more inefficient once one is using 
a measurement-error-consistent estimator. 
11 As pointed out in Ozbas and Scharsftein (2010), one of the main challenges to assessing the 
influence of these within-firm frictions in the allocation decision is the lack of data about the inner 
workings of the firm. 
12 Two recent studies use proprietary data on one specific organization and show that influential 
power within the organization matters in the capital allocation decision. Cremers, Huang and 
Sautner (2010) study a retail-banking group and show that banks with more voting power tend to 
receive more funds. See also Glaser, Lopez de Silanes, and Sautner (2011) who use proprietary 
data from a multinational conglomerate. 
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additional explanations for why large firms benefit more from SOX than do small 
firms.13 
The paper continues as follows. Section 1.2 describes main provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as reviews existing evidence about the effects of the 
Act. In Section 1.3, I develop the main hypotheses. Section 1.4 explains the 
database construction. Section 1.5 provides the empirical analysis and Section 1.6 
investigates the robustness of the results. Section 1.7 concludes and discusses the 
findings in light of the past results about the impact of SOX. 
1.2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Description and Evidence 
1.2.1 Description 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted on July 30, 2002. The most prominent 
provision is Section 404, which requires management to adopt procedures to test 
internal controls over a firm’s financial reports and to assess the efficiency of 
these procedures (404a). In addition, firms are required to have an independent 
auditor that assesses the effectiveness of those procedures and internal controls 
(404b). Section 404 went into effect on November 15, 2004. Firms were required 
to provide the Management's Annual Report on Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting and the Attestation Report of the Registered Public Accounting Firm 
with their 10-K filling if their fiscal year ended on or after November 15, 2004. 
However, small public firms had a stay of execution and were originally required 
                                                 
13 Previous results show that SOX is more beneficial (less detrimental) to large firms (see 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008; Iliev, 2010; and Kang, Liu, and 
 12 
to comply with Section 404 on July 15, 2007.14 Foreign firms were originally 
required to comply with Section 404 on the same date as domestic firms. 
However, the date was postponed to July 15, 2005 and finally to July 15, 2006. 
Section 302 increases the responsibility of signing officers with respect to the 
accuracy of financial reports and the effectiveness of internal controls. In 
addition, Section 302 recommends the use of sub-certification. Indeed, lower-
level managers can be asked to certify the financial reports by signing an 
affidavit. The use of sub-certification is a powerful device made available to top 
management to increase the incentives of divisional managers to report 
truthfully. Section 906 allows criminal charges in cases of misleading or 
fraudulent reports. The charges can be up to 5 million dollars in fine and 20 years 
of prison. SOX also created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) which oversees auditing firms. Among its responsibilities, the PCAOB, 
for instance, sets new auditing standards in order to improve effectiveness of 
auditing procedures, regulates non-audit services that audit firms can offer to 
their clients, and monitors the independence of auditing companies. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains additional provisions such as for more 
independence of auditors, expanded liability of officers and directors with 
respect to financial reporting, and a mandate to the SEC and stock exchanges to 
adopt new rules to strengthen corporate governance. Indeed after the enactment 
                                                                                                                                            
Qi, 2010). 
14 Small domestic and foreign public firms are defined as firms with a public float below 75 
million dollars (non-accelerated filers according to the SEC definition). 
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of SOX, the NYSE and NASDAQ adopted new regulations concerning the 
composition and role of corporate boards. These new requirements are: boards 
should be composed of a majority of independent directors; enhanced definition 
of independent director; audit committee members should be financially literate 
and at least one member of the audit committee should have financial expertise; 
boards should hold meetings without the management; and the compensation, 
auditing and nominating committees should consist only of independent 
directors. 
1.2.2 Review of the Evidence regarding the Impact of SOX 
Previous results suggest that large firms tend to benefit more from the adoption 
of SOX than do small firms. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) show that large 
(small) firms that are less compliant tend to earn positive (negative) abnormal 
stock returns. 15  Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) find that after the SOX 
enactment the listing preferences between US and UK exchanges of large foreign 
firms do not change, whereas, small firms are less likely to choose a US listing 
(instead of a UK one).16 Comparing US and UK firms, Kang, Liu, and Qi (2010) 
show that after SOX US firm managers employ a larger discount rate in their 
investment decision, while UK firms do not change their discount rate. They also 
find that this effect is more significant among small firms.  
                                                 
15 Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) find consistent results with the argument 
that SOX would reduce agency problems. They find that firms for which insiders lobbied against 
SOX exhibit higher cumulative stock returns during SOX passage than non-lobbying firms. 
16 There is some evidence that overall the costs associated to the adoption of SOX outweigh the 
benefits—Zhang (2007) finds significant negative abnormal returns around key SOX events for 
US-traded stocks versus foreign non-US-traded stocks. 
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Existing studies find support that SOX enhances transparency between the firm 
and the investors. Arping and Sautner (2010) find that following the 
implementation of SOX analyst forecasts errors and dispersion decrease. Jain, 
Kim, and Rezaee (2008) observe that measures of stock liquidity increase after 
the act, and that the improvement in liquidity is associated with better quality of 
financial reports. Indeed, Iliev (2010) shows that Section 404 leads to more 
conservative earnings reports. In addition, Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko 
(2011) find that after SOX earnings announcements are more likely to occur 
outside the trading hours. They conclude that SOX levels the playing field among 
small and large investors by allowing more time for investors to digest the news 
before trading and thus induces more fairness and transparency with respect to 
the dissemination of new information. 
Moreover, some results suggest that SOX has an effect on corporate decisions and 
management’s attitude toward risk. Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010) find that 
after the Act, managers tend to be more cautious in their corporate decisions. 
Unlike UK firms, US firms tend to decrease their research and development 
expenses and capital expenditure, as well as to increase their cash holdings after 
SOX. 
Finally, using a web-based survey launched by the SEC of 3184 corporate insiders 
on the benefits of Section 404, Alexander et al. (2010) document that insiders 
tend to perceive that Section 404 has improved internal controls and confidence 
in firms’ financial reporting (i.e., decrease of information asymmetry) especially 
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for large and complex firms.17 However, they also find that insiders tend to 
perceive no impact on the ability to raise capital and on firm stock liquidity. 
Furthermore, there is large heterogeneity in opinions about the effects on the 
efficiency of firms’ operations: 27.7% of insiders report a negative impact; 42.9% 
no impact; and 29.4% a positive impact. Overall, these results suggest that SOX 
has improved the effectiveness of internal control systems and the reliability of 
financial reporting. 
1.3 Development of the Hypotheses 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the effect of information problems on 
internal capital allocation decisions.18 I use a mandatory change in internal 
control systems which mitigates information problems across corporate 
hierarchies. In this section, I review theoretical studies and develop the main 
hypotheses that guide the empirical design of the paper.19 
A typical agency conflicts model assumes asymmetric information and conflicts of 
interests between the principal and the agent (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Harris and 
Raviv, 1996). The principal wants to provide the right incentives to the agent in 
                                                 
17 Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010), find that after SOX auditors become an important player in 
detecting fraud in firm’s activities, which also supports the argument that internal controls are 
more effective after SOX. 
18 Since the scope of this paper is the capital allocation decision, I abstract from the decision of 
the firm to diversify its activities and consider only conglomerate firms when I study the capital 
allocation decision. However, there are rationales for a firm running multiple divisions. For 
instance, compared to stand-alone firms, conglomerate firms might be able to raise more external 
capital. If the divisions’ cash-flows are not perfectly correlated, as the number of divisions 
increases, the volatility of a firm’s total cash-flows decreases and, thus, a conglomerate firm 
would be able to raise more funds (Lewellen, 1971; Stein, 1997). 
19 See Maksimovic and Phillips (2006) and Stein (2003) for a review of the literature on internal 
capital markets. 
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order that the agent will pursue the principal’s interests (e.g., makes effort and 
adopts policies that maximize firm value). In a firm with many divisions, there 
exist two layers of tensions. The first one is between the shareholders and the 
CEO, and the second one is between the CEO and the division managers. 
Harris and Raviv (1996) study the optimal capital allocation process with the 
presence of information and incentives frictions between the CEO and the 
division managers. In their model, division managers report the capital needs of 
the division and the CEO decides how much capital each division will receive. 
However, division managers have private information about the true productivity 
of capital (i.e., the true capital needs) of their divisions (specific knowledge) as 
well as empire-building preferences.20 Without a mechanism to elicit truthful 
revelation, division managers would have incentives to report a higher 
productivity. Harris and Raviv (1996) include the possibility for the CEO to audit 
the division at a certain cost and thus to learn about the true productivity (and 
penalize the division manager if he or she lies).21 According to the Revelation 
Principle, division managers report truthfully in equilibrium. Harris and Raviv 
show that the optimal capital allocation scheme will involve an initial capital 
spending limit. However, division managers can request larger allocation. The 
initial capital spending limit is large relative to first-best in order to encourage 
                                                 
20 A division manager has incentives to overinvest to a build larger division in which he or she 
can derive more utility, e.g., perks, compensation, reputation, and influence (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Jensen, 1986). 
21 There are other papers that show how capital allocation process with additional mechanisms 
will elicit truthful reporting. See Harris and Raviv (1998) using also costly auditing, and Bernardo, 
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the division manager to not request more capital when the true productivity is 
low (and so the firm avoids the auditing cost). Thus, conglomerates will 
overinvest in divisions with low productivity. If the division manager requests 
additional funds, the CEO may allocate a compromise level of capital, or the CEO 
can audit the division (the probability of auditing increases with the amount of 
capital requested) and then allocate the amount requested (if the productivity is 
reported truthfully). For an unaudited request, the allocation is low relative to 
first-best and, so, there is underinvestment in high-productivity divisions. Harris 
and Raviv also show that as the cost of auditing decreases, the initial capital 
spending limit decreases, and the capital budgeting process becomes less rigid 
(CEO is more likely to approve new requests and the compromise allocations 
increase). This implies that the CEO places more importance on information 
reported by the division managers and capital allocation becomes more efficient. 
Relaxing the assumption that the CEO has aligned incentives and, so, in the 
context of the two layers of agency conflicts, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) show 
that lobbying from the division managers to get more capital will lead to 
inefficient capital allocations. In their model, the CEO decides how much capital 
to allocate in each division and how much cash to give to the division managers 
(the division managers can be compensated by either cash or an inefficiently 
large capital allocation). Both the CEO and the division managers act in their own 
interest and derive private benefits. The division manager can spend time on 
                                                                                                                                            
Cai, and Luo (2001, 2004), using incentive contracts. Ozbas (2005) shows that the rigidity in the 
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productive effort for the firm and time on activities that will allow him or her to 
gain bargaining power against the CEO, but that is not productive for the firm 
(e.g., spending time increasing his or her visibility, creating opaque internal 
accounting systems, hiding information to make it harder to replace him or her). 
Since the division managers have a constraint on the amount of time they can 
devote to both types of activities, there will be a cost associated with lobbying 
activities and this cost will increase with division investment opportunities. 
Therefore, it is optimal for the CEO to over-compensate the division managers of 
weak divisions to alleviate their lobbying behavior. However, the CEO prefers to 
compensate them by allocating more capital to their division, rather than by 
paying cash, because the CEO derives more private benefits from cash (Jensen, 
1986). Thus, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) predict that conglomerates will 
overinvest in weaker divisions due to both levels of agency conflicts (the rent-
seeking behavior of the division managers and the misaligned incentives of the 
CEO).22 
SOX improves the effectiveness of internal auditing procedures and imposes a 
higher level of auditing. In the Harris and Raviv model, SOX would be interpreted 
as a positive shock to management’s ability to verify information received from 
their divisions (i.e. it is less costly to learn the true productivity of the segment 
                                                                                                                                            
capital budgeting process will be stronger in diversified firms. 
22 Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) also study the importance of power struggles within the 
firm in capital allocation decisions. They show and find that when divisions have different 
investment opportunities (i.e., the firm is more diversified) the CEO will allocate more capital to 
the weaker divisions to alleviate the rent-seeking behavior of the division managers and increase 
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after SOX). Therefore, we should observe higher responsiveness of investment to 
information reported by the division managers. 
At the same time, productivity reported by other divisions within the firm will 
also be more informative of their true productivity. Therefore, after SOX, the CEO 
will rely more on other segments’ productivity and will decrease segment 
allocation if the other segments are doing better. Models based on the influence 
of the division manager (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) show that firms should 
assign positive weight on other segments’ reported productivity in their 
budgeting decision to increase the cost of lobbying by division managers. Since 
after SOX, influence of division managers is expected to decrease, the sensitivity 
of segment investment to other segments’ profitability will decrease. 
H.1.1: After SOX, the internal capital allocation decision will be more 
responsive to division productivity reported by the division managers. The 
sensitivity of segment investment to other segments’ reported productivity 
will decrease, that is, there will be more relative performance evaluation 
across a firm’s divisions in the allocation decision. 
Rigidity in the allocating process will lead the firm to under- (over-) invest in high 
(low) productive divisions (Harris and Raviv, 1996). Since SOX improves the 
effectiveness of internal auditing procedures and the reliability of internal 
financial reporting across corporate hierarchies, the capital allocation process 
                                                                                                                                            
the incentives to behave more cooperatively. However, they assume that the CEO has aligned 
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will be less rigid and thus more efficient after SOX. In addition, SOX leads to a 
decrease in the lobbying power of division managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 
2000). After SOX, it is more difficult for the division manager to create opaque 
internal accounting systems and to hide information to make it harder to replace 
him or her.23 Therefore, there will be less transfer of resources from the more 
productive segments to the less productive segments (subsidization) and more 
winner-picking behavior after SOX. 
H.1.2: After SOX, the internal capital allocation decision will be more 
efficient and thus will lead to higher subsequent performance. The internal 
capital markets of conglomerate firms will create more (destroy less) value. 
1.4 Data 
From 1976 to 1997, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 14 (SFAS 
14—Financial reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise) requires public 
firms to report financial data for every distinct line of business that accounts for 
more than 10% of a firm’s total sales, profits, or assets. Distinct line of business 
was defined as business activity in a different 4-digit SIC code than the primary 
firm’s activities. In December 1997, SFAS 131 was implemented and superseded 
SFAS 14. Under SFAS 131, firms need to classify and report segments according 
to the primary breakdown used by the management in defining segments for 
operating performance evaluation. The sample period of this study is included in 
                                                                                                                                            
incentives. 
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the post-1998 period and, thus, does not suffer from any misclassification of 
segments due to the change of regulation. In addition, SFAS 131 is of particular 
interest to this study since it requires firms to report segments according to their 
internal organization and, therefore, will lead to more precise estimates of firm 
decisions. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) make a similar argument and 
support the management approach of SFAS 131; however, the new rule was 
implemented too late for their study. 
The initial sample consists of all the multi-segment firms present in the 
Compustat segment and industrial annual databases from fiscal year 2001 to 
2006. Since I aim to study how top managers rely on internal financial reporting 
in their allocating decision, I only consider the initial source-year of each 
segment-year observation (i.e., unrestated data—the information that the 
headquarters receive). However, when investigating the change in future 
performance, I use the latest source year (i.e., restated data) to obtain more 
precise estimates of the segment’s “true” productivity.24 Firms classify segments 
by geographic location and by line of business. I am interested in the different 
lines of business, so I keep only business and operating segments and group them 
by their 4-digit SIC code.25   
                                                                                                                                            
23 In the Scharfstein and Stein (2000) model, this would be translated by a lower marginal 
benefit of lobbying for any level of lobbying activities: g’PostSOX(r) < g’PreSOX (r) for all r. 
24 I obtain similar results if I consider the latest source year when investigating changes in capital 
allocation decisions, and the initial source year when studying the change in future performance. 
25 After SFAS 131, segments can be reported across both geographic location and type of 
business, so one needs to group them by line of business in order to obtain business segments. 
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The construction of the database follows standard practices in the literature. I 
drop corporate segments (SID code equal to 99). I require segments to have 
information about their SIC code, assets, capital expenditure, sales, and operating 
profit. I also require assets, capital expenditure, and sales to be positive. The 
segment-level data (Compustat segment files) are cross-validated with the firm-
level data (Compustat industrial annual files), and I keep only firms for which the 
sum of segment assets is within 25% of firm total assets in the annual files. When 
the sum of segment assets is not equal to firm assets (but meets the 25% 
threshold), the sum of segments assets is grossed up or down till it is equal to 
firm assets. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), I drop financial firms (SIC codes 
6000-6999), firms with a financial segment,26 and firms with total sales less than 
20 million dollars. In addition, I also require firm market capitalization to be 
more than 75 million dollars since firms below this threshold are not required to 
comply with Section 404. Foreign firms (ADRs and dual-listed firms) are formally 
required to comply with most provisions of SOX at the same time as domestic 
firms (e.g., Section 302, CEO and CFO certification of financial statements and 
internal controls), except for Section 404 for which the formal compliance date is 
July 15, 2006 (i.e., the last fiscal year of the sample). 27  Since foreign 
conglomerates are affected by SOX, I include them in my sample. However, since 
                                                 
26 The results are not affected if I include these firms. 
27 There is anecdotal evidence that large foreign firms listed in the United States. got ready to 
comply with Section 404 at the initial compliance date (see comment by Rob Lipton, KPMG 
Partner, “Sarbanes-Oxley goes Global”, Forbes, 7/13/2006). Though some foreign firms might 
have waited till the last moment to comply with Section 404 or decided to delist from the United 
States because of the costs associated with SOX. However, smaller foreign firms, which are not 
included in my sample, were more likely to exit the United States (Marosi and Massoud, 2008). 
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they can delay their compliance with Section 404, I run several robustness tests 
to check the validity of my results. First, I find that their capital allocation policy 
is not significantly different from the one of domestic firms before and after the 
implementation of Section 404. Second, I re-run all the regressions while 
changing the definition of the dummy Post-SOX (for foreign firms: equals 1 if 
fiscal year ends after July 15, 2006) and find similar results. Finally, when 
excluding the foreign firms, I find similar results, although significance levels 
decrease due to a smaller sample size. 
The investment variable is defined as the ratio of end-of-year capital expenditure 
to beginning-of-the-year assets (CAPX/AT). I measure performance by the ratio 
of operating profit to assets (ROA). These two variables are constructed at both 
the segment and firm level.28 I also control for industry growth opportunities, 
which is defined as the median of the market-to-book assets ratio for single-
segment firms within the same industry (Qindustry). Industry is defined by the 
narrowest 4-digit SIC, 3-digit SIC, or 2-digit SIC code for which there are at least 
five single-segment firms. To mitigate the influence of outliers, the variables 
CAPX/AT, ROA (both variables at the segment- and firm-level) and Qindustry are 
winsorized at 1% in each tail. The final sample consists of 6,908 segment-year 
observations and 2,541 firm-year observations. On average, firm total assets 
represents 7.3 billion dollars and segment assets 2.7 billion dollars. Firms with 
                                                 
28 The firm-level variables are defined as the sum of the segment-level variables (e.g., firm capital 
expenditure is equal to the sum of segment capital expenditure) except for the tests of changes in 
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more business segments tend be larger; the correlation between the number of 
segments and firm total assets is 28.6%. Summary statistics of the main variables 
are presented in Table 1.1. Most conglomerate firms have two business segments 
and the average Tobin’s Q of the industry is 1.5. Summary statistics are similar to 
ones in recent studies (see, e.g., Xuan, 2009; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). 
Table 1.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics. The sample consists of multi-segment firms with 
market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars for fiscal year 2001-2006. ROASeg 
equals segment operating profit divided by segment assets at fiscal year end. ROAFirm 
represents the sum of operating profit across firm segments divided by firm assets at 
fiscal year end. CAPXFirm/ATFirm represents the sum of capital expenditure across firm 
segments divided by firm assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. QInd-Seg is the median 
of the market-to-book assets ratio for single-segment firms within the same industry as 
the segment. Industry is defined by the narrowest 4-digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit SIC code for 
which there are at least five single-segment firms. QInd-Firm is the assets-weighted average 
QInd-Seg of the firm. The variables CAPX/AT, ROA, and QInd (both at the segment and firm 
level) are winsorized at 1% in each tail. 
 
Stats Mean Median SD Min Max N 
       
Segment level: 
      CAPX
Seg
(t) / AT
Seg
(t-1) 6.51% 3.77% 9.07% 0.17% 63.72% 6,908 
ROA
Seg
(t-1) 8.53% 8.63% 14.70% -80.29% 44.15% 6,908 
Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) 1.51 1.35 0.51 0.85 5.39 6,908 
       
Firm level: 
      CAPX
Firm
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 6.24% 4.28% 7.03% 0.27% 58.56% 2,541 
ROA
Firm
(t-1) 9.10% 9.09% 8.19% -69.02% 35.81% 2,541 
Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1) 1.51 1.39 0.44 0.88 3.54 2,541 
# Business Segments 2.71 2 0.99 2 7 2,541 
        
  
                                                                                                                                            
future performance (Table 1.8, Panel A), for which I use the consolidated data in order to control 
for changes in auditing costs. 
 25 
Finally, I also use restatement data and collect this information from Andy 
Leone’s webpage. It contains information about which firms restated their 
financial statements (from the GAO database), and I collect this information for 
the period 1997-2003.  
1.5 The Impact of SOX on Internal Capital Allocation Decisions 
In this Section, I explore to which extent conglomerate firms rely on segment past 
performance in their allocation decision and how capital allocation decisions 
change after SOX as well as conglomerate’s productivity and market value 
relative to stand-alone firms. Note that first I use the implementation of Section 
404 to identify the pre- and post-SOX period; however, other provisions of SOX 
implemented prior to Section 404 impact firm’s internal controls and thus 
potentially the allocation decision. I will consider alternative implementation 
dates in Section 1.6. 
1.5.1 Univariate Analysis 
According to Hypothesis 1.1, I expect the capital allocation process to be less rigid 
after SOX. This translates into a lower initial spending limit and more 
responsiveness of the allocation decision to information as reported by business 
segments (Harris and Raviv, 1996). Therefore, I expect more dispersion in 
investment across segments within the firm as well as greater correlation 
between investment and past performance. 
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In Panel A of Table 1.2, I report median statistics of variables measuring 
dispersion of investment across segments within the firm before and after SOX.29 
I observe an increase in the variance of investment across segments within the 
firm, in the range of investment and in the concentration of investment. For the 
variance and range statistics, I first use the ratio of segment investment to 
segment assets (σ2(CAPXSeg/ATSeg) and Range(CAPXSeg/ATSeg)). Second, in order to 
control for changes in the level of firm investment, I study the variance and range 
of investment across segments within the firm divided by firm investment 
(σ2(CAPXSeg)/CAPXFirm and Range(CAPXSeg)/CAPXFirm). Concentration of 
investment is measured by a Herfindahl-based index (i.e., sum of the squared-
ratios of segment-to-firm capital expenditure, HHI(CAPXSeg /CAPXFirm)). 
In Panel B, I study how the correlation of firm-adjusted investment and firm-
adjusted ROA changes after SOX. I analyze the variation across all multi-segment 
firms. Before SOX, this correlation is negative (-1.36%), whereas, it is positive 
after SOX (5.90%)—the change of correlation is significant.30 Therefore, after 
SOX, conglomerates tend to allocate more capital in their highest-performing 
segments, while before SOX they tend to subsidize their worst-performing 
segments. 
                                                 
29 I use median statistics to control for potential outliers. I obtain similar results if I study the 
mean statistics. 
30 I rely on the method of Cohen and Cohen (1983) to compute the test of the difference between 
two independent correlation coefficients. The method is based on Fisher z’ transformation and 
takes into account sample size. 
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These univariate results are consistent with the theory and Hypothesis 1.1. After 
SOX, there is less rigidity in the capital allocation process in the sense that there 
is greater dispersion of investment across segments and more reliance on past 
performance in the decision of allocating resources across the business segments. 
Table 1.2. Univariate Analysis - A Snapshot of Capital Budget Before and After SOX 
 
Table 1.2 provides median and correlation statistics before and after implementation of 
SOX 404 (i.e., fiscal year ends before or after November 15 2004). The sample consists of 
multi-segment firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars for fiscal 
year 2001-2006. The variables are defined at the firm level in Panel A, and at the 
segment level in Panel B. HHI is the sum of the squared ratios of segment capital 
expenditure to firm capital expenditure. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets at 
fiscal year end. In Panel B, z-stat is computed according to Cohen and Cohen (1983). 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Panel A: Variation of Investment across Divisions 
Median Statistics 
Variables (at the firm level) Pre-SOX 404 Post-SOX 404 Difference 
Wilcoxon 
z-stat 
     
  σ
2
(CAPX
Seg 
/AT
Seg
) 0.06% 0.08% 0.02%*** 2.950 
  σ
2
(CAPX
Seg
) / CAPX
Firm
 10.24 13.94 3.70*** 3.393 
     
  Range(CAPX
Seg 
/AT
Seg
) 3.23% 3.80% 0.57%*** 3.064 
  Range(CAPX
Seg
) / CAPX
Firm
 57.61% 61.64% 4.03%* 1.710 
     
  HHI(CAPX
Seg 
/CAPX
Firm
) 58.20% 62.90% 4.70%** 2.440 
     
Panel B: Correlation of Firm-adjusted Investment and Performance 
Correlation [CAPX
Seg 
(t)/AT
Seg
(t-1) – CAPX
Firm 
(t)/AT
Firm
(t-1) , ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 
 
Pre-SOX 404 Post-SOX 404 Difference z-stat 
     
All Multi-Segment Firms  -1.36% 5.90% 7.26%*** 3.018 
     
Firms with # Bus. Seg. = 2 6.26% 2.66% -3.60% 0.959 
Firms with  # Bus. Seg. ≥ 3  -4.81% 8.24% 13.05%*** 4.164 
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1.5.2 Responsiveness of Investment to Performance Before and After 
SOX 
1.5.2.1 Baseline Specification 
My main objective in this section is to investigate how firm reliance on past 
performance in the allocation decision changes after SOX. My baseline 
specification is the following panel regression, with segment and year fixed-
effects: 
     
     ,  
    1
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where  
     
     ,  
    1
     ,   
     
       
    1
         is a measure for segment capital allocation (the 
firm-adjusted investment ratio) of segment i in firm j at time t,  0
     ,  
 is the 
segment-specific intercept (i.e. segment fixed-effects) to capture unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity across segments in the level of investment, Post-SOX 
(Pre-SOX) is a dummy variable that takes the value one if fiscal year ends after 
(before) November 15, 2004,      1
     ,  
 is the ratio of segment operating profit 
to segment assets of segment i in firm j at time t-1,      1
    ( )
 is the ratio of firm 
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operating profit to firm assets of firm j at time t-1, and    captures year fixed-
effects.31, 32 
 1  and  2  represent the responsiveness of investment to performance, before 
and after SOX respectively. A positive coefficient means that firms tend to allocate 
more capital in their best-performing business segments while a negative 
coefficient indicates that firms tend to subsidize their worst-performing 
segments. The magnitude of the coefficient is of great matter in this study since it 
represents to which extent top-executives rely on past performance (i.e. internal 
financial reports) in their capital allocation decision as well as to which extent 
there is relative performance evaluation across the segments. Hypothesis 1.1 
predicts that the responsiveness of investment to performance should increase 
after SOX, thus I investigate whether  2  is greater than  1  via a test of 
inequality of coefficients. 
Note that this study departs from previous empirical studies: previous studies 
focus on the relation between the allocation decision and the Q of the industry, a 
measure of industry growth opportunities, while I focus on how the performance 
as reported by business segments is related to the capital allocation decision and 
will control for the Q of the industry. My focus on explaining allocation decision 
by past performance (and not Q of the industry) is motivated by several 
                                                 
31 Since I include year fixed-effects, I do not add the dummy Post-SOX in the regression. Results 
are almost identical if I include the dummy Post-SOX. 
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arguments. First, it captures better the actual business practices. In a recent 
survey of more than 1,000 US CEOs, Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2010) document 
that 78.6% of their respondents use the NPV rank in their capital allocation 
decision. This ranking measure is consistent with the fact that there is relative 
performance evaluation across projects and divisions. They also find that a large 
proportion of respondents use previous return (51.2%) and manager reputation 
(71.3%) in their allocation decision. To the extent that reputation is built based 
on past performance, these results indicate that past performance is an 
important factor in the capital allocation decision of US managers. Thus Graham, 
Harvey, and Puri (2010) show that a large proportion of CEOs use past return 
and reputation, which to some extent is built on past performance, as well as 
relative performance across divisions in their capital allocation decisions. In 
addition, my empirical specification is also better suited to study the effects of 
SOX (i.e., it captures the change in the quality of internal financial reporting) as 
well as to test the theory (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1996).33 Finally, it circumvents 
the problem of measurement errors in Q that has been reported in past studies 
(see, e.g., Whited, 2001).34 
                                                                                                                                            
32 I use standard errors clustered at the segment level since my sample represents a large panel 
of segments with a short time series and since the results from my regressions suggest that 
unobserved segment fixed-effects are important. See Petersen (2009) for an analysis of this issue. 
33 In addition, as exposed in Wulf (2002), which also focuses on the relation between past 
profitability and segment investment, industry Q does not capture segment-specific investment 
opportunities and since profits tend to be persistent, current profits are in general a reasonable 
indicator of future profits. 
34 Nevertheless, my conclusions about the efficiency of allocation decisions would not be affected 
if I based my analysis on the sensitivity of investment to industry Q (instead of responsiveness of 
investment to past performance). 
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In Panel A of Table 1.3, I report the estimates of the panel regression. Across all 
conglomerate firms, I find that the sensitivity of investment to performance 
increases after SOX—the sensitivity is 3.0% before SOX, while it is 8.5% after 
SOX. Before SOX there is no significant sensitivity, which means that, on average, 
firms do not invest more in their best-performing segments. On the other hand, 
after SOX, the responsiveness of investment to performance is significant at a 1% 
confidence level. The difference of responsiveness before and after SOX is 
significant at a 5% confidence level, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1.1. 
These results confirm those from the univariate analysis: after SOX, firms rely 
more on past performance in their internal capital allocation decisions. In column 
(2) of Panel A of Table 1.3, I control for industry investment opportunities and 
find consistent results. I measure industry investment opportunities by the 
difference of the segment’s industry Q and segment-asset-weighted average 
industry Q at the firm level (i.e.,    1
         ,      1
            ). The increase of 
responsiveness of investment to performance is even greater once including Q of 
the industry in the regression. 
In addition, I find that the sensitivity of investment to industry Q increases after 
SOX. After SOX, firms tend to invest more in segments operating in industries 
with greater investment opportunities. Using similar logic than previous papers, 
this would indicate that internal allocations are more efficient after SOX. 
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Table 1.3. Responsiveness of Investment to Performance Before and After SOX 
 
Table 1.3 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions for a sample of multi-segment 
firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars. The sample period is 
fiscal year 2001-2006 Post-SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
fiscal-year ends after November 15, 2004. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets 
at fiscal year end. QInd-Seg is the median of the market-to-book assets ratio for single-
segment firms within the same industry as the segment. Industry is defined by the 
narrowest 4-digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit SIC code for which there are at least five single-
segment firms. QInd-Firm is the assets-weighted average QInd-Seg of the firm. ROAOther-Seg is the 
average ROA of the other segments of the firm. QInd-Other-Seg is the average QInd of the other 
segments of the firm. Robust standard errors clustered at the segment level are reported 
in parentheses. P-values of the tests of inequality of the coefficients are reported in 
braces. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) 
level. 
 
Panel A: Baseline Specification 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg
(t) / AT
Seg
(t-1)  –  CAPX
Firm 
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 
 
[2001-2006] 
Period 
 
(1) (2) 
   
Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.030 0.027 
 
(0.030) (0.030) 
Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.003 
  
(0.005) 
Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.012** 
  
(0.005) 
   
Year F.E.  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  
# Obs.  6,908 6,908 
Within R
2
  0.011 0.012 
R
2
 0.657 0.658 
   
Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
     δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] 0.055** 0.058** 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.019} {0.014} 
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Table 1.3. Continued 
Panel B: Alternative Specification 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg 
(t) / AT
Seg
(t-1) - CAPX
Firm
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 
 
(1) (2) 
   
Pre-SOX * ROA
Seg
(t-1) 0.019 0.017 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
Post-SOX * ROA
Seg
(t-1) 0.052** 0.054** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Pre-SOX * ROA
Other-Seg
(t-1) -0.009 -0.011 
 
(0.011) (0.012) 
Post-SOX * ROA
Other-Seg
(t-1) -0.046*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Pre-SOX * Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) 
 
0.002 
  
(0.003) 
Post-SOX * Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) 
 
0.003 
  
(0.004) 
Pre-SOX * Q
Ind-Other-Seg
(t-1) 
 
0.002 
  
(0.003) 
Post-SOX * Q
Ind-Other-Seg
(t-1) 
 
-0.005 
  
(0.004) 
   Year F.E.  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  
# Obs.  6,908 6,908 
Within R
2
  0.008 0.010 
R
2
 0.608 0.608 
   Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
     δ = Post – Pre-SOX * ROA
Seg
 0.033* 0.037** 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.062} {0.045} 
   δ = Post – Pre-SOX * ROA
Other-Seg
 -0.037*** -0.033** 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.004} {0.010} 
   
 
1.5.2.2 Alternative Specification 
I change my baseline specification by not adjusting for firm performance and by 
including past performance of other segments in the firm (results are reported in 
Panel B). In other words, I study the following panel regression: 
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where      1
           ,  
 is the average ratio of segment operating profit to 
segment assets; the average is computed for segments other than segment i of 
firm j. 
The conclusions from this analysis are consistent with the previous findings. I 
find that the sensitivity of segment investment to segment performance increases 
significantly after SOX. The sensitivity is 1.7% before SOX, while it is 5.4% after 
SOX. At the same time, the sensitivity of segment investment to performance of 
other segments in the firm decreases significantly (becomes more negative) after 
SOX: from -1.1% to -4.3%. In other words, firms rely more on segment past 
performance in their capital allocation decision. In addition, after SOX there is 
more relative performance evaluation across segments, and thus on average 
firms do not subsidize their worst-performing segments after SOX. 
1.5.3 Change in Responsiveness for Firms that Are More Prone Versus 
Less Prone to Asymmetric Information Problems Across 
Hierarchies 
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Although SOX affects all publicly traded conglomerates, it does not affect all 
conglomerates the same way. Conglomerates that are more prone to asymmetric 
information problems will react more to the implementation of SOX. Due to 
limitations in acquiring specific knowledge (Jensen and Meckling, 1992), the 
within-firm information problem should be stronger for firms with more 
divisions. These firms tend be more complex and, furthermore, require more 
information gathering than firms with fewer divisions. It is more costly for firms 
with more divisions to audit and verify numbers from divisions and to monitor 
them (Stein, 1997). I, therefore, expect firms with more divisions to be more 
affected by SOX. The median number of segments is 2, so I compare firms that 
have two segments with firms that have three or more segments.35 
I first investigate how the univariate results vary across the two groups of firms. 
In Table 1.2, I study how the changes in correlations between investment and 
ROA vary across multi-segment firms. I observe that there is no significant 
change for firms with two segments (the correlation decreases, 6.26% before 
SOX, and 2.66% after SOX). At the same time the correlation significantly 
increases for firms with three segments or more (the correlation is negative 
before SOX, -4.81%, and positive after SOX, 8.24%). 
  
                                                 
35 Changes tend to be even more pronounced for firms with a higher number of segments (four 
segments or more). However, the level of significance is lower due to the decrease in sample size. 
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Table 1.4. Responsiveness of Investment to Performance by Number of Segments 
 
Table 1.4 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions for a sample of multi-segment 
firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars for 2001-2006. Post-SOX 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal year ends after November 15, 
2004. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets at fiscal year end. QInd-Seg is the 
median of the market-to-book assets ratio for single-segment firms within the same 
industry as the segment. Industry is defined by the narrowest 4-digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit 
SIC code for which there are at least five single-segment firms.   QInd-Firm is the assets-
weighted average QInd-Seg of the firm. P-values of the tests of inequality of the coefficients 
are reported in braces. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 
or 10% (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg 
(t) / AT
Seg
(t-1)  –  CAPX
Firm 
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 
 
Firms with 
# Bus. Seg. = 2 
Firms with 
# Bus. Seg. ≥ 3 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.062 0.061 0.031 0.028 
 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.040) (0.039) 
Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.078* 0.079* 0.123*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.036) (0.036) 
Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.012 
 
0.013** 
  
(0.011) 
 
(0.006) 
     Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  2,834 2,834 4,074 4,074 
Within R
2
  0.013 0.014 0.021 0.023 
R
2
 0.613 0.614 0.668 0.669 
     Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
         δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] 0.016 0.018 0.092*** 0.094*** 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.313} {0.293} {0.010} {0.007} 
     Δ = δ
# Bus. Seg ≥ 3
 - δ
# Bus. Seg = 2
 
  
0.076* 0.076* 
H0: Δ = 0, HA: Δ > 0 {p-value} 
  
{0.072} {0.065} 
     
 
Second, using the baseline specification, I compare the change of responsiveness 
of investment to performance between the two groups. The results are reported 
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in Table 1.4. The sensitivity increases slightly after SOX for firms with two 
segments (6.1% before SOX, and 7.9% after SOX), while it increases significantly 
for firms with three segments or more (2.8% before, 12.2% after). In addition, 
the increase for firms with three segments or more is significantly larger than for 
firms with two segments (see second test of inequality of coefficients at the 
bottom of Table 1.4). 
These results show that changes in internal allocation decisions are more 
pronounced for that firms that are most prone to information asymmetry 
problems across corporate hierarchies. 
1.5.4 Responsiveness of Investment to Performance for Firms that 
Restated Their Financial Reports 
Restatement of financial reports is a signal of weaker internal controls and less 
reliable internal financial reports. I investigate the change of responsiveness for 
firms that restated their financial statements in the years 1997-2003. I expect 
that these firms do not rely on past performance in their allocation decision in 
the pre-SOX period and to some extent would be more affected by SOX. The 
results are reported in Table 1.5. 
I find that there is a large increase in the sensitivity of capital allocation to 
reported performance for restating firms. Before SOX, the sensitivity is negative 
(-5.6%), while the sensitivity is positive and significant after SOX (10.1%). In 
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addition, even though the sample size is small, the increase in sensitivity is 
significant at a 5% confidence level. 
Table 1.5. Responsiveness of Investment to Performance for Restating Firms 
 
Table 1.5 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions for a sample of multi-segment 
firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars for 2001-2006. 
Restatement represents a sample of firms that restated their financial statements during 
the period 1997-2003. Post-SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
fiscal year ends after November 15, 2004. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets 
at fiscal year end. The pair-matching is based on number of segments in the firm 
(required), whether the ratio of segment-to-firm assets is greater or smaller than one 
divided by number of segments (required), Qindustry (closest – 1st criteria), and segment 
assets (closest – 2nd criteria). Robust standard errors clustered at the segment level are 
reported in parentheses. P-values of the tests of inequality of the coefficients are 
reported in braces. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 
10% (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg 
(t) / AT
Seg 
(t-1)  –  CAPX
Firm 
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 
 
Restatement 
Sample Selection Check: 
Matched-Pair Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] -0.039 -0.056 0.038 0.037 
 
(0.096) (0.096) (0.054) (0.054) 
Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.105* 0.101* 0.105** 0.105** 
 
(0.060) (0.061) (0.053) (0.052) 
Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.017 
  
(0.011) 
 
(0.013) 
Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.028* 
 
-0.004 
  
(0.015) 
 
(0.011) 
     Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  878 878 878 878 
Within R
2
  0.039 0.048 0.040 0.043 
R
2
 0.629 0.632 0.670 0.671 
     
Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
         
δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] 0.144** 0.157** 0.067* 0.068* 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.042} {0.028} {0.090} {0.082} 
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I investigate whether the level of responsiveness before and after SOX can be 
associated to firms’ and segments’ characteristics by performing matched-pair 
sample analysis (see results in columns (3) and (4)). The pair-matching is based 
on number of segments in the firm (required), whether the ratio of segment-to-
firm assets is greater than or smaller than one divided by the number of 
segments (required), Qindustry (closest – 1st criteria), and segment assets (closest – 
2nd criteria). I find that the results of pair-matched sample are very similar to the 
results of the full sample, which suggest that the results are not driven by firms’ 
and segments’ characteristics. 
It is interesting to note that while the levels of responsiveness are quasi-identical 
after SOX across both groups, the sensitivity is considerably smaller and even 
negative for restating firms before SOX. These results suggest that information 
problems were more important in restating firms and, as a result, firms rely even 
less on past performance in the pre-SOX period. The implementation of SOX 
levels the playing field among firms by improving reliability of information even 
more for restating firms. As a consequence, the increase in sensitivity is larger for 
restating firms. 
1.5.5 Responsiveness of Investment to Performance for Firms with 
Weak Internal Controls 
Since the implementation of Section 404, I can observe the report regarding the 
effectiveness of internal controls written by the firm’s auditor. I collect this 
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information and identify firms the reports for which indicate material weakness 
in internal controls in the post-SOX period (2004-2006) and I investigate the 
responsiveness before and after SOX.36 Auditor opinion is useful information 
since it provides a direct measure of the quality of internal controls and, thus, 
allows me to further investigate the importance of internal controls in the capital 
allocation decision. Results are reported in Table 1.6. 
I find that the responsiveness is negative and non-significant both before and 
after the implementation of SOX for firms with material weakness in the post-SOX 
period (-4.9% before SOX and -2.7% after SOX). Since internal controls are weak 
in the post-SOX period, I expect these firms to not rely on past performance in the 
capital allocation after SOX. Moreover, it is likely that these firms also have weak 
internal controls before SOX and, thus, they would also not rely on past 
performance in the pre-SOX period. Furthermore, the increase in sensitivity after 
SOX (less negative) is small and not significant (+2.2%). Since internal controls 
are (still) weak after the implementation of SOX, SOX did not resolve the internal 
control problems. Thus, these firms potentially are less affected by SOX. 
The results are not driven by firms’ and segments’ characteristics: I find that the 
results of the pair-matched sample are very similar to results of the full sample, 
although significance drops due to a small sample size. 
  
                                                 
36 I obtain this information from the Compustat database (data item auopic). 
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Table 1.6. Responsiveness of Investment to Performance for Firms with Weak 
Internal Controls 
 
Table 1.6 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions for a sample of multi-segment 
firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars for 2001-2006. Material 
Weakness in Internal Controls (Post-SOX) represents a sample of firms for which auditor 
reports material weakness in the company's internal controls during the post-SOX 
period (2004-2006). Post-SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal 
year ends after November 15, 2004. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets at 
fiscal year end. The pair-matching is based on number of segments in the firm (required), 
whether the ratio of segment-to-firm assets is greater or smaller than one divided by 
number of segments (required), Qindustry (closest – 1st criteria) and segment assets (closest 
– 2nd criteria). Robust standard errors clustered at the segment level are reported in 
parentheses. P-values of the tests of inequality of the coefficients are reported in braces. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg 
(t) / AT
Seg 
(t-1)  –  CAPX
Firm 
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 
 
Material Weakness in Internal 
Controls (Post-SOX) 
Sample Selection Check: 
Matched-Pair Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] -0.052 -0.049 0.042 0.031 
 
(0.075) (0.074) (0.053) (0.055) 
Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] -0.023 -0.027 0.087* 0.081* 
 
(0.049) (0.050) (0.047) (0.049) 
Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.005 
 
0.010 
  
(0.024) 
 
(0.012) 
Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
-0.009 
 
0.025** 
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.010) 
     Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  776 776 776 776 
Within R
2
  0.013 0.014 0.021 0.028 
R
2
 0.562 0.562 0.678 0.680 
     
Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
         
δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] 0.029 0.022 0.045 0.050* 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.284} {0.323} {0.118} {0.098} 
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1.5.6. Earnings Management and Responsiveness of Investment to 
Performance 
In this subsection, I investigate the responsiveness of investment to past 
performance when firms are more or less likely to manage the earnings. Research 
in accounting has developed measures of discretionary accruals to assess the 
potential for earnings management within the firm. Discretionary accruals are 
defined as the difference between total accruals and predicted total accruals. 
Total accruals represent earnings minus cash flows. Following Hribar and Collins 
(2002), I define total accruals as the difference between income before 
extraordinary items and cash flows from continuing operations divided by 
beginning-of-year total assets.37, 38 I employ a version of the Modified Jones 
Model (see Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) to compute the 
predicted accruals. Precisely, I run the following regression over the 1999-2003 
period for Compustat firms: 
 otal  ccrualst   0   1  
1
 ssetst- 
  2  
       
 ssetst- 
  3  
    
 ssetst- 
                (3) 
where PPE represents the gross property plant and equipment of the firm. 
I then use the estimated coefficients to compute the predicted accruals: 
 
                                                 
37 Hribar and Collins (2002) show that this approach is more precise than the balance-sheet 
method. 
38 Following the literature I censor observations for which total accruals exceed +100% or -
100%. 
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           otal  ccrualst   0   1  
1
 ssetst  
  2  
                     
 ssetst  
  
 3  
    
 ssetst- 
                          (4) 
Discretionary accruals are the difference between total accruals and predicted 
accruals. I then compute the average of the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals over the 1999-2003 period. I classify firms with discretionary accruals 
above (below) the median as High (Low) Discretionary Accruals firms and study 
their responsiveness before and after SOX. Results are reported in Table 1.7. 
SOX has improved earnings quality (see Iliev, 2010), thus, I expect firms that are 
more likely to manage their earnings to be more affected. Indeed, I find that firms 
with high discretionary accruals before SOX tend to rely less on past 
performance, while this difference of sensitivity is smaller in the post-SOX period. 
However, contrary to the results related to number of business segments, I find 
that the difference in the change of sensitivity is not significant. Although 
discretionary accruals can capture manipulation of firms’ reported earnings at 
the segment level (i.e., earnings management from the bottom-up), it can also 
capture manipulation at the headquarter level (i.e. earnings management from 
the top-down—e.g., the CEO pushing the earnings in order to not miss the 
earnings target). Both types of earnings management will affect earnings 
informativeness but would capture different aspects of information problems 
within the organization. Therefore, to the extent that the results related to the 
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complexity of the organization (i.e., number of segments) are more conclusive 
than the ones related to earnings management indicate that information frictions 
from the bottom-up along the corporate hierarchy are at the root of the problem 
of inefficiencies in the capital allocation decision. 
Table 1.7. Earnings Management and the Responsiveness of Invest. to Performance 
 
Table 1.7 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions. Low (High) Discretionary 
Accruals are firms with pre-SOX average discretionary accruals below (above) the 
median. The average value is calculated over the fiscal years 1999-2003. Discretionary 
accruals are the difference between total accruals and accruals predicted by the Modified 
Jones Model. Post-SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal year 
ends after November 15, 2004. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets at fiscal 
year end. Robust standard errors clustered at the segment level are reported in 
parentheses. P-values of the tests of inequality of the coefficients are reported in braces. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg 
(t) / AT
Seg 
(t-1)  –  CAPX
Firm 
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 
 
Low Dis. Accruals High Dis. Accruals 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.053 0.050 0.012 0.009 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.045) (0.045) 
Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.094** 0.094** 0.082** 0.083** 
 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.035) (0.035) 
Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.008) 
Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.013* 
 
0.011 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
     Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  3225 3225 3254 3254 
Within R
2
  0.013 0.015 0.014 0.015 
R
2
 0.642 0.643 0.568 0.568 
     
Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
         
δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] 0.041 0.044* 0.070** 0.074** 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.114} {0.098} {0.041} {0.033} 
     
Δ = δ
High Discretionary Accruals
 – δ
Low Discretionary Accruals
 
  
0.029 0.030 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} 
  
{0.293} {0.286} 
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1.5.7 Future Performance 
In order to test Hypothesis 1.2, I employ a difference-in-differences methodology 
and compare the change in operating performance after SOX for conglomerate 
and stand-alone firms. In panels A and B of Table 1.8, I report fixed-effect 
estimates of the regression of future ROA on a Post-SOX dummy variable. The 
coefficient for the Post-SOX dummy variable represents the average change in 
future operating performance after SOX. In Panel A, I show the performance at 
the firm level and in Panel B at the segment level.39 
In general, future profitability increases after SOX. The coefficients are positive 
for each sub-group but the coefficients are significantly greater for firms that are 
more affected by SOX. In addition, I observe a monotone increase of future 
performance by number of segments: (i) at the firm-level (Panel A), firms with 
one segment: +0.8%, two segments: +1.4%, and three segments and more: 
+1.8%) (ii) at the segment-level (Panel B), firms with one segment: +0.9%, two 
segments: +1.3%, and three segments and more: +2.5%. 
I repeat the analysis by executing a pair-matching analysis to limit potential 
sample selection bias (results shown in Panel C). The matching is based on the 3-
digit SIC code of the segment industry (required) and segment assets (closest). 
The results are consistent with the ones in Panel A and Panel B. I find that the 
                                                 
39 Since firms have discretion with regard to how to allocate auditing costs (can be included at 
the segment level or only at the firm level), it is important to study the change of performance 
both at the segment level and at the firm level to account for changes in auditing costs due to the 
implementation of Section 404. 
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increase in productivity is more pronounced for more affected firms and 
segments. In general, multi-segment firms exhibit higher productivity than 
single-segment firms, which is consistent with Schoar (2002), and this 
productivity advantage increases after SOX. 
Table 1.8. Future Performance 
 
Panel A and Panel B show results of OLS fixed-effects regressions for a sample of single 
and multi-segment firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars for 
2001-2006. Post-SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal year 
ends after November 15, 2004. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets at fiscal 
year end. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level (Panel A) and at the 
segment-level (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. Panel C shows results of the pair-
matching analysis. The matching is based on the 3-digit SIC code of the segment industry 
(required) and segment assets (closest). P-values of the tests of inequality of the 
coefficients are reported in braces. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% 
(***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Panel A 
Fixed-Effect Regression – Firm-level 
Dependent Variable:  ROA
Firm
(t+1) 
 
All Single- All Multi- Firms with 
# Bus. Segment 
 
Segment Segment 
 
Firms Firms = 2 ≥ 3 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) 
 
 
   
Post-SOX 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 0.056*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
 
   Firm F.E.  Y Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  7877 2186 1286 900 
Within R
2
  0.003 0.042 0.024 0.069 
R
2
 0.813 0.770 0.783 0.822 
 
 
   Tests of inequality of coefficients:  
    
 
   
δ
 
= Post-SOX
MoreAffected
 –  
PostSOX
LessAffected
  0.008** 
 
0.004 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value}  {0.042} 
 
{0.167} 
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Table 1.8. Continued 
Panel B 
Fixed-Effect Regression – Segment-level 
Dependent Variable:  ROA
Segment
(t+1) 
 
All 
Single- All Multi- Firms with 
Segments with 
AT
Seg 
/AT
Firm
 
 
Segment Segment # Bus. Seg. >1/# Bus.Seg. <1/#Bus.Seg. 
 
Firms Firms = 2 ≥ 3 (Larger Seg.) (Smaller Seg.) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
    
 
Post-SOX 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.013** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Constant 0.057*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.086*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
 
    
 
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  7877 5598 2520 3078 2600 2998 
Within R
2
  0.003 0.014 0.005 0.024 0.018 0.016 
R
2
 0.806 0.790 0.800 0.805 0.780 0.804 
 
 
    
 
Tests of ineq. of coeff.:  
    
 
 
 
    
 
δ
 
= Post-SOX
MoreAffected
 - 
   Post-SOX
LessAffected
  0.011** 
 
0.012* 
 
0.009 
H0: δ = 0,HA: δ > 0 
  {p-value}  {0.013} 
 
{0.066} 
 
{0.121} 
 
 
    
 
Panel C 
Pair-Matching Analysis 
  
 
 
  
δ
 
= ROA
Seg.-MoreAffected
(t+1) –  
ROA
Seg.-Matched
(t+1) 
  
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0  {p-value} 
More Affected Group: Matched Group Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
  
 
 
Multi-Segment Firms Single-Segment Firms 1.54%*** 2.36%*** 
  
{0.003} {0.000} 
  
 
 
Multi-Seg. Firms with #B.Seg. = 2 Single-Segment Firms 0.78% 1.10%* 
  
{0.119} {0.069} 
  
 
 
Multi-Seg. Firms with #B.Seg. ≥ 3 Multi-Seg. Firms with #B.Seg. = 2 -0.27% 2.19%*** 
  
{0.878} {0.004} 
  
 
 
Smaller Segments Larger Segments -0.55% 0.47% 
AT
Seg 
/AT
Firm
 < 1/#B.Seg. AT
Seg 
 / AT
Firm
 > 1/#B.Seg. {0.774} {0.209} 
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These results are consistent with the theory and Hypothesis 1.2. Since top 
executives have better information on segment performance after SOX, they will 
rely more on it, and thus their allocating decision will be more efficient (i.e., 
closer to the first-best solution [see Harris and Raviv, 1996]). It is also more 
difficult for divisional managers to create opaque internal accounting systems 
and to hide information after SOX. In other words, after SOX the marginal costs of 
lobbying increase and, thus, internal capital allocations are more efficient 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) 
I also investigate the change of profitability across segments within the firm. I 
expect that the effects of SOX will be more pronounced for divisions that are 
more prone to asymmetric information problems. To the extent that smaller 
segments in the firm are likely to be younger ones and that the CEO has less 
knowledge about them; I expect that information problems should be more 
severe for smaller segments. Moreover, due to limitation in acquiring specific 
knowledge, CEOs are likely to focus their attention on the core-business of the 
firm, that is, the larger divisions (Ozbas and Selvili, 2009). I define smaller 
(larger) segments as segments for which the ratio of segment-to-firm assets is 
below (above) one divided by the number of segments. I find that the profitability 
of smaller segments compared to larger segments within the conglomerate tends 
to increase more, although the difference is not significant (see Panel B: +1.6% 
for larger segments and +2.5% for smaller segments). In the pair-matching 
analysis (Panel C), I observe that larger segments tend to outperform smaller 
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segments before SOX, whereas, it is the opposite after SOX. However the 
differences are not significant in both periods. 
1.5.8 Change in the Conglomerate Discount 
I study the change in market value of conglomerate firms relative to stand-alone 
firms. To the extent that internal capital markets are more efficient after SOX, I 
expect that the market-value of conglomerate firms relative to stand-alone firms 
will increase after the announcement of the Act. I follow Berger and Ofek (1995) 
to compute the excess value of conglomerate value relative to stand-alone firms. 
The excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
market-value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its 
segments’ imputed values, which are the product of the segments’ total sales and 
the median market-to-sales ratio of single-segments firms in the same industry. 
Industry is defined by the narrowest 4-digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit SIC code for which 
there are at least five single-segment firms. The market-to-sales ratio represents 
the ratio of firm market value (market capitalization minus book common equity 
plus total assets) by total sales at the end of fiscal year. I restrict my sample to 
firms the fiscal year of which ends between September 1 and December 31 and 
whose market capitalization is greater than 75 million dollars. Consistent with 
previous findings, the excess value is negative and, thus, is commonly known as 
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the conglomerate discount.40 I plot this discount between 1999 and 2008 in 
Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1. Conglomerate Discount by Year 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the mean and median excess value of multi-segment firms from fiscal 
year end 1999 to 2008. Firm excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of a firm’s market value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of its 
segments’ imputed value, which are the product of the segments’ total sales and the 
median market-to-sales ratio of single-segments firms in the same industry (Berger and 
Ofek, 1995). Industry is defined by the narrowest 4-digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit SIC code for 
which there are at least five single-segment firms. The market-to-sales ratio represents 
the ratio of firm market value (market capitalization minus book common equity plus 
total assets) by total sales at the end of fiscal year. The sample includes single and multi-
segment firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars and with their 
fiscal year ending between September 1 and December 31. 
 
 
                                                 
40 The magnitude of the discount is larger than in previous studies because I drop small single-
segment firms. I find that the conglomerate discount is very sensitive to the inclusion of small 
firms since it is based on the median statistics to compute segment imputed value. If I include 
small single-segment firms, the range of the discount would be 10% to 20%, which is consistent 
with previous findings. 
-45.00% 
-40.00% 
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I observe that the conglomerate discount sharply decreases after the 
announcement of SOX in 2002. However, the discount increases significantly in 
2003 and then remains relatively stable afterwards. Over the sample period, the 
only significant variations over the year are from 2001 to 2002 and from 2002 to 
2003. Although the discount increases in 2003, its level during the period 2003-
2006 is significantly lower than in 1999-2001. The sharp decrease in the discount 
in 2002 could be driven by over-reaction and also be influenced by the burst of 
the tech bubble. Indeed many factors influence the conglomerate discount, and to 
analyze the value of diversification is beyond the scope of this paper. I therefore 
consider the fact that the discount decreases at SOX announcement and remains 
at a lower level in the following years to be additional evidence supporting 
Hypothesis 1.2: SOX has a positive impact on the efficiency of internal capital 
markets. 
1.6 Robustness Checks Analysis 
1.6.1 Alternative Investment and Performance Definitions 
In this subsection, I check the robustness of my results to a change in variable 
definitions. The results are reported in Table 1.9. I employ alternative investment 
and performance definitions. I use the ratio of segment-to-firm capital 
expenditure as the dependent variable, which basically represents the proportion 
of new invested capital in each segment. Consistent with the previous results, I 
observe that better-performing segments tend to receive a larger fraction of the 
new invested capital after SOX. In column (3) and (4), I also change the definition 
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of performance—I substitute ROA for the ratio of segment-to-firm operating 
profit. I find that after SOX, firms assign a larger fraction of their new invested 
capital to segments that represent a larger fraction of their operating profit, 
which is consistent with my previous results. 
Table 1.9. Robustness Checks: Alternative Investment and Performance Definitions 
 
Table 1.9 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions for a sample of multi-segment 
firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars for 2001-2006. Post-SOX 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal year ends after November 15, 
2004. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets at fiscal year end. Op. Profit is the 
operating profit of the segment (Seg) or total operating profit of the firm (Firm). ROA 
equals operating profit divided by assets at fiscal year end. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the segment level are reported in parentheses. P-values of the tests of 
inequality of the coefficients are reported in braces. Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg 
(t) / CAPX
Firm
(t) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.014 0.005 
  
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
  
Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.134*** 0.133*** 
  
 
(0.025) (0.026) 
  Pre-SOX * Op.Profit
Seg
(t-1) / Op.Profit
Firm
(t-1) 
  
0.023*** 0.022** 
   
(0.008) (0.008) 
Post-SOX * Op.Profit
Seg
(t-1) / Op.Profit
Firm
(t-1) 
  
0.045*** 0.045*** 
   
(0.010) (0.010) 
Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.005 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.034*** 
 
0.032*** 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  6,908 6,908 6,908 6,908 
Within R
2
  0.007 0.011 0.009 0.013 
R
2
 0.914 0.915 0.914 0.915 
     
Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
    δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] 0.120*** 0.128*** 
  δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [Op.Profit
Seg
 / Op.Profit
Firm
] 
  
0.022*** 0.023*** 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.000} {0.000} {0.007} {0.004} 
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1.6.2 Implementation Date Check, Business Cycle Check, and Placebo 
Test 
1.6.2.1 Implementation Date Check 
Since SOX contains multiple provisions that potentially could have influenced the 
allocation decision and there might have been some delay in the understanding of 
the new rules, there is some uncertainty with regard to the actual date SOX was 
implemented. In my baseline specification, I use the year 2004 (implementation 
of Section 404) to identify the post-SOX period. However, other provisions 
implemented in 2003, such as Section 302 and Section 906 would impact the 
allocation decision. In addition, SOX provisions were announced in 2002 and, 
thus, firms could have adjusted their investment policy before the 
implementation date. Conversely, it is possible that firms might have not fully 
understood the new rule at the implementation date and, thus, the adjustment in 
the allocation decision would occur later. To control for these issues, I drop the 
years 2003 and 2004 and investigate the change in responsiveness of investment 
to past performance. The results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 
1.10.  
Consistent with my previous results, before SOX there is no significant sensitivity 
of investment to performance while it is significant after SOX—the increase is 
significant. 
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Table 1.10. Implementation Date Check, Business Cycle Check, and Placebo Test 
 
Table 1.10 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions for a sample of multi-segment 
firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars. The sample period is 
fiscal year 2001-2002 and 2005-2006 (Implementation Date Check), fiscal year 1999-
2000 and 2005-2006 (Business Cycle Check), and fiscal year 1999-2002 (Placebo Test). 
Post-SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal year ends after 
November 15, 2004. Post-SOX (Placebo) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets at fiscal 
year end. QInd-Seg is the median of the market-to-book assets ratio for single-segment 
firms within the same industry as the segment. Industry is defined by the narrowest 4-
digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit SIC code for which there are at least five single-segment firms. 
QInd-Firm is the assets-weighted average QInd-Seg of the firm. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the segment-level are reported in parentheses. P-values of the tests of 
inequality of the coefficients are reported in braces. Asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPXSeg(t) / ATSeg(t-1)  –  CAPXFirm (t) / ATFirm(t-1) 
 
Implementation 
Date Check 
 
[2001-2002] & 
[2005-2006] 
Period 
Business-Cycle 
Check 
 
[1999-2000] & 
[2005-2006] 
Period 
Placebo Test 
 
[1999-2002] 
Period 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-SOX * [ROASeg(t-1) – ROAFirm(t-1)] 0.041 0.035 -0.020 -0.023 0.037 0.039 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.059) (0.060) (0.041) (0.041) 
Post-SOX * [ROASeg(t-1) – ROAFirm(t-1)] 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.101** 0.098**   
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.048)   
Post-SOX(Placebo)*[ROASeg(t-1)–ROAFirm(t-1)] 
    
0.058 0.059 
     
(0.049) (0.048) 
Pre-SOX * [QInd-Seg(t-1) – QInd-Firm(t-1)] 
 
0.001 
 
-0.001  0.007 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.004)  (0.005) 
Post-SOX * [QInd-Seg(t-1) – QInd-Firm(t-1)] 
 
0.017** 
 
0.018**   
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.009)   
Post-SOX(Placebo)*[QInd-Seg(t-1)–QInd-Firm(t-1)] 
    
 0.012 
     
 (0.008) 
Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  4,560 4,560 4,685 4,685 4,487 4,487 
Within R2  0.017 0.021 0.011 0.014 0.007 0.010 
R2 0.670 0.671 0.691 0.691 0.634 0.635 
Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
    
  
δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [ROASeg – ROAFirm] 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.121** 0.121**   
δ = Post(Placebo)–Pre-SOX*[ROASeg–ROAFirm] 
    
0.021 0.020 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.009} {0.006} {0.024} {0.026} {0.311} {0.323} 
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In addition, I find that the increase in sensitivity is larger and more significant 
than in the baseline specification, which to some extent justifies the concern 
about identifying the control and affected period. In addition, these results also 
suggest that the effects of SOX on the allocation decision would potentially be 
stronger than the ones reported in the baseline specification. 
1.6.2.2 Business Cycle Check and Placebo Test 
Recent findings show that economic activities and access to external capital 
influence the performance and behavior of conglomerate firms relative to stand-
alone firms (Dimitrov and Tice, 2006). It is therefore possible that my results are 
driven by changes in the economic activity in the United States during the period 
where SOX was implemented. I check whether the business cycle influences my 
results by using different control periods (i.e., period before SOX) and employ a 
pre-SOX period similar to the affected period (i.e., the period after SOX) in terms 
of business cycle. I impose a date for the new control period that is after the 
implementation of SFAS 131 in order to avoid any misclassification of segments 
due to the change of disclosure regulation. The new control period is 1999-2000, 
which represents a period similar in the business cycle as the affected period 
(2005-2006) according to the NBER US Business Cycle Expansions and 
Contractions Table. 41 Both periods are close to the end of an expansion cycle. 
The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table X. The results are 
                                                 
41 I do not include 1998, since past performance would be affected by the change of regulation. In 
order to have similar period length, the affected period will represent 2 years. Conclusions do not 
change if I employ a 3-year period. 
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consistent with the main findings. The responsiveness of investment to 
performance increases significantly after SOX. 
I also run a placebo test using only the two periods before SOX (1999-2000 and 
2001-2002). The results are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table III. I find no 
significant change in the responsiveness of investment to performance. These 
results indicate that the responsiveness of investment to performance does not 
vary because of changes in the business cycle. Therefore, I conclude that the 
change of responsiveness of investment to performance is not driven by changes 
in US economic activity around SOX. 
Capital constraints might prevent firms from adopting the optimal investment 
strategy. In addition to investigating that the changes in the allocating decision 
are not related to the business cycle, I look at the interaction of the change in 
responsiveness with cash reserves. In case of external financing constraints, 
segment profitability will be considered more as a vehicle of liquidity easing 
financing constraints than as a signal of performance. Firms can respond to new 
information more easily when they are less financially constrained (Chen, 
Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007). I find that cash reserves do not influence the change 
in internal capital allocation decision. The changes in responsiveness of 
investment to performance interacted with cash reserves are not significantly 
different from zero.42 
                                                 
42 These results are not reported but available upon request. 
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1.6.3 Agency Conflicts Between the Management and Shareholders (or 
Directors) 
1.6.3.1 Board Structure 
SOX and concomitant governance regulations in the New York Stock Exchange 
and NASDAQ have improved the external monitoring environment and the 
transparency of publicly traded firms and, thus, my results could be driven by the 
decrease of agency conflicts between the management and the investors (or the 
board of directors). As shown in the model by Scharfstein and Stein (2000), both 
layers of information problems or conflicts of interests (first layer: between top 
executives and investors (or the board of directors); second layer: between the 
division managers and top executives) could influence the allocating decision. In 
addition, previous findings suggest that when executive ownership and block 
ownership are larger, internal allocations tend to be more efficient (Scharfstein, 
1998; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; Sautner and Villalonga, 2010). It is therefore 
possible that my results are driven by changes in the agency conflicts between 
management and shareholders. To address this concern, I first study firms that 
were affected by the regulations concerning the independence of the board of 
directors. I obtain data about board characteristics from Corporate Library 
database. The results are reported in Table 1.11. 
I find that firms the board compositions of which do not satisfy the board 
independence requirements before SOX (Non-Compliant Firms) do not exhibit 
significant changes in their capital allocation decisions. Actually, the change of 
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responsiveness of investment to performance is negative (but not significant). In 
addition, these results are not driven by firms’ and segments’ characteristics 
since there is a significant increase in the sensitivity for a matched-pair sample 
(see results in columns (3) and (4)). 
Table 1.11. Respons. of Invest. to Perf. For Firms with Non-Inde. Board in 2001 
 
Table 1.11 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions for a sample of multi-segment 
firms with market capitalization greater than 75 million dollars for 2001-2006. Non-
Compliant Firms represents a sample of firms for which the board of director does not 
have a majority of independent directors in the 2001 annual meeting (proxy year). Post-
SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal year ends after 
November 15, 2004. ROA equals operating profit divided by assets at fiscal year end. The 
pair-matching is based on number of segments in the firm (required), whether the ratio 
of segment-to-firm assets is greater or smaller to one divided by number of segments 
(required), Qindustry (closest – 1st criteria) and segment assets (closest – 2nd criteria). Robust 
standard errors clustered at the segment level are reported in parentheses. P-values of 
the tests of inequality of the coefficients are reported in braces. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg 
(t) / AT
Seg 
(t-1)  –  CAPX
Firm 
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 
 
Non-Compliant Firms 
Sample Selection Check: 
Matched-Pair Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.373** 0.358** 0.072 0.064 
 
(0.149) (0.155) (0.071) (0.069) 
Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.304*** 0.274*** 0.152* 0.153** 
 
(0.027) (0.040) (0.077) (0.076) 
Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.009 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.021) 
Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.027 
  
(0.042) 
 
(0.021) 
Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Segment F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  
# Obs.  220 220 220 220 
Within R
2
  0.349 0.374 0.062 0.074 
R
2
 0.793 0.801 0.608 0.613 
Tests of inequality of coefficients: 
    δ = Post – Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] -0.069 -0.084 0.080** 0.089** 
H0: δ = 0, HA: δ > 0 {p-value} {0.796} {0.777} {0.017} {0.011} 
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1.6.3.2 Ownership Structure 
I check whether the ownership structure affects my results by studying the 
effects of management and block ownership on the responsiveness of investment 
to performance. Management (Block) Ownership is the fraction of outstanding 
shares held by top executives and directors (by 5% or greater shareholders). I 
collect the data from Corporate Library database. The results are reported in 
Table 1.12. 
There is no significant influence of executive ownership or block ownership on 
the change of responsiveness of investment to performance. The changes in 
responsiveness of investment to performance interacted with executive 
ownership as well as with block ownership are not significantly different from 
zero. Thus, although there might be some difference in responsiveness across 
firms depending on their ownership structure, the change before and after SOX 
within the firm is not related to the ownership structure.  
These results suggest that my results are not driven by changes in the external 
monitoring environment. 
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Table 1.12. Respons. of Invest. to Perf. by Mngmt Ownership and Block Ownership 
 
Table 1.12 shows results of OLS fixed-effects regressions. Management (Block) 
Ownership is the fraction of outstanding shares held by top executives and directors (5% 
or greater shareholders). Both Mngmt Ownership and Block Ownership are winsorized 
at 1% in each tail. Robust standard errors clustered at the segment level are reported in 
parentheses. P-values of the tests of equality of the coefficients are reported in braces. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAPX
Seg
(t) / AT
Seg
(t-1)  –  CAPX
Firm 
(t) / AT
Firm
(t-1) 
 
Management Ownership 
and Responsiveness 
Block Ownership 
and Responsiveness 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.055 0.053 0.052 0.078 0.076 0.078 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.105** 0.102** 0.102** 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 
 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Management Ownership 0.009 0.007 0.005 
   
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   MgtO.*Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 0.009 0.004 0.018 
   
 
(0.110) (0.108) (0.105) 
   MgtO.*Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] -0.092 -0.078 -0.054 
   
 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.089) 
   Block Ownership 
   
-0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
    
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
BlockO.*Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 
   
-0.078 -0.084 -0.089 
    
(0.142) (0.134) (0.137) 
BlockO.*Post-SOX * [ROA
Seg
(t-1) – ROA
Firm
(t-1)] 
   
-0.186 -0.179 -0.183 
    
(0.123) (0.119) (0.119) 
Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.002 0.002 
 
0.001 0.005 
  
(0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.007) (0.009) 
Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
 
0.011* 0.003 
 
0.012* 0.019** 
  
(0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.006) (0.009) 
MgtO.*Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
  
-0.015 
   
   
(0.030) 
   MgtO.*Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
  
0.066* 
   
   
(0.036) 
   BlockO.*Pre-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
     
-0.025 
      
(0.028) 
BlockO.*Post-SOX * [Q
Ind-Seg
(t-1) – Q
Ind-Firm
(t-1)] 
     
-0.039 
      
(0.032) 
Year F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Segment F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,681 3,681 3,681 3,763 3,763 3,763 
Within R
2
 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.018 0.018 
R
2
 0.647 0.648 0.649 0.639 0.639 0.640 
Tests of equality of coefficients: 
      δ = MgtO.*Post – Pre-SOX * [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] -0.101 -0.082 -0.072 
   δ = BlockO.*Post – Pre-SOX* [ROA
Seg
 – ROA
Firm
] 
   
-0.108 -0.095 -0.094 
      H0: δ = 0, HA: δ = 0 {p-value} {0.483} {0.561} {0.576} {0.503} {0.528} {0.530} 
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1.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate the effects of information problems across corporate 
hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions by using the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment of a shock to the level of information 
frictions across corporate hierarchies. SOX requires firms to enhance their 
internal control systems in order to improve the reliability of financial reporting 
across corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX the capital allocation decision is 
more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The 
changes in sensitivity of investment to performance are more pronounced for 
conglomerates that are more prone to information problems across corporate 
hierarchies. Moreover, in the post-SOX era, firms do not rely on past performance 
in their capital allocation decision when auditors report material weaknesses in 
their internal controls. The productivity advantage of conglomerates over stand-
alone firms increases after SOX. In addition, conglomerates and segments that are 
more affected by SOX exhibit a larger increase in future profitability after SOX. 
Furthermore, the excess value of conglomerate firms relative to stand-alone 
firms increases (i.e., the conglomerate discount decreases). These changes in the 
internal capital allocation process are not associated with economic activities, 
financial constraints, or tensions between the management and shareholders. 
My findings support the idea that after an increase in the reliability of internal 
financial reporting, top executives rely more on information reported by the 
division managers. By improving the within-firm information system, stronger 
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internal controls lead firms to adopt more efficient capital allocations and, thus, 
firm productivity increases after SOX. The results of this paper suggest that 
inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information 
frictions across corporate hierarchies. It thus confirms predictions from a wide 
range of models that use within-firm frictions to explain inefficiencies in internal 
capital markets (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1996; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).  
In addition, this study clarifies the impact of SOX—revealing the consequences of 
SOX for conglomerate firms from a new perspective and providing additional 
explanations for why large firms benefit more from SOX than do small firms (see, 
e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007). Larger firms are more likely to have 
multiple divisions and, thus, are more prone to information problems within the 
organization. By mitigating information problems, the implementation of SOX 
leads firms to make better investment decisions and thus increases their 
productivity. These findings also shed light on the importance of internal control 
systems in the efficiency of corporate decisions (Jensen, 1993). 
Internal governance laws also influence incentives for firms to diversify their 
activities in the first place. By improving corporate transparency and outside 
investor protection, for instance, stronger corporate governance would decrease 
the benefits of diversification. Therefore, I believe it is important to further 
explore the effects of corporate governance laws on the value of corporate 
diversification, and I leave it for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PAY FOR THE RIGHT PERFORMANCE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
CEO compensation in U.S. public firms has attracted a great deal of empirical 
work. Yet our understanding of the contractual terms that govern CEO 
compensation and especially how the compensation committee ties CEO 
compensation to performance is still incomplete. The main reason is that CEO 
compensation contracts are, in general, not observable. For the most part, firms 
disclose only the realized amounts that their CEOs receive at the end of any given 
year. The terms by which the board determines these amounts are not fully 
disclosed.43 
The fact that the contractual terms are not fully observable has led researchers to 
doubt that such contracts optimally tie CEO compensation to performance. For 
example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that companies have decoupled 
compensation from performance and camouflaged both the amount and 
performance-insensitivity of pay. Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) show both 
theoretically and empirically that, with lack of transparency of compensation 
                                                 
43 Regulation S-K of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 items 402(b) and 402(c) requires the 
disclosure of some of the contractual terms regarding equity awards. However, no specific 
disclosure is required for the performance-based cash component of the executive contract. Even 
for equity-based awards, past research finds that many times firms were vague in their reporting 
(e.g., Bettis et al. 2010). 
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contracts, powerful managers have the ability to rig their performance-pay for 
their own benefit.44 
In December 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued new 
disclosure requirements on CEO compensation.45 These requirements came as a 
response to investor concerns that in recent years CEO compensation packages 
have not been properly disclosed or well understood.46 According to these new 
requirements, firms now must provide additional information about the 
contractual terms of their compensation to the CEO. In particular, firms need to 
disclose the types of performance measures that they use to determine CEO 
rewards, the performance targets, and the performance horizon. We show that 
these requirements are binding: we document a significant change in the level of 
disclosure of CEO contractual terms after the rule.  
We use this newly available data to examine how firms tie CEO compensation to 
performance and the extent to which such practices support the predictions of 
optimal contracting theories. We focus on three aspects of the pay-performance 
terms: first, we examine firms’ choice to pre-specify performance goals in their 
                                                 
44
 Other empirical studies such as Yermack (1997), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001), Lie 
(2005), Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2008), and Bebchuk, Grinstein, and 
Peyer (2010), all point to the positive relation between lack of transparency in contractual terms 
and questionable pay-performance practices. 
45 The final rule is available online at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf  
46 For example, SEC Chairman Cox commented that: “Over the last decade and half, the 
compensation packages awarded to directors and top executives have changed substantially. Our 
disclosure rules haven't kept pace with changes in the marketplace, and in some cases disclosure 
obfuscates rather than illuminates the true picture of compensation. This has led to concern that 
some companies may not be disclosing all compensation as is currently required. We have 
concluded that executive compensation disclosure requirements should be modified.” 
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compensation contracts versus using their discretion in awarding the CEO. 
Second, we study firms’ choice across the wide array of performance measures, 
and third, we examine firms’ choice of performance horizon.  
Our sample consists of firms in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index in fiscal 
2007. We collect information from the proxy statements on the performance 
measures that are used in the CEO compensation contract in fiscal year 2007. We 
focus on identifying the different types of performance measures, their relative 
weights, and their horizons.  
Across all firms in our sample, CEO compensation is given in the form of cash 
(e.g., bonuses and non-equity incentive plans), stocks, and option awards. The 
SEC distinguishes between performance-based awards, which are given for 
meeting pre-specified goals, and other awards (i.e., time-vesting awards and 
bonuses), which, for the most part, are given at the discretion of the board. We 
observe that 90% of our sample firms grant some type of performance-based 
awards. The average value of these awards is 4.8 million dollars. On average, 52% 
of the estimated value of CEO total awards is performance-based. 
We first study the choice of the compensation committee between pre-specified 
performance-based awards and discretionary awards. In a complete-contracting 
framework, the compensation committee can pre-specify all relevant 
contingencies in the CEO compensation contract. However, in an incomplete 
                                                                                                                                            
(Chairman's Opening Statement; Proposed Revisions to the Executive Compensation and Related 
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contracting framework, it might be optimal for some firms not to pre-specify all 
of their performance goals. We argue that when firm’s optimal strategies change 
rapidly over time, or when the activities of the CEO are too complex to be 
completely specified in the contract, then the firm will rely less heavily on pre-
specified goals. We find evidence consistent with this argument: Firms assign a 
smaller fraction of the CEO awards to explicit measures when their strategies 
change more rapidly over time (e.g., investment-intensive firms, which are likely 
to face faster changes in business conditions), and when their activities are more 
complex.  
Next, we examine the choice among performance goals. On average, firms pre-
specify their performance goals over several performance measures. On average, 
79% of the estimated value of performance-based awards is based on 
accounting-performance measures, 13% is based on stock-performance 
measures (i.e., market-based), and 8% is based on non-financial measures. Firms 
use a wide array of accounting measures. Firms reward CEOs based on income 
measures (e.g., earnings-per-share (EPS), net income growth, and earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT)), sales, accounting returns (e.g., return on equity, return 
on assets), cash flows, margins, cost-reduction measures, and EVA-type 
measures. On average, 56% of the estimated value of performance-based awards 
assigned to accounting measures is tied to income measures. A significant portion 
                                                                                                                                            
Party Disclosure Rules, January 17, 2006). 
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of the awards is also assigned to sales measures (12%) and accounting returns 
measures (17%).  
We find that larger firms and firms with larger growth opportunities tend to rely 
more heavily on market-based measures, and firms that are more mature tend to 
rely more heavily on accounting-based measures. In addition, among accounting 
measures, sales are used by firms with larger growth opportunities, and 
accounting returns are used more heavily by more mature firms with fewer 
growth opportunities. We also find that firms in similar sectors tend to adopt 
similar performance measures. We find a weaker relation between performance 
horizon and firm characteristics, likely because of the tendency of firms to cluster 
over particular performance horizons. 
Overall, our findings regarding the choice of performance measures support the 
optimal contracting theories. Consistent with the informativeness principle 
(Holmstrom, 1979), firms tend to choose performance measures that are more 
informative of CEO actions. Consistent with the incomplete contract theory, firms 
tend to rely more on pre-specified measures when the contractual costs are 
smaller (Hart, 1995). 
Finally, we examine whether CEOs who have more ability to influence their 
compensation contract, will choose contractual terms that benefit them rather 
than increase shareholder value. We find some support to this argument: when 
shareholder monitoring is weaker, CEO awards tend to be more discretionary, 
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and the level of the discretionary portion is not correlated with past 
performance, present performance, or even future performance. However, 
regardless of the strength of shareholder monitoring, the portion of the award 
that is based on pre-specified goals seems to behave according to the optimal 
contracting theory. All the measures that we use for weak governance are not 
significantly related to the choice of performance measures. Thus, it seems that 
deviations from optimal contracting might potentially occur in the portion of the 
compensation that is less transparent and we interpret these results as weak 
evidence of deviation from optimal contracting. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the 
disclosure rule allows us to document the large array of performance measures 
that are used in CEO compensation contracts and to examine firms’ choices 
across the different measures. With the new data, we are able to directly examine 
the choice of different performance measures in CEO compensation contracts, 
and relate it to contracting theory. Past studies could not observe the choice of 
performance measures across the different components of compensation 
contracts because this data was not available. As a result, most studies have 
estimated the choice of performance measures from observed compensation 
outcomes.47 Few previous empirical studies had access to more precise data 
                                                 
47 Since data on performance measures was not available until recently, studies have used 
proxies instead. For example, Kole (1997) uses the level of non-equity awards as a proxy for 
accounting-based compensation and equity awards as a proxy for market-based compensation. 
Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2003) use the ratio of total pay variance unexplained by stock returns 
to the variance of total pay explained by stock returns to study the use of price and non-price 
performance measures in CEO compensation. Lambert and Larcker (1987) study how changes in 
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regarding the terms of the contracts, but even then, the data was available only 
for particular components of the contract.48 
Our second contribution is in analyzing the reasons behind tying CEO 
compensation to pre-specified performance goals. 49 The rich information on the 
variety of performance measures allows us to shed new light on the reasons 
behind performance choices and to contribute to the debate about CEO influence 
over pay practices. 
Finally, we should note that the new compensation rules have led to a few other 
related studies that explore aspects of CEO compensation contracts. Their focus, 
however, is different than ours.50 
The paper continues as follows. Section 2.2 is a brief review of the financial 
contracting literature relevant for optimal compensation design. In Section 2.3, 
                                                                                                                                            
cash compensation are explained by changes in return on equity (accounting performance 
measure) and firm stock return (market performance measure). 
48 See, for example, Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy (2010), who analyze vesting provisions in 
stock and option grants; Sautner and Weber (2011), who study stock options plans for Europeans 
firms using proprietary data; and Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997), who use proprietary data to 
investigate the use of financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO annual bonuses. 
With regard to non-executive employee compensation, see Bouwens and Van Lent (2007), who 
use survey data to study the performance metrics employed for periodic assessment, bonus 
decisions, and career paths of business unit managers. 
49 Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) study whether the relationship between the firm and its 
CEO is governed by an explicit employee agreement. However, the scope of their paper is 
different than ours. They do not explore the choice of performance measures in the compensation 
contract. 
50 Grinstein, Weinbaum, and Yehuda (2011) study the impact of the 2006 disclosure rules on the 
amount of perquisites disclosed in CEO compensation. Kim and Yang (2010) compare earnings-
per-share targets in the annual incentive plans to earnings expectations and explain their 
difference with corporate governance and firm characteristics. Wei and Yermack (2011) study 
investor reactions to the disclosure of CEO’s deferred compensation. Finally, Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach (2011) utilize the new disclosure rule to examine changes in the contractual terms of 
firms that went private. 
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we explain the new disclosure requirements issued by the SEC. We describe the 
database in Section 2.4 and in Section 2.5 we provide an empirical analysis of 
how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. In Section 2.6, we study 
potential deviations from optimal contracting and the rationales for these 
deviations. Section 2.7 concludes. We also provide appendices in which we 
illustrate our data collection methodology and examine the effect of the rule on 
the level of disclosure. 
2.2 Development of the Hypotheses 
2.2.1 The Informativeness Hypothesis 
In a standard moral-hazard problem, the shareholders (the principals) hire the 
CEO (the risk-averse agent) to complete a series of tasks to maximize shareholder 
wealth. Shareholders are risk neutral and do not observe CEO actions or level of 
effort. The action desired by the CEO differs from the one maximizing firm value; 
thus, the shareholders need to align CEO’s incentives with their own. Holmstrom 
(1979) formulates the optimal compensation contract under the moral-hazard 
problem and defines the “Informativeness Principle,” which means that optimal 
CEO compensation should depend on the likelihood that the action desired by 
shareholders is taken by the CEO. Thus, any performance measure that reveals 
partial information about the action taken (or level of effort provided) by the CEO 
should be included in the contract. Holmstrom shows that the optimal weight 
placed on a performance measure in the CEO contract exhibits a positive relation 
with the signal-to-noise ratio with respect to the CEO action. Hence, ceteris 
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paribus, there is a negative relation between the amount of noise of a 
performance measure and its use in the compensation contract. 
H.2.1: (Informativeness Hypothesis) Ceteris paribus, firms tend to rely less on 
measures that are noisier signals of the CEO actions desired by shareholders. 
What are CEO actions desired by shareholders? Clearly this depends on the 
strategy of the firm. Firms in different environments would develop different 
strategies in order to maximize shareholder value and these strategies are likely 
to vary across firms and over time. For example, for some firms the optimal 
strategy would be to focus on product development, while for others it would be 
to focus on reducing production costs or on developing new marketing strategies. 
According to the informativeness principle, directors should focus on the type of 
measure that is most informative of the desired action. For example, if the firm 
wants the CEO to develop new marketing strategies in order to increase value, it 
might wish to tie the CEO performance to sales-growth performance measures. 
Surely, there are other performance measures that the firm could consider, such 
as stock performance or profit margins. Both stock performance and profit 
margins measures are likely to be correlated with the desired actions of gaining 
market share, but there is likely a higher correlation of sales-growth performance 
measures with the desired actions than with the other measures (especially 
when stock-price measures and profitability measures capture other aspects of 
the firm and the industry, not related to the desired action). According to the 
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informativeness principle, firms should rely more heavily on the more 
informative performance measure – i.e., sales growth in this example. 
Our approach in this study is to identify firm strategies and to examine whether 
the incentive contract conforms to these strategies. Unfortunately, strategies 
differ across firms and managers, and it is hard to pin down the exact desired 
strategy of every firm. However, industrial organization and strategy literature 
provides some basic guidance on the relevance of certain strategies depending on 
the type of environment in which the firm operates. One aspect is the life cycle of 
the firm and its products and the implication on firm strategies.51 The basic 
premise in this literature is that young and growing businesses have plenty of 
profitable opportunities in which to re-invest earnings. However, as businesses 
mature, the opportunities become scarce. Managerial strategies should therefore 
be aligned with the life-cycle of the firm: managers in high-growth firms should 
be focused on activities that are aimed at long-term growth, (e.g., choosing the 
right projects to invest in, devising marketing strategies to introduce new 
products to the market, etc). As the firm matures, the growth opportunities 
become scarce, and managerial strategies should focus on achieving higher 
efficiency in production and pay excess cash to shareholders (Jensen 1986). 
                                                 
51 Early mentioning of the firm life cycle include Penrose (1959) and Mueller (1972). Porter 
(1980) applies this framework in analyzing firm strategies. A large body of literature applies this 
framework to explain organizational choice and activity choice. See, e.g., Montgomery (1994) for a 
literature review, and Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) for a rationalization of the firm life cycle 
within a firm-learning framework. 
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Another aspect is related to the ability of the firm to manage the scope of its 
operations. Larger firms and multi-division firms often engage more in 
acquisitions and in managing the scope and the size of their activities. Inevitably, 
CEOs in these firms control not only the level of future profits, but also the level 
of risk associated with these profits. In contrast, small firms are often specialized 
and engage in activities in one particular industry. Their CEOs have a more 
limited effect on the inherent risk in their activities. For large firms, we should 
therefore expect more reliance on performance measures that take into account 
the varying risk profile of firms’ operations.  
We use these principles to make predictions about firm’s choice of performance 
measures depending on its growth and maturity stage as well as its ability to 
manage the scope of its activities. 
2.2.1.1 Growth Opportunities and Maturity 
Firms that are in their growth stage make large investments, for example, in R&D 
or in launching new products, and require managerial focus on achieving long-
term outcomes. Therefore, accounting measures, which focus on current 
outcomes, will be poorer measures of optimal managerial actions than stock 
market performance, which focuses on the long-term prospects of the firm 
(Smith and Watts, 1992).52  
                                                 
52
 Consistent with this argument, Kole (1997) finds that firms with more intangible assets are 
more likely to adopt an equity compensation plan. 
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In addition, for firms that are in their growth stage, among accounting measures, 
market share and sales growth will be more relevant than profitability measures 
such as income measures or accounting returns. These firms are more concerned 
with establishing market share than with making large profits in the short run. 
According to the informativeness principle, we should therefore observe a 
positive relation between growth opportunities and the use of sales growth 
measures. In contrast, mature firms with fewer growth opportunities are more 
concerned about the efficiency of their investments and the redistribution of 
their profits. Consistent with a firm’s life cycle argument, we therefore expect 
these firms to assign more weight to accounting performance measures. 
Firms’ growth opportunities should have also an effect on performance horizon. 
Since the impact of certain CEO decisions on firm value in growth firms is not 
immediate, it is important to measure the performance of the CEO over a longer 
horizon. Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990) show that the length of the 
managerial contract is positively related to the delay of the arrival of information. 
We should therefore expect firms in the growth stage to rely on long-term 
performance measures. 
2.2.1.2 Managing Risk Profile 
Past studies show that larger firms, and firms with multiple segments engage 
more in managing the risk of their firms’ activities. For example, Amihud and Lev 
(1981) point to the tendency of managers in large, conglomerate firms to manage 
the risk profile of their operations through acquisition activities and 
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diversification strategies. In addition, larger firms are more prone to engage in 
hedging activities (see, e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993, and Mian, 1996). 
To the extent that managing the risk profile of the firm is more important in 
larger organizations and organizations with multiple segments, we expect these 
organizations to use performance measures that take into account changes in the 
risk profile of the firm. Market-based measures take into account both the 
incremental cash flows from managing these activities as well as the risk in these 
cash flows. In contrast, accounting measures do not incorporate the risk profile of 
these activities and would therefore be a less precise measure of the desired 
strategy. We therefore predict larger firms and firms with more segments to rely 
more on market based performance measures. 
In addition, the benefits of managing the risk-profile of the firm (e.g., 
diversifications and refocusing activities) are more likely to be realized over 
longer horizon than simple production activities. Therefore, performance 
measures in larger firms should be measured over a longer horizon. 
2.2.2 Contract Incompleteness 
Some firms do not tie large portions of the CEO compensation to any explicit 
measure. Instead, they use their discretion in determining the amount and type of 
award that they reward the CEO. Such a practice is more likely when it is costly to 
write all relevant performance contingencies into the contract (Hart, 1995, and 
Segal, 1999). For example, if renegotiation is costly and there is large uncertainty 
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regarding optimal CEO actions (which might get resolved only after the contract 
is signed), then the firm might be better-off not committing itself ex-ante to a 
specific performance measure. We identify two cases where pre-specified 
contracts are less desirable: when the strategy of the firm is not stable over time, 
and when firm activities are more complex. We describe these cases below. 
2.2.2.1 Stability of Firm Strategy 
When optimal strategy changes rapidly over time such that a contract that is 
written in the beginning of the year is not optimal later on, then the firm will face 
higher renegotiation costs and might be better-off not committing ex-ante to 
specific performance goals. We argue that firms that are in their growth phase 
are more likely to be in this situation. Such firms are often entering new markets 
and exploring new products. A contract that pre-specifies the desired CEO actions 
in the beginning of the year is less likely to be optimal later on either because 
competitors enter with new products, or because new technologies are identified 
in the market, or because of other changes in the firms’ environment. It is more 
desirable in this case not to pre-specify performance goals in the CEO contracts 
because these goals are likely to change. Rather, the firm will use its own 
discretion in compensating the CEO once it observes the path that both the CEO 
and the industry took.  
Another measure of the stability of firm optimal strategy is the seniority of the 
CEO. Arguably, else equal, firms whose strategies change rapidly over time are 
likely to replace their CEOs more often since not all CEOs are equally qualified to 
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implement different strategies. In contrast, firms whose strategies are stable are 
likely to retain their CEOs longer.Our prediction is therefore that firms whose 
CEOs have longer tenure are more likely to rely on pre-specified performance 
goals, while firms whose CEOs have shorter tenure are more likely to give 
discretion to the board with respect to CEO compensation. 
2.2.2.2 Firm Complexity 
The second case is when the firm is too complex such that the directors find it 
more difficult to identify optimal goals. We therefore expect complex firms to rely 
less on pre-specified performance goals and to provide more discretion to the 
board. We measure firm complexity through firm size and number of business 
segments in the firm.  
We summarize these two arguments in the following hypothesis: 
H.2.2: (Incomplete Contracting Hypothesis) Firms that are more complex 
and firms whose optimal strategy is less stable over time will rely less on 
pre-specified performance goals and will give more discretion to the board 
of directors regarding CEO compensation. 
2.2.3 Business Environment 
Finally, there are other considerations in the business environment which are not 
captured by the previous arguments. To account for such considerations we also 
analyze the tendency of firms in similar sectors to adopt similar contractual 
terms.  
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Table 2.1. Hypotheses  
 
Table 2.1 summarizes the hypotheses and their predicted effect on the explanatory variables. 
 
  Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 
  
Explicit-Performance 
Awards Market Accounting Sales Income 
Accounting 
Return 
Performance 
Horizon 
 
 Optimal Contracting: 
        
 
  
 
  
Strategy Type: 
 
- Growth 
 
+ - +  -/+ - + 
        - Managing Risk Profile 
 
+ - 
   
+ 
        
Cost of Contracting: 
 
- Stability of Firm Strategy + 
       
- Firm Complexity - 
       
 
 Deviations from Optimal 
Contracting: 
 
       - Monitoring + + - 
   
+ 
        - CEO Power  - - + 
   
- 
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Firms in similar sectors tend to face similar technological constraints and similar 
prospects. As a result, CEO optimal tasks in firms in the same sector are likely to 
be related. Therefore, we expect similar contractual terms (including types of 
performance measures, performance horizon, and the level of discretion) for 
firms in the same sector. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the empirical predictions in this section. 
2.3 2006 Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules—Summary 
In December 2006, the SEC issued new compensation disclosure requirements in 
order “…to provide investors with a clearer and more complete picture of 
compensation to principal executive officers” (see Background and Overview 
Section in the SEC Release No. 33-8732A). The two new components of interest 
for this study are improved narrative disclosure in the new Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis section and broader formatted tables that capture all 
compensation components and promote comparability.  
In the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section, the registrants are now 
required to provide material information about compensation policies and must 
address the following questions: 
i. What are the objectives of the company’s compensation programs? 
ii. What is the compensation program designed to reward? 
iii. What is each element of compensation? 
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iv. Why does the company choose to pay each element? 
v. How does the company determine the amount (and, where 
applicable, the formula) for each element? 
vi. How do each element and the company’s decisions regarding that 
element fit into the company’s overall compensation objectives and 
affect decisions regarding other elements? 
Firms are now also required to report performance measures and target levels 
considered by the compensation committee unless they can show that disclosing 
this information would result in competitive harm to the company.53 
The SEC reorganizes the compensation tables into three categories: 
i. Compensation with respect to the last fiscal year: the Summary 
Compensation Table and the Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table 
ii. Holdings of equity-based interests that relate to compensation or 
are potential sources of future compensation: the Outstanding 
Equity Awards at Fiscal Year-End Table and the Option Exercises 
and Stock Vested Table 
                                                 
53 Some commenters suggested that “competitive harm would be mitigated if disclosure were 
required on an after-the-fact basis, after the performance related to the award is measured” (see 
letters from American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, dated April 
5, 2006; Council of Institutional Investors; Governance for Owners; International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers; and The Honorable Barney Frank, United States 
Representative (MA)). 
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iii. Retirement and other post-employment compensation: the Pension 
Benefits Table and the Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Table 
The SEC has also revised the Summary Compensation Table to “provide a clearer 
picture of total compensation” (see Figure 2.1). The main changes from previous 
requirements are that stock and option awards valuation is in accordance with 
FAS 123R. In addition, the components of the compensation are divided 
somewhat differently than before: Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation is 
the dollar amount earned in the fiscal year from a non-equity incentive plan. The 
Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table (Panel B) reports information for each grant 
awarded to the executive, especially future payout of both non-equity and equity 
grants at the threshold, target, and maximum performance levels. This table is 
accompanied by a narrative text explaining material factors necessary for 
understanding it. This includes, among other material factors, the performance 
measure and/or criteria used to determine the threshold, target, and maximum 
payout.
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Figure 2.1. New Compensation Tables with Respect to Last Fiscal Year 
 
Panel A: Summary Compensation Table 
 
Name and 
Principal 
Position Year Salary ($) Bonus ($) 
Stock 
Awards ($) 
Option 
Awards ($) 
Non-Equity 
Incentive Plan 
Compensation 
($) 
Change in 
Pension Value 
and 
Nonqualified 
Deferred 
Compensation 
Earnings ($) 
All Other 
Compensation 
($) Total ($) 
PEO                   
PFO                   
A                   
B                   
C                   
 
Panel B: Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table 
 
Name 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Grant 
Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Estimated Future Payouts Under Non-
Equity Incentive Plan Awards 
Estimated Future Payouts Under Equity 
Incentive Plan Awards 
All Other Stock 
Awards: 
Number of 
Shares of 
Stock or Units 
(#) 
 
  
All Other 
Option 
Awards: 
Number of 
Securities 
Underlying 
Options (#) 
  
Exercise 
or Base 
Price of 
Option 
Awards 
($/Sh) 
 
 
  
Threshold 
($) Target ($) 
Maximum 
($) 
Threshold 
(#) Target (#) 
Maximum 
(#) 
PEO                     
PFO                     
A                     
B                     
C                     
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Appendix 2.A illustrates the effect of the rule on the level of disclosure of a 
sample of 87 firms out of the S&P500 firms in our sample. For each firm we 
examine the level of disclosure of the different components of compensation in 
fiscal year 2005 (a year before the rule), in fiscal year 2006 (the first year after 
the rule) and in fiscal year 2007 (a year after the announcement of the rule). The 
appendix shows that while some firms have been disclosing information about 
the pay-performance relation even before the rule, there has been a significant 
increase in the level of disclosure of performance-based compensation 
arrangements, especially in non-equity awards. 
In addition to having an effect on the level of disclosure, the regulation may also 
have some effects on the way firms compensate their CEO. For instance, it is 
possible that firms create the performance thresholds in order to identify the 
minimum, target and maximum levels of payoff to comply with the regulation. As 
a result, these potential new compensation practices may exacerbate 
nonlinearities in the compensation payoff. However, it is unlikely that the 
regulation would influence the choice of performance measures, which is the 
focus of our study. 
2.4 Data and Variables 
2.4.1 Data 
We collect information about CEO compensation contracts from the proxy 
statements of public U.S. firms after the new SEC requirements took effect. Our 
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sample includes 494 firms that belong to the S&P 500 index as of December 
2007.54 S&P includes in this index the largest and most prominent U.S. firms. We 
focus on this set of firms for two main reasons. First, larger firms tend to provide 
more information about their practices and to comply with the SEC requirements 
early-on because of their visibility. Second, these firms are the largest in the U.S., 
and incentive schemes to management in these companies are likely to have a 
large effect on value. 
For each firm, we read the section about CEO compensation in the proxy 
statement of fiscal year 2007. We use Compustat’s definition of fiscal year, which 
means that fiscal year 2007 ends between 06/01/2007 and 05/31/2008. 
We gather information from the discussion of the compensation arrangements, 
the summary compensation tables, and the grants plan-based awards tables in 
the proxy statements. Information about payoffs conditional on achieving certain 
performance targets is available in the discussion and in the footnotes of the 
grant plan-based tables. In appendix 2.B we illustrate how we gathered the 
information, using the IBM proxy statement as an example. 
Several firms report one payoff for achieving targets across several measures, 
and they usually provide the different weights assigned to each measure. In the 
cases where firms do not disclose the weights, we assume that the payoff is 
                                                 
54 We are not able to retrieve the proxy statements of 6 firms among S&P 500 members. 
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divided equally with respect to each performance measure.55 This assumption is 
motivated by the fact that most firms that disclose weights use equal weights. 
We find that firms classify awards into two categories. The first category consists 
of awards that are given for achieving a pre-specified performance goal. We call 
these awards performance-based awards. The second type of awards is given at 
the discretion of the board. We call these awards discretionary awards. For 
example, by-and-large stock option plans are considered discretionary awards 
since they are granted at the discretion of the board and they vest independently 
of performance.56 Each type of award (pre-specified or discretionary) can be 
given in the form of cash, restricted stock, or options. 
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports types of awards granted in our sample in fiscal year 
2007. We also provide summary statistics of the values of these awards for firms 
that grant them.57 
 
 
                                                 
55
 A total of 106 firms do not disclose their weights for performance-based cash compensation, 
and 30 firms do not disclose their weights for performance-based stock compensation.  
56 For example, the option plan for the Microsoft Corporation states that the board has discretion 
to ...“determine the employees to whom, and the time or times at which, Options shall be granted 
and the number of shares to be represented by each Option…” (Microsoft 1991 Stock Option Plan, 
as amended and restated as of June 21, 2006. Section 4.b)  
57 With respect to the pre-specified performance-based awards, we define the value of the 
awards as the target payout for the non-equity incentive plan awards and the grant date fair value 
for the equity incentive plan awards (which is calculated in accordance to FAS123R. In the case of 
stock awards, the fair value represents the target number of shares to be paid out multiplied by 
the closing price at grant date).  
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Table 2.2. Components of CEO Compensation in 2007 
Table 2.2 describes the different components of CEO compensation awarded in 2007 for a sample of 494 firms (S&P 500 members). We 
report the numbers and proportion of firms that grant the different types of awards. We also provide summary statistics of the (target) 
value of these awards for firms that grant these awards in thousands of dollars. 
Panel A: Components of CEO Compensation in 2007 
 
# Firms with  
  
Value of awards in thousands of $ 
(firms with awards > 0) 
 
awards > 0 Proportion 
 
Mean Median SD 
Compensation in cash 492 99.60% 
 
3690 2600 4062 
    - Base Salary 488 98.79% 
 
1064 1000 511 
    - Discretionary bonus 100 20.24% 
 
2691 1091 5391 
    - Pre-specified performance awards 
      (Non-Equity awards) 
425 86.03% 2433 1532 3172 
Compensation in stock 386 78.14% 
 
4593 3208 4511 
    - Discretionary awards (Other Stock awards) 214 43.32% 
 
3546 2050 4581 
    - Pre-specified performance awards 
      (Stock Incentive Plan awards) 
257 52.02% 3945 2961 3394 
Compensation in options 354 71.66% 
 
4005 2825 5331 
    - Discretionary awards (Other Option awards) 342 69.23% 
 
3880 2825 5052 
    - Pre-specified performance awards 
      (Option Incentive Plan awards) 
19 3.85% 4758 2421 6234 
Any type of pre-specified performance-based compensation 447 90.49% 
 
4779 3496 5272 
    (Non-Equity awards + Stock Incentive Plan awards + 
Option Incentive Plan awards) 
      Panel B: Proportion of Awards Tied to Pre-specified Performance Measures 
 
N Mean SD p25 Median p75 
Pre-specified performance-based awards/ Total awards 482 52% 30% 28% 53% 72% 
   (excluding Base Salary) 
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Almost all of our sample firms grant some compensation in cash. Non equity 
awards represent the component of cash compensation given for achieving a pre-
specified performance goal (i.e. performance-based cash awards) while annual 
cash bonuses are most of the time given at the discretion of the board—we will 
consider the discretionary bonus later in this section when we compute total 
awards to the CEO. For some firms, we find that the terms of the annual cash 
bonuses are pre-specified and so in these cases we classify these cash bonuses 
along with non-equity awards as performance-based cash compensation.58 Six 
CEOs in our sample have a base salary less than or equal to $1, and about 86% of 
the CEOs receive performance-based cash awards. When granted, the targeted 
value of performance-based cash awards tends to be much larger than base 
salary (more than twice on average). 
More than half of our sample firms grant pre-specified performance-based stock 
awards.59, 60 This result contrasts with that of Bettis et al. (2010). They collected 
information about stock and option performance-vesting provisions for 2055 
firms between 1995 and 2001 and found a total of 475 firms that granted at least 
one performance-vesting equity award over the seven years. Their final sample 
                                                 
58 For 17 firms in our sample, we are able to retrieve the same type of information for the annual 
bonus as for the non-equity awards (performance measures used, performance thresholds, and 
payoff conditional on performance). 
59 We consider accelerated stock awards (11 observations) and accelerated options awards (3 
observations) to be performance-based. These awards are accelerated (given ahead of time) if the 
manager reaches a pre-specified performance. 
60 A recent report by the independent consulting firm Frederick W. Cook & Co provides similar 
distributions of types of executives grants than ours (Frederick W. Cook & Co, 2010). In their 
sample of 250 firms, they find that 60% of the firms grant performance-based stock awards to 
their executives in 2007 (see 2008 report). 
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contained 1013 performance-based equity awards. Given their distribution of 
awards, the probability that a firm would grant a performance-based equity 
award in a given year was roughly 7%.61 They find that very few firms provide 
performance-vested option awards, which is consistent with our findings. 62, 63 
However, they also find very few performance-based stock awards in 2001, 
which is inconsistent with our findings. Sample differences could potentially 
account for the disparity in results between the two studies. Firms in our sample 
are much larger than firms in their study.64 Our sample is also more recent, and 
compensation practices have likely changed due to regulations and changes in 
business practices.65 
Overall, performance-based awards are important elements of CEO 
compensation in our sample. We observe that 90% of firms in our sample grant 
some type of performance-based award and the average value of these awards is 
approximately 4.8 million dollars. 
                                                 
61 Their distribution of the 1013 performance-based equity awards was: 240 firms in a single 
year, 100 in two years, 61 in three years, 26 in 4 years, 16 in five years, 18 in six years, and 14 in 
all seven years. Therefore, the probability that a firm grants a performance-based equity award in 
a given year is equal to 1013/(2055*7). 
62 Table 2 in their study reports that in 2001, 39 grants were accelerated option awards and 42 
were performance contingent awards. Their sample size for the entire period is 2055 firms. We 
find 19 firms that report accelerated or performance contingent awards, out of 494 firms.  
63 Similarly, Frederic W. Cook & Co (2010) find that only 6% of their 250 sample-firms grant 
performance-based option awards in 2007. 
64 Median asset value in our sample is $11.8 Billion. Bettis et al. (2010) report that, in their 
sample, firms which gave grants had a median asset value of $1.168 Billion. 
65 For example, beginning in 2006, firms were required to expense options in their financial 
reports. This requirement may have led firms to shift from option compensation to stock-based 
compensation. 
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In Panel B, we compute the ratio of the value of performance-based awards to the 
value of total awards (which excludes base salary but includes performance-
based awards, discretionary bonuses, time-vesting stock awards, and time-
vesting options awards). On average, more than half of the value of the awards to 
the CEO is performance-based. This confirms the importance of understanding 
the role of performance-based awards in CEO compensation. We argue that this 
ratio captures the CEO explicit-performance incentives. For performance-based 
awards, the compensation committee selects ex-ante explicit-performance 
measures and performance targets, whereas non-performance-based awards are 
generally given at the discretion of the board. 
We extract accounting data from the Compustat database, blockholder ownership 
and board of directors’ characteristics from the Corporate Library database, and 
managerial compensation and ownership data from the Execucomp database. 
The terms of the CEO compensation contracts are hand-collected from each firm’s 
proxy statement. 
2.4.2 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
2.4.2.1 Contractual Terms 
We study the pay-performance terms in the CEO compensation contract, focusing 
on two main terms: the types of performance measures and the number of years 
over which the performance is measured (duration). 
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We read each compensation report and look for whether the compensation is 
given for achieving a certain level of performance. We look separately at 
performance measures across non-equity awards, cash bonuses, stock awards, 
and options awards and aggregate the value assigned to each particular measure 
across all components. To estimate the proportion of the contract that is based on 
a particular performance measure, we rely on the disclosure of the target award 
associated with achieving the performance. The target award is the amount that 
CEOs are expected to receive if they meet the target performance, and firms 
provide this information for the different awards in the proxy statement. We note 
that the target award is sometimes given for achieving several targets. Whenever 
firms report the weights associated with each performance measure—for 
example, 30% of award Z is conditional on achieving earnings X, and 70% of 
award Z is conditional on achieving stock return Y—we use the weights to assign 
the respective value associated with each performance measure. In some cases, 
where the weights are not reported or are not identifiable, we assume that 
achieving each target contributes equally to the award.66  
We acknowledge that estimating the portion of compensation attributed to each 
performance measure using the target compensation associated with each 
measure has some limitations. Some firms might assign targets that are harder to 
achieve than other firms, and we can neither observe the level of effort for 
achieving different targets, nor can we observe fully the curvature of the relation 
                                                 
66 We assume equal weights because when firms do report the proportion of the award, they 
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between the performance and the payment. Nevertheless, we do not believe that 
this is a big concern for the purpose of our study because a firm that has some 
bias in choosing the target value of the awards is likely to have the same bias 
across different awards; thus, the proportion of the contract that is attributed to 
each performance measures will remain intact. 
We observe three main types of measures: market-based measures, which are 
performance measures that are based on stock price performance; accounting-
based measures, which are performance measures that are based on accounting 
variables; and non-financial measures, which are performance measures that are 
based on some subjective evaluations, such as customer satisfaction, corporate 
diversity, etc. In Panel A of Table 2.3, we observe that almost all firms that grant 
performance-based awards use at least one accounting-based performance 
measure, while market-based measures are less prevalent since less than a third 
of the sample firms are using market-based measures. Almost 40% of the firms 
that grant performance-based awards use non-financial performance measures. 
Firms exhibit large variation in the use of accounting-based performance 
measures. Firms might award CEOs based on income measures (e.g., EPS, net 
income growth, EBIT), sales growth, accounting returns (e.g., return on equity, 
return on assets), cash flows, margins, cost reductions, and economic value added 
(EVA)-type measures. Most firms that use accounting-based measures use 
                                                                                                                                            
often assign equal weight to each award. 
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income measures, almost 40% use sales measures, and slightly less use 
accounting returns measures. The other measures are less prevalent. 
Table 2.3. Contractual Terms of CEO Compensation in 2007 
 
Table 2.3 describes the contractual terms of CEO compensation for a sample of 494 S&P 
500 firms in 2007. Panel A and B report the proportions of firms using different types of 
performance measures. These proportions are computed for firms that grant 
performance-based awards and for which the respective performance measures are 
identified in their proxy statements. Panel C provides descriptive statistics about the 
number of different types of performance measures used and reports information about 
the performance-vesting horizon for firms that grant performance-based awards. 
Performance Horizon is the value-weighted average performance horizon, in years, for 
the different awards of the CEO. 
 
Panel A: Types of performance measure 
Stats \ Component Accounting Market 
Non-
financial 
  
   % of users among firms that grant perf.-based awards 98% 30% 39% 
 
Panel B: Types of accounting performance measure 
Stats \ Component: Income Sales 
Acct. 
Return 
Cash 
Flows Margins 
Cost 
Red. EVA 
                
% of users among firms that use 
accounting perf. measures 87% 39% 37% 23% 9% 6% 5% 
 
Panel C: Number of performance measures & Performance Horizon 
Stats \ Component # Metrics 
Performance 
Horizon 
   Mean 2.81 1.89 
SD 1.29 1.00 
p25 2 1 
p50 3 1.81 
p75 4 2.44 
Min 1 0.25 
Max 7 7.92 
N 442 446 
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Figure 2.2. Average Proportion of Performance-based Awards and the Average 
Weights of Performance Measures 
 
Figure 2.2.A: Performance-based Awards 
 
 
Figure 2.2.B: Type of Performance Measure 
 
Figure 2.2.C: Type of Accounting Performance Measure   
Non 
Performance-
based Awards, 
48% 
Performance-
based Awards, 
52% 
Market 
Measure, 
13% 
Accounting 
Measure, 79% 
Non-Financial 
Measure, 8% 
Income 
Measure, 56% 
Accounting 
Return 
Measure, 
17% 
Sales 
Measure, 12% 
Other, 15% 
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Figure 2.3. Average Proportion of Performance-based Awards, Average Weights of 
Performance Measures, and Average Performance Horizon by Sector 
 
Figure 2.3.A: Performance-based Awards 
 
 
Figure 2.3.B: Type of Performance Measure 
 
 
Figure 3.2.C: Type of Accounting Performance Measure 
 
 
Figure 2.3.D: Performance Horizon (in years)  
56% 52% 54% 32% 50% 54% 
61% 70% 57% 44% 46% 54% 
44% 49% 46% 68% 50% 46% 
39% 30% 43% 56% 54% 46% 
Performance-based Awards Non Performance-based Awards 
11% 7% 8% 
43% 
14% 6% 25% 
37% 
5% 14% 12% 11% 
83% 88% 87% 
44% 
79% 86% 67% 
51% 
92% 76% 78% 84% 
7% 5% 6% 13% 7% 8% 8% 12% 3% 11% 10% 5% 
Market Measure Accounting Measure Non-Financial Measure 
14% 6% 10% 1% 
14% 21% 12% 
0% 
17% 
28% 
8% 7% 
64% 
54% 41% 
43% 
48% 
55% 
59% 78% 
66% 
58% 
51% 55% 
6% 
23% 
29% 36% 
31% 6% 4% 
8% 
16% 5% 
27% 18% 
16% 17% 21% 20% 
7% 
18% 24% 
14% 
0% 8% 
13% 19% 
Sales Measure Income Measure Accounting Return Measure Other 
1.82 1.57 1.97 2.12 1.96 1.70 2.04 2.01 1.66 1.87 2.05 1.97 
 101 
More than half of our sample firms that grant performance-based awards use 
between two and four different types of performance measures. For each 
performance measure, we also document the length of time for evaluating the 
performance. The performance horizon is the value-weighted average 
performance horizon for the different awards to the CEO. We observe a large 
variety of performance horizon, ranging from a quarter to almost eight years. On 
average the performance horizon of a given compensation contract is slightly less 
than two years. 
In Figure 2.2 we plot the average CEO “contract” for our sample. Figure 2.2.A 
represents the average proportion of performance-based awards versus non-
performance-based awards (excluding base salary but including discretionary 
bonuses, time-vesting stock awards, and time-vesting options awards). On 
average, more than half of the awards are performance-based. Figure 2.2.B shows 
the average fraction of the value of performance-based awards assigned to each 
type of performance measure. Accounting performance measures play a major 
role: on average, 79% of the performance-based awards are assigned to this type 
of measure. About 13% of the performance-based awards are assigned to 
market-based measures and 8% to non-financial measures. Even though more 
firms use non-financial measures compared to marked-based measures, the 
average fraction of performance-based awards value assigned to market-based 
measures is significantly higher. This result shows that firms that use market 
measures tend to assign a large award to these measures, while firms that use 
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non-financial measures tend to assign a smaller award to these measures. Figure 
2.2.C shows the average fraction of the value of performance-based awards 
assigned to accounting measures to each type of accounting performance 
measure. On average, more than half of the accounting-based awards rely on 
income measures. We also observe substantial use of sales and accounting 
returns measures. 
We plot the average CEO “contract” by industry sector in Figure 2.3. The sectors 
are defined according to Kenneth French’s 12 industries classification. We 
observe similar patterns across sectors. In most sectors, the majority of the 
awards are performance-based. We observe that in only three sectors out of 
twelve the ratio of performance-based to non-performance-based awards is 
below 50% (Figure 2.3.A - Energy, Health and Finance). Accounting measures and 
income measures in particular are widely used in performance based awards. In 
all sectors, the largest fraction of performance-based awards is tied to accounting 
measures (Figure 2.3.B). Moreover, in all sector, the income measure is the 
accounting measure on which firms assign the largest weight. However, there are 
significant variations across sectors in the choice of performance measures 
(Figure 2.3.C). For instance, firms in the energy and utilities sectors assign more 
than a third of the value of performance-based awards to market-based 
measures, while firms in the durable goods, manufacturing, business equipment, 
and shops sectors assign a weight lower than or equal to 8% (Figure 2.3.B). The 
choice of sales measures also tends to be clustered by sector. No firm in the utility 
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sector uses sales measures, while firms in the health sector, which has high 
growth opportunities, assign on average 28% of the value of the award to sales 
performance (Figure 2.3.C). Overall, we observe that the nature of the sector in 
which the firm operates, matters in the design of CEO compensation. 
2.4.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
We use a host of explanatory variables to test the hypotheses associated with 
explicit-performance incentives and the choice of performance measures. The 
natural log of a firm’s assets is a proxy for firm size, which aims to capture the 
importance to manage the risk profile of firms’ activities. Firm assets are also a 
proxy for the complexity of firms’ activities. We also use the number of business 
segments in the firm to measure the complexity of firms’ activities as well as 
firm’s tendency to manage the scope of its activities. To measure a firm’s 
investment policy, we use the ratio of research and development expenses plus 
capital expenditures to total assets (Investment/A).67 This measure is also a 
proxy for the growth opportunities of the firm as well as for the stability of firm’s 
optimal strategy. As an additional measure of the firms’ growth opportunities, we 
use the value-weighted average Tobin’s Q of firm’s industry (Q(ind)—industries 
                                                 
67 We set the research and development expenses to zero if this variable is missing. Firms are 
required to report research and development expenses when these expenses are material. 
Therefore, when these expenses are immaterial, firms can omit from their reports the research 
and development expenses line in their income statement, and thus this item would be missing in 
the Compustat database. Following Loughran and Ritter (1997), we confirm the validity of this 
procedure by observing that no sample firm in the Chemistry industry has missing R&D items, 
and all sample firms in the Utilities industry have missing R&D items. 
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are classified according to the Fama-French 48 Industries classification). 68, 69 
To measure firm maturity, we use the natural logarithm of firm age, defined by 
the year the firm was founded. Log CEO Tenure is a proxy for CEO experience and 
the stability of the firm’s strategy. We use shareholder monitoring power and 
board leadership to measure the CEO’s ability to affect board decisions (i.e., CEO 
power). We measure shareholder monitoring power by the ratio of shares held 
by the outside shareholders who held more than 5% of the total number of 
shares outstanding to the total number of shares outstanding. Investors who hold 
a large stake in the firm are less likely to suffer from the free rider problem and 
are more likely to affect board structure and firm decisions. Thus, in these firms 
we expect the CEO to have less ability to capture the board and to influence 
compensation decisions. With regard to board leadership, we use an indicator 
variable for the CEO as the chairman of the board to measure CEO power. 
 
 
                                                 
68 Tobin’s Q ratio is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. The market value 
of assets equals to the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value 
of equity. 
69 There might be some reverse causality issue with the Investment/A variable since the 
investment decision could be affected by the terms in the CEO contract. To check the robustness 
of our results, we use only Q(ind) and not Investment/A as a proxy for growth opportunities. Our 
conclusions are not affected, but we get less significance in some specifications (due to the lower 
total variation in the explanatory variable: firm variations for Investment/A but only industry 
variations for Q(ind)). 
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Table 2.4. Explanatory Variables—Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2.4 provides descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in this study for a sample of 494 S&P 500 members in 2007. 
The explanatory variables are from fiscal year 2006 data (unless stated otherwise). Log Assets is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total 
assets (in millions). Investment/ A is a ratio of the sum of research and development expenses and capital and expenditure expenses to 
total assets. Q(ind) is the value-weighted average Tobin’s Q ratio of firm’s industry (we use the Fama and French 48 Industries 
classification). Log Firm Age is the natural logarithm of 2007 minus the year the firm was founded plus one. Log CEO Tenure is the 
natural logarithm of the difference between the end of 2007 and the date the executive became the CEO (expressed in years) plus one. 
Prop. Ownership by Blockholder 5% is the ratio of shares held by the outside shareholders who held more than 5% of the total number 
of shares outstanding to the number of shares outstanding. CEO Chairman is a dummy indicating whether or not the CEO was also the 
chairman of the board in fiscal year 2006. E Index is an entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter 
amendments (see Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). 
 
Stats 
Log 
Assets 
# Business 
Segment 
Investment/ 
A Q(ind) 
Log Firm 
Age 
Log CEO 
Tenure 
Prop. Ownership 
by Blockholder 5% 
CEO 
Chairman E index 
          
Mean 9.52 2.69 0.07 2.25 3.63 1.75 0.17 0.53 2.29 
SD 1.41 1.83 0.06 0.76 1.00 0.74 0.14 0.50 1.32 
p25 8.49 1 0.02 1.71 3.04 1.23 0.06 0 1 
p50 9.38 2 0.05 2.19 3.71 1.73 0.14 1 2 
p75 10.31 4 0.09 2.72 4.48 2.23 0.24 1 3 
Min 6.20 1 0.00 1.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Max 14.45 8 0.36 3.77 5.41 3.82 1.00 1 5 
N 494 494 491 489 494 494 472 494 451 
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We also include the entrenchment index (E index—see Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell, 2009), which is based on six antitakeover provisions: staggered boards, 
limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. Firms with a 
large E index have strong protection against hostile takeovers and thus it is more 
difficult to replace the incumbent CEO in these firms (i.e., the CEO has more 
power). Finally, in our regressions, we also include sector dummies that are 
classified according to the Kenneth French’s 12 Industries classification system.70 
Table 2.4 provides descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables.  
2.5 Empirical Analysis 
2.5.1 Reliance on Pre-specified Performance Goals 
We run Tobit regressions to study the proportion of awards that is assigned to 
pre-specified performance goals (i.e., performance-based awards).71 We find that 
firms with complex activities and large growth opportunities tend to tie a lower 
                                                 
70 Some past studies have excluded firms in the Utilities industry (32 observations in our 
sample) and financial firms (95 observations in our sample). The rationale behind excluding the 
Utilities industry was that these firms are regulated and thus would have different constraints on 
compensation. Since in our sample period most firms in the Utilities industry are no longer 
regulated, we do not consider this a concern. Financial firms have been excluded in some previous 
studies because they tend to have different compensation packages than other industries. We 
already control for these differences by including sector dummies. In addition, we run subsample 
analyses that exclude the financial firms. Except for the regressions displayed in Table 10 with the 
performance horizon as the dependent variable, in which the coefficient of blockholder 
ownership is no longer significant, all the other results hold and in many cases are even 
strengthened. We also run another subsample analysis with only financial firms. Even though we 
have a small sample size, most of the results hold (some coefficients are less significant but the 
signs remain unchanged). Therefore, we believe that including the financial firms does not create 
any bias in our results compared to previous studies. 
71 To compare with results in Section 2.6 –Table 2.10, in all our regressions in Table 2.5, 2.6 and 
2.8 we drop sample firms with missing observations for the main governance characteristics (i.e., 
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portion of CEO awards to pre-specified performance goals. This is consistent with 
the incomplete contracting hypothesis: it is more costly to pre-specify 
performance terms for firms with complex activities and less stable strategy; 
thus, these firms tend to use more discretion in rewarding CEOs. In addition, 
firms where the CEO has longer tenure tend to grant a larger fraction of the 
awards as performance-based awards. CEO tenure is an additional proxy for the 
stability of a firm’s strategy and thus we find that firms with more stable 
strategies tend to rely more on pre-specified performance goals, which is also 
consistent with the incomplete contracting hypothesis. Furthermore, we observe 
that sector dummies have significant explanatory power, suggesting that 
business environment matters a great deal to the decision between explicit and 
discretionary awards. 
However, some discretionary awards (stock and options time-vesting awards) 
are in essence performance-based because their value increases if price increases 
even though the number of shares is fixed. To check the robustness of our results, 
we define discretionary bonus as the only discretionary award. We use two 
different dependant variables: the ratio of discretionary bonus to total awards 
and the ratio of discretionary bonus to the sum of bonus and non-equity awards. 
Our results are consistent with those in Table 5: complex and growth firms tend 
to use more discretionary rewards. 
                                                                                                                                            
blockholder ownership and CEO Chairman dummy). The results do not change if we keep all 
sample firms. 
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Table 2.5. Performance-based Awards 
 
Table 2.5 shows results of Tobit regressions (left censored at 0 and right censored at 1) 
with the ratio of the value of performance-based awards to total awards as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are defined in Table 2.4. The constant 
term is included but not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The symbol *** indicates that the p-value is less than 0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and 
* that it is less than 0.1. 
 
  Tobit Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  
VARIABLES Perf/Total Perf/Total Perf/Total 
    Log Assets -0.0323** -0.0137 -0.0173 
 
(0.0130) (0.0142) (0.0152) 
# Business Segments 
  
0.00966 
   
(0.00942) 
Investment / A -1.170*** -1.557*** -1.652*** 
 
(0.328) (0.385) (0.384) 
Q(ind) 
  
-0.0434 
   
(0.0390) 
Log Firm Age 0.0143 0.0179 0.0179 
 
(0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0174) 
Log CEO Tenure 
  
0.0442* 
   
(0.0250) 
    Sector Dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 457 457 452 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0344 0.103 0.122 
 
2.5.2 Market and Accounting Performance Measures 
We run Tobit regressions to study the proportions of performance-based awards 
tied to different performance measures. We focus on accounting-based and 
market-based performance measures because they are the most commonly used 
performance measures. The fraction assigned to non-financial performance 
measures is simply equal to one minus the sum of fractions assigned to 
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accounting and market measures; thus, it is relatively easy to infer the results for 
non-financial measures. 
The choice of performance measures is mainly driven by the nature of a firm’s 
activities. Large firms and firms with multiple business segments tend to tie a 
larger fraction of the performance-based awards to market measures rather than 
accounting measures. In addition, young firms and firms with large growth 
opportunities tend also to tie a larger fraction of the performance-based awards 
to market measures rather than accounting measures. Furthermore, business 
environment matters. We observe that sector dummies have significant 
explanatory power. All these results are consistent with the informativeness 
hypothesis. Finally, we find that CEOs with longer tenure tend to receive 
performance-based awards tied to accounting measures rather than market 
measures. We do not have a clear prediction concerning CEO tenure. However, 
since CEO tenure might measure the stability of a firm’s strategy and because 
mature firms tend to have more stable strategies, this result is also in line with 
predictions from optimal contracting theories.72 
 
                                                 
72 We note that CEO shareholdings might play a role in choice of market versus accounting 
performance evaluation. For instance, a firm with a CEO with large shareholdings might be less 
inclined to assign a large fraction of the awards to market-based performance since the CEO 
already has a lot of incentives to increase the stock price (versus accounting performance). Due to 
the collinearity issue, we do not include CEO shareholdings and CEO tenure in the same 
regression (their correlation coefficient is close to 0.5). We substitute CEO tenure with CEO 
shareholdings in the regressions of Table 2.6 and find that the coefficient for CEO shareholdings is 
not significant. The results might indicate that, within our sample of large firms, CEO holdings do 
not seem to play a significant role in the choice of performance measure. 
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Table 2.6. Weights of Market and Accounting Performance Measure 
 
Table 2.6 shows results of Tobit regressions (left censored at 0 and right censored at 1). 
The dependent variables are the proportions of the value of performance-based awards 
assigned to market and accounting performance measures. The independent variables 
are defined in Table 2.4. The constant term is included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates that the p-value is less than 
0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and * that it is less than 0.1. 
 
  Tobit Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Prop.Mkt Prop.Mkt Prop.Mkt Prop.Acct Prop.Acct Prop.Acct 
              
Log Assets 0.135*** 0.102*** 0.0813*** -0.0813*** -0.0521*** -0.0442** 
 
(0.0266) (0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0173) (0.0183) (0.0185) 
# Business Segments 
  
0.0305 
  
-0.0122 
   
(0.0199) 
  
(0.0115) 
Investment / A 1.454* 0.471 0.778 -1.223*** -0.677 -0.888* 
 
(0.806) (0.896) (0.892) (0.459) (0.472) (0.491) 
Q(ind) 
  
0.0183 
  
-0.00285 
   
(0.0988) 
  
(0.0524) 
Log Firm Age -0.0516 -0.0396 -0.0389 0.0473** 0.0325 0.0308 
 
(0.0393) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0223) (0.0211) (0.0213) 
Log CEO Tenure 
  
-0.0695 
  
0.0739** 
   
(0.0536) 
  
(0.0325) 
       Sector Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 420 420 416 420 420 416 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0386 0.139 0.146 0.0444 0.148 0.161 
 
2.5.3 Sales, Income, and Accounting Returns Performance Measures 
Our next step is to study the proportions of performance-based awards tied to 
the various performance measures among accounting performance measures. 
Because they are the measures most commonly used, we focus on income 
measures, sales, and accounting returns performance measures. 
Table 2.7 shows the results. We find that firms that have high investment 
activities and large growth opportunities tend to tie a larger portion of CEO 
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compensation to sales performance measures, consistent with the interpretation 
that these firms are more concerned with establishing market share than with 
making large profits in the short run. In contrast, firms that have a low level of 
investments and few growth opportunities tend to tie a larger portion of CEO 
compensation to income and accounting returns performance measures. We also 
observe that firms rely more on accounting performance measures when they are 
more mature and have fewer growth opportunities, which is consistent with a 
firm’s life cycle argument. We also observe that firms in similar sectors tend to 
adopt similar accounting performance measures, especially for sales-based 
measures. We find less significant results for the income measures. One potential 
reason for the lack of significance is that we have little variability in this measure 
- most firms in our sample that rely on accounting measures use income-based 
performance measures. The popularity of this measures is possibly linked to the 
fact that analysts and the financial press rely heavily on these measures to 
evaluate firms. This potential popularity might play a role in the choice of this 
measure. 
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Table 2.7. The Choice across Accounting Performance Measures 
 
Table 2.7 shows results of Tobit regressions (left censored at 0 and right censored at 1). The dependent variables are the proportions 
of the performance-based awards assigned to sales, income, and accounting returns performance measures among accounting 
performance measures. The independent variables are defined in Table 2.4. The constant term is included but not reported. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates that the p-value is less than 0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and * 
that it is less than 0.1. 
 
  Tobit Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES P. Sales P. Sales P. Sales P. Income P. Income P. Income P. Acct R. P. Acct R. P. Acct R. 
          Log Assets -0.0192 -0.00545 0.0167 -0.0713*** -0.0781*** -0.0719*** 0.114*** 0.122*** 0.114*** 
 
(0.0168) (0.0179) (0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0208) (0.0215) (0.0289) (0.0314) (0.0319) 
# Bus. Segments 
  
-0.0151 
  
-0.0102 
  
-0.0112 
   
(0.0109) 
  
(0.0155) 
  
(0.0202) 
Investment / A 1.587*** 0.891* 0.821* -1.042* -1.215* -1.280* -1.494* -0.860 -0.636 
 
(0.393) (0.482) (0.464) (0.549) (0.665) (0.677) (0.837) (1.022) (1.014) 
Q(ind) 
  
0.163*** 
  
0.0192 
  
-0.265*** 
   
(0.0447) 
  
(0.0579) 
  
(0.0793) 
Log Firm Age 0.000290 0.00502 0.00473 -0.0321 -0.0103 -0.00508 0.0984** 0.0411 0.0418 
 
(0.0210) (0.0215) (0.0218) (0.0255) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0404) (0.0375) (0.0372) 
Log CEO Tenure 
  
0.00582 
  
-0.00482 
  
-0.00541 
   
(0.0292) 
  
(0.0407) 
  
(0.0514) 
          Sector Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 432 432 428 432 432 428 432 432 428 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.0423 0.183 0.218 0.0215 0.0692 0.0687 0.0497 0.136 0.154 
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2.5.4 Performance Horizon 
We run OLS regressions with the value-weighted performance horizon as a 
dependent variable. Table 2.8 shows the results. The table shows that, overall, 
there is a weak relation between performance horizon and firm characteristics, 
and the signs of the coefficients are not consistent across the specifications. Firm 
size is positively related to performance horizon and it is statistically significant. 
However, number of business segments is negatively related to performance 
horizon and is not significant. 
Table 2.8. Performance Horizon 
 
Table 2.8 shows results of three OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the value 
weighted contract length of performance-based awards (Perf H). The independent 
variables are defined in Table 2.4. The constant term is included in the regression but not 
reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates 
that the p-value is less than 0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and * that it is less than 0.1. 
 
  OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Perf H. Perf H. Perf H. 
        
Log Assets 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.132*** 
 
(0.0382) (0.0446) (0.0430) 
# Business Segments 
  
-0.00986 
   
(0.0239) 
Investment / A 0.394 0.397 0.515 
 
(1.176) (1.236) (1.214) 
Q(ind) 
  
-0.160* 
   
(0.0962) 
Log Firm Age -0.00285 -0.0145 -0.0194 
 
(0.0499) (0.0533) (0.0537) 
Log CEO Tenure 
  
0.00370 
   
(0.0684) 
    Sector Dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 420 420 416 
R-squared 0.049 0.060 0.056 
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We find that the coefficients of growth opportunities (investment/assets) and 
firm maturity (firm age) have signs that are consistent with our predictions. CEOs 
in firms that have higher growth opportunities tend to have contracts with longer 
horizons. However, none of these coefficients is statistically significant. In 
addition, we do not find that Q(ind) is positively related to performance horizon 
(column 3). In fact, it is significantly negative at the 10% level. However, this 
significant relation disappears once we add governance variables to the 
regression (next section). 
Furthermore, we do not find that performance horizon is significantly clustered 
by sector, since the goodness-of-fit measure is not improved when we add the 
sector dummies. We conjecture that the lack of significance is related to the fact 
that most firms choose similar vesting periods for their CEOs. 
2.5.5 Robustness tests - Contract Design and Compensation Consultant 
Identity 
It is possible that our results are influenced by the identity of the compensation 
consultants. Some compensation consultants might have specific “tastes” in 
designing CEO contracts and thus influence the contractual terms. In that case the 
choices of performance measures might be suboptimal. To examine this potential 
effect, we add dummy variables to the regression, one for each of the most hired 
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compensation consultants in our sample.73 In untabulated results, we find no 
relation between the identity of the compensation consultant and any of the 
performance choices.74 Moreover, the addition of these dummy variables does 
not alter the results concerning the economic determinants. 
2.5.6 Robustness tests - Reliability of the Data 
A concern regarding the data is that firms do not necessarily disclose the right 
information regarding their compensation contracts. Past studies have shown 
that disclosed terms of CEO compensation can be manipulated, and we 
acknowledge that it is possible that firms have manipulated the disclosure of the 
terms used here.75 It is also possible that firms rig performance measures after 
the fact (Morse et al. 2011), and the disclosed measures are simply an ad hoc 
justification for high compensation to the CEO. While we cannot completely 
dismiss this interpretation, we try to address these concerns with several tests, 
as we discuss below. 
2.5.6.1 Persistence of the Choice of Performance Measures 
First, we examine the extent to which the choice of performance measures is 
persistent. If firms are rigging measures after the fact, then we should see 
fluctuation in the use of performance measures over time.  
                                                 
73 In our sample, we find that 18.02% firms employ Frederick W. Cook & Co., 17.81% Towers 
Perrin, 13.77% Mercer, 12.55% Hewitt, 7.89% Watson Wyatt & Co., 5.06% Pearl Meyer & 
Partners, and 3.24% Semler Brossy. 
74 The results are not reported but are available upon request. 
75
 For example, Lie (2005) has shown that firms falsified the grant dates of options grants in the 
backdating scandal. (See also Yermack, 1997, and Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyers, 2010). 
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We randomly choose 30 firms that granted non-equity awards in 2006 and 
compare the choice of performance measures in 2006 and 2007. Among them, 25 
firms used the exact same set of performance measures for the non-equity 
awards in 2006 and 2007, 4 firms modified the set, and 1 firm completely 
changed the performance measures used. The firm that changed the set of 
performance measures had a new CEO in 2007. In comparison, four firms 
retained the same CEO in 2006 and 2007 but, on average, slightly modified the 
set of performance measures.76 For instance, one firm had only earnings per 
share (EPS) in 2006 and added two measures in 2007—free-cash flow and 
revenue—but assigned a 50% weight to EPS in 2007, thus keeping EPS as the 
major performance measure. In this subsample analysis, we find that a large 
majority of firms keep the same set of performance measures. These results 
indicate that, while some flucatuations in performance measures exist, the choice 
of performance measures is quite persistent. 
2.5.6.2 Modification of performance goals in multi-year awards 
We check and validate that the terms of multi-year awards are not changed over 
the years. This means that firms do not assign ad hoc performance goals after the 
fact but keep the original goals over the term of the award. We randomly choose 
30 firms that granted equity awards in 2007 with a 3-year performance horizon 
and examine whether in the 3 subsequent years (fiscal 2008, fiscal 2009, 2010 
                                                 
76
 Among the 4 firms, 2 added one performance measure in 2007, and 2 firms added 2 measures 
in 2007 to the ones they used in 2006. For these 4 firms, we check if these choices were persistent 
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proxy) the firm does not change the performance goal. In all cases, the 
performance goals remain the same. 
2.5.6.3 Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Incorporating the Newly Disclosed 
Contractual Terms 
Our last test examines whether the new information from the proxy statements 
regarding the reliance on market and accounting performance goals helps explain 
cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation realization. If the disclosed terms 
are incorrect, then the realization of the CEO compensation will not be related to 
these terms.  
We run a regression where CEO compensation is explained by firms’ economic 
and performance variables. Our regression specification is based on Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999) and Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora, (2006). We define CEO 
total direct compensation (TDC) as the dependent variable, dollars returns (total 
shareholder returns (TSR) multiplied by market capitalization at the beginning of 
the year) as the firm’s market performance, and net income as the firm’s 
accounting performance.77 We add to the independent variables explanatory 
variables for the terms of the contracts. We use the proportion of performance-
based awards tied to market measures multiplied by the firm stock-performance 
realization to capture the proportion of the contract tied to market-based 
performance and the proportion tied to accounting measures multiplied by the 
                                                                                                                                            
for 2008: 2 firms had the same set of performance measure for 2007 and 2008, one firm added a 
new measure in 2008, and one firm substituted a measure (but this last firm had a new CEO). 
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earnings performance to capture the extent to which the contract relies on 
accounting-based performance. The coefficients are estimated via median 
regressions.78 We control for firm size, year fixed-effects, and sector fixed-
effects, and study 3 years of compensation and performance.79 The results 
suggest that the contractual terms are very informative.. We find that when firms 
declare that they tie a larger proportion of their performance-based awards to 
market performance, the sensitivity of compensation to market performance is 
significantly higher. The results are even more striking with respet to accounting 
performance. Without the use of the new information disclosed under the 2006 
SEC requirements, we do not obverse significant pay-for-accounting 
performance. However, once we interact the accounting performance with the 
proportion of performance-based awards tied to accounting measures, the 
coefficient becomes statistically and economically significant. These conclusions 
do not change when we study both types of performance at the same time. 
Therefore, our results indicate that firms that assign larger weights on market 
(accounting) performance have greater pay for market (accounting) performance 
sensitivity.
                                                                                                                                            
77 We winsorize TSR at 5% in the Compustat database. 
78 Median regressions are also used in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Rajgopal, Shevlin, and 
Zamora (2006). See, for instance, Koenker and Hallock (2001) for an explanation of Median 
regressions. Compared to ordinary least squares regressions, median regressions are less 
influenced and more robust to the presence of large outliers, since they are based on the median 
as the measure of the distribution’s center instead of the mean. Large outliers and skewness of 
the data are important issues in compensation regression; for instance, in our sample (in 2007) 
the values of TDC vary from 0 to 75 million dollars, and its mean is about 10 million dollars. Due 
to this issue, median regressions give us more precise estimates. 
79 In our regressions, we drop the observations for which TDC is equal to zero (21 observations). 
Conclusions remain unchanged if we keep these observations. 
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Table 2.9. Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity Taking into Account the New Information 
 
Table 2.9 shows results of median regressions for a sample of S&P 500 firms with CEO unchanged from previous year (2006-2007 and 
2007-2008). The sample covers the year 2006 to 2008. The dependent variable is CEO total direct compensation (TDC). Market 
capitalization is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the firm’s stock price. Market performance is defined as dollar return 
to shareholders (i.e., total shareholder returns (TSR) multiplied by market capitalization at the beginning of the year). Accounting 
performance is defined as the firm’s net income. The value of TDC is in thousands of dollars while market capitalization, market and 
accounting performance are in millions of dollars. Market Weight and Accounting Weight are the proportions of the value of 
performance-based awards assigned to market and accounting performance measures in the 2007 contract. The constant term, year 
fixed effects, and sector dummies are included but not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 20 replications are reported in 
parentheses. The symbol *** indicates that the p-value is less than 0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and * that it is less than 0.1. 
 
  Median Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC 
       Market Cap (t-1) 0.0970*** 0.0959*** 0.0826*** 0.0405** 0.0934*** 0.0721*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0107) (0.0134) (0.1744) (0.0124) (0.0249) 
Market Perf. 0.110** 0.0358 
  
0.106** 0.0537 
 
(0.0442) (0.0444) 
  
(0.0447) (0.0463) 
Market Weight * Market Perf. 
 
0.201*** 
   
0.142** 
  
(0.0708) 
   
(0.0715) 
Accounting Perf. 
  
0.0940 0.0746 0.0582 -0.211 
   
(0.115) (0.2699) (0.0606) (0.313) 
Accounting Weight * Accounting Perf. 
   
1.010*** 
 
0.793** 
    
(0.3502) 
 
(0.370) 
       Observations 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 
Pseudo R-squared 0.130 0.135 0.125 0.135 0.131 0.142 
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Hence, we find strong evidence that the contractual terms of CEO compensation 
(i.e., the choice of performance measures) are indeed informative. 
In light of these results, we conclude that the choice of performance measure is 
persistent, binding and, indeed, informative. 
2.6. Deviations from Optimal Contracting 
In this subsection, we investigate potential deviations from optimal contracting 
by assessing whether measures of CEO power influence the design of the 
contract. A recent argument regarding the design of compensation contracts is 
that CEOs often have the power to influence who will sit on the boards, and the 
directors often feel obligated to the CEOs and are afraid to challenge them, 
especially when it comes to compensation decisions (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003, 2004). According to these arguments, when the CEOs have more power to 
affect their compensation decisions, they will choose not to base their 
compensation on explicit-performance measures, but rather will choose 
outcomes ex-post to rationalize their large compensation. To the extent that 
powerful managers have some explicit-performance measures in the 
compensation contracts, they will choose performance measures that are easier 
to manipulate, such as accounting measures or short-horizon measures.  
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To test this argument, we include governance characteristics in our cross-
sectional analysis to examine whether governance has an effect on the structure 
of the compensation contract.80 The results are reported in Table 2.10. 
We use three different measures to capture CEO power: the proportion of 
ownership by shareholders who own more than 5% of the shares outstanding 
(shareholder monitoring, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000, 2001), an indicator 
variable for CEO Chairman (board leadership), and the E-index (anti-takeover 
protection, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). 
Panel A shows a potential relation between the strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms and the reliance on discretionary awards. We find a significant 
positive relation between concentration of holdings by shareholders and the 
proportion of awards based on explicit-performance measures. In addition, the 
coefficient for CEO Chairman is negative (but not significant), which is also 
consistent with the CEO power hypothesis. In contrast, the coefficient for the E-
index is positive and not significant, a result inconsistent with the CEO power 
hypothesis.  
While weaker governance is associated with more reliance on discretionary 
awards, it does not seem to affect the choice between performance measures in 
the pre-specified portion of compensation. Panel A also shows that CEO power 
                                                 
80
 Since we do not have a clear prediction on the relation between CEO power and the use of the 
different accounting measures, we do not study the relation between the choice of the different 
accounting measures and governance characteristics. 
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does not influence firm choice between accounting- and market-based awards. 
This portion of the award, which is based on pre-specified goals, is not affected. 
Finally, we find a significant positive relation between concentration of holdings 
by shareholders and performance horizon (consistent with the CEO power 
hypothesis). However, the coefficient for the E index is significant and positive, 
which is not consistent with the CEO power hypothesis. 81 The coefficient for 
CEO Chairman is positive as well.  
Overall, the results suggest potential relations between weaker governance and 
heavier reliance on discretionary awards and the performance horizon of the 
pre-specified awards. However, the only significant coefficient is that of the 
concentration of ownership by shareholders. None of the other governance 
variables has a significant effect, and the sign of the E-index coefficient is 
inconsistent with the CEO power hypothesis..  
To further explore the effect of concentration of ownership on deviation from 
optimal contracting, we examine whether concentration of holdings alters the 
economic relations that we find in the previous section. We test whether the 
fundamental relations between compensation structure and firm size, 
complexity, and maturity change if we have low concentration of ownership. To 
that end, we split our sample into two equal subsamples, based on the level of 
                                                 
81
 We obtain similar results if we use the G index (i.e., the governance index proposed by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which is based on 24 antitakeover provisions that are equally 
weighted) instead of the E index, except that the coefficient for the G index is not significant at 
10% in the performance horizon regression. 
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shareholder ownership concentration. We then run the original specifications on 
each of the subsamples and compare the coefficients of the economic variables 
across the two subsamples. We present the results in Panel B of Table 2.10. 
Overall, we cannot reject the similarity of the coefficients across the different 
subsamples. These findings suggest that the ownership structure does not alter 
the fundamental relation between size, complexity, growth, maturity, and 
compensation structure. 
One potential reason for the weak evidence of the relation between contract 
structure and governance is that firms that need to disclose the contract will hide 
their agenda by showing a contract that is sound economically. In that case, firms 
might compensate the manager sub-optimally with the discretionary portion of 
the compensation. Since the reasons behind discretionary payments lack 
transparency, it is difficult to make conclusions about the appropriateness of 
these payments. This portion of CEO compensation remains the gray area in our 
analysis. On the one hand, we find consistent results with the rent extraction 
argument: CEOs who are less monitored receive a larger portion of their 
compensation via discretionary awards. On the other hand, according to the 
incomplete contracting hypothesis, there are economic rationales concerning the 
use of discretion, and we find results consistent with this hypothesis: complex 
firms use more discretionary rewards.
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Table 2.10. Contract Design and Corporate Governance 
 
Table 2.10 shows results of Tobit regressions (left censored at 0 and right censored at 1) 
and OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the ratio of the value of performance-
based awards to total awards (Perf/Total), the proportions of the value of performance-
based awards assigned to market and accounting performance measures (Prop. Mkt and 
Prop. Acct, respectively), and the value weighted contract length of performance-based 
awards (Perf H). The independent variables are defined in Table 2.4. In Panel B, we 
provide subsample results. Firms are sorted by the proportion of ownership by 
shareholders who own more than 5% of the shares outstanding: we classify firms into 
two groups, low (first half of the distribution) and high (second half of the distribution) 
blockholder ownership. The constant term is included in the regression but not reported. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates that the p-
value is less than 0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and * that it is less than 0.1. 
 
Panel A 
 
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Perf/Total Perf/Total Prop.Mkt Prop.Mkt Prop.Acct Prop.Acct Perf H. Perf H. 
Log Assets -0.00902 -0.00662 0.0822*** 0.0926*** -0.0457** -0.0507** 0.140*** 0.179*** 
 
(0.0152) (0.0167) (0.0289) (0.0305) (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0412) (0.0417) 
# Bus. Segments 0.0109 0.00876 0.0320 0.0299 -0.0129 -0.0123 -0.00577 -0.00343 
 
(0.00934) (0.00946) (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Investment / A -1.695*** -1.670*** 0.793 0.639 -0.886* -0.721 0.503 0.699 
 
(0.381) (0.390) (0.893) (0.870) (0.496) (0.508) (1.215) (1.293) 
Q(ind) -0.0319 -0.0187 0.0346 0.0376 -0.00901 -0.0102 -0.127 -0.111 
 
(0.0389) (0.0395) (0.101) (0.0981) (0.0529) (0.0535) (0.0932) (0.0940) 
Log Firm Age 0.0223 0.0116 -0.0408 -0.0604* 0.0310 0.0413* -0.0227 -0.0423 
 
(0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0217) (0.0227) (0.0547) (0.0577) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.0475 0.0529* -0.109* -0.0767 0.0842** 0.0709* -0.0475 0.00623 
 
(0.0290) (0.0303) (0.0617) (0.0615) (0.0364) (0.0379) (0.0803) (0.0848) 
Governance 
Characteristics: 
        Prop. Ownership 
By 5% Block 0.288*** 0.286** 0.413 0.413 -0.158 -0.194 0.791** 0.889** 
 
(0.106) (0.115) (0.258) (0.256) (0.144) (0.147) (0.368) (0.380) 
CEO Chairman -0.00839 -0.0173 0.137 0.123 -0.0365 -0.0422 0.182 0.126 
 
(0.0418) (0.0437) (0.0884) (0.0900) (0.0517) (0.0547) (0.128) (0.135) 
E index 
 
0.00695 
 
0.0247 
 
0.00220 
 
0.0676* 
  
(0.0143) 
 
(0.0296) 
 
(0.0182) 
 
(0.0351) 
         
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 452 432 416 400 416 400 416 400 
R-squared 
      
0.074 0.095 
Pseudo R^2 0.134 0.125 0.156 0.164 0.164 0.154 
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Table 2.10. Continued 
Panel B 
 
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS OLS 
VARIABLES Perf/Total Perf/Total Prop.Mkt Prop.Mkt Prop.Acct Prop.Acct Perf H. Perf H. 
 
Subsample 
sorted by 
Prop. Ownership By 5% 
Blockholder 
Prop. Ownership By 
5% Blockholder 
Prop. Ownership By 
5% Blockholder 
Prop. Ownership By 
5% Blockholder 
 
Low High Low High Low High Low High 
 
(1
st
 Half) (2
nd
 Half) (1
st
 Half) (2
nd
 Half) (1
st
 Half) (2
nd
 Half) (1
st
 Half) (2
nd
 Half) 
                  
Log Assets -0.00533 -0.0193 0.124*** 0.0195 -0.0579** -0.00764 0.166*** 0.148* 
 
(0.0187) (0.0258) (0.0437) (0.0442) (0.0246) (0.0317) (0.0464) (0.0801) 
# Bus. Segments -0.000592 0.0205 0.0234 0.0191 0.0117 -0.0251 0.0110 -0.0373 
 
(0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0332) (0.0263) (0.0199) (0.0155) (0.0382) (0.0360) 
Investment / A -1.936*** -1.648*** -0.430 1.155 -0.454 -0.924 1.960 -0.814 
 
(0.517) (0.542) (1.461) (1.030) (0.736) (0.613) (2.698) (1.179) 
Q(ind) -0.0597 -0.0114 -0.259 0.139 0.157* -0.0817 -0.227* -0.0846 
 
(0.0596) (0.0540) (0.168) (0.123) (0.0848) (0.0666) (0.131) (0.136) 
Log Firm Age 0.0401* -0.00202 0.00199 -0.0586 -0.00542 0.0608** 0.0510 -0.0217 
 
(0.0221) (0.0265) (0.0554) (0.0432) (0.0297) (0.0278) (0.0615) (0.0825) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.0755** 0.0143 -0.0209 -0.0899 0.0336 0.101** -0.00466 0.0173 
 
(0.0311) (0.0407) (0.0788) (0.0706) (0.0460) (0.0440) (0.0885) (0.108) 
         
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 220 232 201 215 201 215 201 215 
R-squared 
      
0.117 0.096 
Pseudo R^2 0.215 0.106 0.174 0.201 0.199 0.198 
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Table 2.11. Discretionary Awards and Firm (Past, Present, and Future) Performance 
 
Table 2.11 shows results of median regressions for a sample of S&P 500 firms with CEO unchanged from the previous year. The 
dependent variable is the discretionary awards granted to the CEO in 2007. Market capitalization is the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the firm stock price. Market performance is defined as dollar return to shareholders (i.e., total shareholder returns (TSR) 
multiplied by market capitalization at the beginning of the year). Accounting performance is defined as the firm’s net income. The value 
of discretionary wards is in thousands of dollars while market capitalization, market and accounting performance are in millions of 
dollars. Market Weight and Accounting Weight are the proportions of the value of performance-based awards assigned to market and 
accounting performance measures in the 2007 contract. Past performance is defined as 2006 performance (Panel A). Present 
performance is defined as 2007 performance (Panel B). Future performance is defined as 2008 performance (Panel C). The constant 
term and sector dummies are included but not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 20 replications are reported in 
parentheses. The symbol *** indicates that the p-value is less than 0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and * that it is less than 0.1. 
 
Panel A:  Discretionary Awards and Firm Past Performance 
 
Median Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Discretionary 
Awards 
Discretionary 
Awards 
Discretionary 
Awards 
Discretionary 
Awards 
Discretionary 
Awards 
Discretionary 
Awards 
       
Market Cap (t-1) 0.0367*** 0.0397** 0.0328 0.0350 0.0285 0.0218 
 
(0.0102) (0.0193) (0.0347) (0.0249) (0.0244) (0.0259) 
Market Perf. 0.0299 0.0341 
  
0.0309 0.0460 
 
(0.0428) (0.0704) 
  
(0.0371) (0.0632) 
Market Weight * Market Perf. 
 
-0.244 
   
-0.208 
  
(0.298) 
   
(0.501) 
Accounting Perf. 
  
0.108 -0.00454 0.117 0.0724 
   
(0.408) (0.575) (0.365) (0.752) 
Accounting Weight * Accounting Perf. 
   
0.212 
 
0.251 
    
(0.667) 
 
(0.881) 
Observations 395 395 395 395 395 395 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1164 0.1209 0.1155 0.1170 0.1171 0.1227 
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Table 2.11. Continued 
Panel B:  Discretionary Awards and Firm Present Performance -- Median Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Dis. Awards Dis. Awards Dis. Awards Dis. Awards Dis. Awards Dis. Awards 
Market Cap (t-1) 0.0420*** 0.0374*** 0.0447*** 0.0519*** 0.0460*** 0.0458** 
 
(0.00652) (0.00772) (0.0156) (0.0185) (0.0177) (0.0219) 
Market Perf. -0.0349 -0.0164 
  
-0.0317 -0.0225 
 
(0.0233) (0.0197) 
  
(0.0307) (0.0226) 
Market Weight * Market Perf. 
 
-0.0983 
   
-0.0542 
  
(0.177) 
   
(0.119) 
Accounting Perf. 
  
-0.0659 -0.196 -0.0502 -0.0758 
   
(0.238) (0.440) (0.221) (0.363) 
Accounting Weight * Accounting Perf. 
   
0.171 
 
0.0474 
    
(0.527) 
 
(0.309) 
Observations 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1213 0.1237 0.1130 0.1176 0.1223 0.1254 
Panel C:  Discretionary Awards and Firm Future Performance -- Median Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Dis. Awards Dis. Awards Dis. Awards Dis. Awards Dis. Awards Dis. Awards 
Market Cap (t-1) 0.0299** 0.0277* 0.0438*** 0.0452*** 0.0415* 0.0387** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0142) (0.00793) (0.00718) (0.0232) (0.0162) 
Market Perf. -0.0290 -0.0431 
  
-0.00950 -0.0240 
 
(0.0271) (0.0324) 
  
(0.0458) (0.0357) 
Market Weight * Market Perf. 
 
0.0507 
   
0.0397 
  
(0.101) 
   
(0.0824) 
Accounting Perf. 
  
-0.0856 -0.106 -0.0819 -0.0794 
   
(0.0620) (0.255) (0.0789) (0.253) 
Accounting Weight * Accounting Perf. 
   
0.148 
 
0.140 
    
(0.286) 
 
(0.355) 
Observations 395 395 395 395 395 395 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1136 0.1165 0.1162 0.1243 0.1170 0.1274 
 
  
So we further investigate the link between discretionary awards and firm performance. We 
analyze the pay-for-performance sensitivity in the discretionary portion of CEO 
compensation. The results are reported in Table 2.11. We use similar specifications to 
those in Section 4.6 (see Table 2.9). We define market performance as dollar returns to 
shareholders and accounting performance as net income. We use past performance (fiscal 
2006—Panel A) and present performance (fiscal 2007—Panel B) because some 
discretionary awards are granted at the beginning and at the end of fiscal 2007. The 
dependent variable is the value of the discretionary awards granted to the CEO in 2007. We 
use median regression and control for firm size (at the beginning of fiscal 2007) and sector 
dummies. We find that neither market nor accounting performance significantly explain 
the level of discretionary awards. 
While no pay-for-past-performance could indicate sub-optimality of the contract, it is also 
possible that the board pays the CEO for actions that are not easily observable or cannot be 
easily contracted. If this is the case, then to the extent that these actions maximize value, we 
should observe a correlation between the non-discretionary awards and future firm value. 
We therefore study whether there is some relation between discretionary awards and 
future performance (Panel C). We do not find any significant relation.82 
These results cast doubt on the optimality of these awards and call for further research to 
understand the reasons for awarding discretionary awards. Based on our analysis thus far, 
we find mixed evidence on the relation between compensation and governance. Measures 
                                                 
82 Another possibility is that discretionary awards are not given for performance at all. For example, Oyer 
(2004) shows that some awards are given for retention purposes. However, even when awards are given for 
retention purposes, it is likely that they will be given when the outside options of the CEO are high - 
correlated with the performance of the stock (Himmelberg and Hubbard 2000). 
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that we use for weak governance are not significantly related to the choice of performance 
measures; only ownership concentration is related to the fraction of discretionary awards 
and performance horizon; and ownership structure does not alter the fundamental relation 
between complexity, growth, maturity, and compensation structure. We interpret these 
results as weak evidence of deviation from optimal contracting. 
2.7. Conclusion 
The new disclosure requirements introduced in December 2006 by the SEC enable us to 
observe how boards link CEO awards to performance. Our evidence suggests that firms 
base the majority of the awards on explicit and pre-specified performance measures. 
Furthermore, we find significant variations in the use of performance measures. On 
average, firms rely mostly on accounting-based performance measures, among which they 
put heavier weights on income measures, sales, and accounting returns. Our findings are in 
line with predictions from optimal contracting theories: firms with complex activities and 
large growth opportunities tend to rely less on explicit-performance measures and tend to 
tie a larger fraction of the award to market-based measures rather than to accounting-
based measures. Large firms tend to use long-term performance horizon. Growth firms 
tend to rely on sales measures among accounting measures, whereas mature firms tend to 
rely more on accounting returns. CEOs with long tenure, a measure of the stability of firm 
strategy, tend to receive a larger fraction of awards tied to explicit-performance measures 
and a larger fraction of performance-based awards tied to accounting-based measures. 
We do not find that governance mechanisms distort the choice of performance measures in 
the CEO contract. All the measures that we use for weak governance are not significantly 
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related to the choice of measures. We find some evidence that the discretionary portion of 
the compensation is larger and performance horizon is shorter when shareholder 
monitoring is weaker, but only when measured by the proportion of ownership by 5% 
blockholder. We interpret these results as weak evidence of deviation from optimal 
contracting. Further investigation of the discretionary portion of compensation is a fruitful 
area for future research. 
  
Appendix 2.A. Evolution of compensation disclosure: 2005-2007 
In this appendix we examine the level of disclosure of the different components of CEO compensation for a sample of 87 firms 
that belong to the S&P 500. We examine the proxy statements of fiscal 2005 (a year before the rule), fiscal 2006 (immediately 
after the rule) and fiscal 2007 (after the rule). 
Disclosure Evolution 
  2005 (N=87) 2006 (N=87) 2007 (N=87) 
Items 
Nbr of 
Firms Proportion 
Nbr of 
Firms Proportion 
Nbr of 
Firms Proportion 
Information about consulting service and peer group:          
   Firm employs an external consulting firm and its name is reported 17 20% 66 76% 79 91% 
   Use of a peer group 73 84% 81 93% 86 99% 
Information about benchmarking:          
   Total direct compensation benchmarked against a peer group 14 16% 14 16% 22 25% 
   Base salary is targeted as a certain proportion of total direct 
   compensation 2 2% 26 30% 28 32% 
   Base salary benchmarked against a peer group 19 22% 22 25% 29 33% 
Details of performance based non equity awards and cash bonus:          
   Disclosure of performance threshold 8 9% 33 38% 54 62% 
   Disclosure of payoff conditional on performance 13 15% 63 72% 73 84% 
Details of performance based stock awards:          
   Disclosure of performance threshold 9 10% 36 41% 38 44% 
   Disclosure of payoff conditional on performance 28 32% 45 52% 48 55% 
Details of non-performance based stock awards:          
   Disclosure of vesting schedule 40 46% 40 46% 43 49% 
Details of performance based stock-option awards:          
   Disclosure of performance threshold 0 0% 3 3% 0 0% 
   Disclosure of payoff conditional on performance 0 0% 4 5% 0 0% 
Details of non-performance based stock-option awards:          
   Disclosure of vesting schedule and pricing method 68 78% 68 78% 67 77% 
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Appendix 2.B. Illustration of our Data Collection Methodology 
In this appendix, we illustrate our data collection methodology using the 2008 
Proxy Statement (for fiscal 2007) of the IBM company. We start by looking at the 
Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table to identify the performance-based and time-
vesting awards granted to CEO Palmisano in fiscal year 2007. 
 
 
In 2007, IBM granted to Mr. Palmisano non-equity and equity performance-based 
awards: respectively, annual incentive awards (AIP) and performance share 
awards (PSU). IBM also granted equity time-vesting awards: restricted shares 
awards (RSU) and nonqualified stock option awards (SO). RSU and SO vest 
independently of firm performance, and thus according to the SEC definition, RSU 
and SO are not performance-based awards. In contrast, the amount of AIP and 
PSU that will be paid to the CEO is conditional on performance; thus, according to 
the SEC definition, AIP and PSU are performance-based awards. Performance-
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based awards are tied to pre-specified performance targets. For these awards, we 
consider the amount that is likely to be expensed by the company (i.e., the target 
value for non-equity awards and the fair value for equity awards). Furthermore, 
the CEO did not receive any discretionary bonus in 2007. Therefore, we can now 
compute the proportion of value of the CEO awards in 2007 that is tied to pre-
specified performance targets: 
 
Proportion of the value of CEO awards tied to pre-specified performance targets 
(i.e. proportion of performance-based awards) 
 
Non Equity Performance based   Equity Performance based 
Discret. Bonus   Non Equity Perf. based   Equity Perf. based    Equity Time vesting 
 
5,000  7,574.818
0  5,000  7,574.818  3,24 .321  1,498.55
 
 72. 0% 
 
Therefore 72.60% of the value of CEO awards in 2007 is tied to pre-specified 
targets. 
 
We then identify the performance measures used in the performance-based 
awards and their respective weights. This information is usually located in the 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis Section, but sometimes one can also find 
it in the footnotes of the Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table or of the Summary 
Compensation Table. 
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We copy below two paragraphs of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
Section in which we identify the performance measures: 
 
Given this information, we can now compute the proportion of performance-
based awards tied to the different performance measures. We first observe that 
IBM uses only accounting-based measures. Therefore, the proportion of 
performance-based awards tied to accounting (market)-based measures is 100% 
(0%). IBM uses three types of accounting measures: Income Measure (Net 
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Income and EPS), Revenue Measure (Revenue Growth), and Cash-Flow Measure. 
Below are the details of the calculations of their weights: 
 
Among accounting measures, proportion of value of performance-based awards 
tied to measure X 
   
Non Equity Performance based Awards 
Non Equity Perf. based Awards   Equity Perf. based Awards 
 
                Non Equity Performance based Awards  
   
Equity Performance based Awards 
Non Equity Perf. based Awards   Equity Perf. based Awards 
 
                Equity Performance based Awards   
  
1
Proportion of value of Performance based Awards tied to Accounting Measures
  
 
Therefore, we obtain the following weights: 
 
Income Weight   
5,000
5,000  7,574.818
     
7,574.818
5,000  7,574.818
     
        
 evenue Weight   
5,000
5,000  7,574.818
     11.93% 
Cash Flow Weight   
5,000
5,000  7,574.818
     
7,574.818
5,000  7,574.818
     
 1 .02% 
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We are also interested in the performance horizon used by IBM to set the 
performance goals. The performance horizon is 1 year for AIP and 3 years for 
PSU. We can now compute the performance horizon of CEO performance-based 
awards: 
 
Performance Horizon 
   
Non Equity Performance based Awards 
Non Equity Perf. based Awards   Equity Perf. based Awards 
 
                         Non Equity Performance based Awards 
   
Equity Performance based Awards 
Non Equity Perf. based Awards   Equity Perf. based Awards 
 
                         Equity Performance based Awards 
= 
5,000
5,000 7,574.818
 1 year  
         
               
 3 years 
 2.20 years 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DESIGN OF DIVISION MANAGERS INCENTIVE COMPENSATION CONTRACTS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Division managers (DMs) are key elements in the well-functioning of an 
organization. In addition to supervising a subset of firm’s activities, DMs are also 
crucial intermediaries in the information flow within the company. Misalignment 
in DM incentives could lead to not only weak division performance but also to 
sub-optimal capital allocation decisions across the entire company (Harris and 
Raviv, 1996, and Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). One important mechanism to 
control these incentive problems is the compensation contract. Yet, although 
there is an extensive literature on CEO compensation, little is known regarding 
how firms design DM compensation contracts. 
Investigating DM incentives involves different challenges than examining CEO 
incentives. First, while the CEO is already at the top of the hierarchy, the DM can 
still climb the corporate ladder and potentially become the next CEO if he or she 
is performing well. These implicit incentives could play a significant role in 
designing DM incentives. Second, contrary to the CEO who is responsible for the 
overall firm performance, the DM bears direct responsibility only for the 
performance of his or her division. This creates a trade-off between using firm 
performance and division performance in designing DM compensation contract. 
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On the one hand, division performance is likely to be more informative of DM 
effort or actions. On the other hand, the use of division performance can create 
some adverse incentives such as to not collaborate with other divisions or to 
distort the information flow, in particular to exacerbate investment opportunities 
in his or her own division at the expense of the other divisions. Understanding 
how firms consider these issues and design DM incentive compensation contracts 
is the goal of this paper. 
In December 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued 
disclosures rules on executive compensation, which require firms to provide 
additional information regarding the choice of contractual terms in executive 
compensation. I take advantage of these disclosure requirements and hand-
collect information regarding the contractual terms that govern the level and 
types of DM incentives such as ownership requirements, target incentive 
compensation, and choice of performance measures with their assigned weights. 
I gather this information from the 100 largest companies in the U.S. in fiscal year 
2007. However, compensation details need to be disclosed only for the top5 
executives within the firm and thus not all firms publicly disclose DM 
compensation details. To identify DMs within the organization, I follow previous 
studies, such as Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), and classify executives who bear 
direct divisional responsibility among top5 executives as DMs. More than half of 
the sample firms have at least one DM among their top5 executives. In addition, 
the number of identifiable DMs varies across firms and, thus, to alleviate part of 
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the sample selection concerns, most of the analysis focuses on the top DM within 
the organization. 
The first set of results is related to the level of incentives in DM contracts. In 
order to study the role of promotion-based incentives in the design of DM 
contract, I compare the level of contractual incentives provided to the DM and to 
the CEO (i.e. the contractual incentive gap). As mentioned in Baker, Jensen, and 
Murphy (1988), the fact that the CEO is at the top of the corporate hierarchy 
precludes the presence of any promotion-based incentives for the CEO. In 
addition, comparing DM incentives to CEO incentives also controls for potential 
firm fixed effects in the provision of employee incentives. While firms tend to 
provide significantly more contractual incentives to the CEO, the contractual 
incentive gap varies extensively across firms. I observe that on average the 
ownership requirements (target incentive compensation) are 3.5 (3.2) times 
higher for the CEO than for the DM. Furthermore, the ratios of ownership 
requirements (target incentive compensation) of the CEO to the DM vary from 1 
to 6.6 (0 to 10.4). I find that both measures of contractual incentive gap are 
significantly and positively related to CEO age. Moreover, the gap tends to be 
greater in industries where new CEOs are likely to be recruited from within the 
firm. These results suggest that when the probability of promotion to CEO is 
lower, firms tend to provide greater contractual incentives to their DMs, which is 
consistent with the prediction that promotion-based incentives can act as a 
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substitute for contractual incentives (see Gibbs, 1995, and the discussion in the 
next section). 
The second set of results is related to the type of incentives in DM compensation 
contracts. For that purpose, I study the pay-performance terms and measure how 
compensation incentives are tied to different performance measures, in 
particular firm performance and division performance. I observe that in general 
most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance, 
whereas division performance captures only a small portion of DM incentives: on 
average 11% of the value of DM awards are explicitly associated with division 
performance (the median equals 8%). These results suggest that potential 
influence costs within the organization are high:83 firms assign a large weight on 
firm performance in order to reduce DM adverse incentives to engage in 
influence activities or to distort information flow (Milgrom, 1988, and Meyer, 
Milgrom, and Roberts, 1992). Consistent with this argument, I also find that 
division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when 
within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. These findings further 
show that influence cost considerations are an important determinant of the 
design of DM contract. 
                                                 
83 This finding is consistent with Wulf (2002) who investigates the effect of DM compensation 
incentives on capital allocation policies. She finds a negative relation between the sensitivity of 
division-investment to division-performance and firm performance-based compensation 
incentives. She interprets these results as supportive evidence of the presence of influence 
activities within the firm. 
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When agents face some common uncertainties, moral hazard in teams’ models 
predict the use of relative performance evaluation in designing compensation 
contracts (see Holmstrom, 1982). In that case, inducing competition among their 
DMs would lead to more efficient incentives schemes within the organization. 
Although some firms explicitly benchmark firm performance to peer or market 
performance, I do not find evidence that firms use relative performance 
evaluation across divisions within the firm. This result also supports the 
argument that firms favor “team-play” practices in order to reduce DM adverse 
incentives. Moreover, it contrasts with the results in Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2003) who find some support in the presence of relative performance evaluation 
across divisions within the firm.84 
In addition, my results show that the type of contractual terms do not vary across 
DMs. In most cases, the weights assigned to firm and division performance are 
identical across DMs within the organization. This result can be to some extent 
unexpected: recent results regarding network characteristics within the 
organization (Duchin and Sosyura, 2011), suggest that the influence or lobbying 
power across DMs would vary. If that is the case, it would be optimal to change 
the weight assigned to division performance across DMs. However, apart from 
potential deviations from optimal contracting, this result might just reflect the 
fact that contracting costs are high and, thus, firms use uniform contractual 
                                                 
84  See De Angelis and Grinstein (2011) for an analysis and discussion regarding the 
informativeness of the choice of contractual terms in detecting the use of relative performance 
evaluation. 
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policies (instead of personalizing contractual terms for each DM) in order to 
reduce these costs. 
This study adds to the incentive compensation literature in several ways. First, in 
the spirit of Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and De Angelis and Grinstein (2012), 
this paper examines actual contracts and provides a snapshot of current practices 
as well as directly investigates the choice of contractual terms. Apart from studies 
that used proprietary data (although of only one firm or on a single-component of 
the DM contract),85 past studies needed to estimate contractual choices from 
observed compensation outcomes. This methodology can be prone to 
identification problems due to nonlinearities in the payoff structure as well as be 
prone to sample selection issues due to matching difficulties across 
compensation and segment performance databases.86 
Second, the examination of firm performance-based and division performance-
based incentives sheds light on the importance of within-firm influence cost 
considerations in the design of DM contracts. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) also 
study the presence of these two types of incentives in DM compensation; 
however, they do not consider influence costs explanations in their empirical 
framework. 
                                                 
85 See, for instance, Gibbs (1995) and Ederhof (2011) who use proprietary data from a single 
firm, and Wulf (2002) who uses survey data on annual bonuses. 
86 Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) are able to match only 46 percent of their DMs (among top5 
executives) to segment information using the Compustat Segment database. 
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Finally, this paper also contributes to the debate regarding the interaction 
between promotion-based incentives and contractual incentives.87 Even though 
there are theoretical arguments predicting a substitution effect between these 
two incentive mechanisms (Gibbs, 1995), only few papers aim to empirically 
disentangle these two types of incentives. Moreover, the existing evidence is 
mixed. Gibbs (1995) and Ederhof (2011) use proprietary data from a single large 
hierarchical corporation and reach opposite conclusions. Both studies focus on 
middle managers (3 to 6 ranks below the DM in my study) and their analysis is 
limited to a single firm. Thus, it is debatable whether their conclusions can be 
extended to higher-ranking managers, and to a larger sample. 
The paper continues as follows. Section 3.2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3.3 
provides a brief description of the disclosure requirements issued by the SEC as 
well as explains the data collection methodology. In Section 3.4, I describe and 
analyze the choice of the contractual terms in DM incentive compensation 
contracts. Section 3.5 concludes and proposes some directions for further 
research. 
3.2 Development of the Hypotheses 
In this section, I review theoretical arguments related to the design of DM 
contract. I focus on two aspects of the contract. The first one is the level of 
contractual incentives and its interaction with promotion-based incentives. The 
                                                 
87 See also Gibbons and Murphy (1992) who study CEO implicit incentives from career concerns. 
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second aspect pertains to the trade-off between the use of firm-performance 
incentives and division-performance incentives in DM contract. 
3.2.1 DM Contractual Incentives and Promotion-based Incentives 
As shown in Gibbons and Murphy (1992), implicit incentives derived from the 
possibility of career advancement are expected to play a role in the provision of 
explicit contractual incentives. Implicit incentives in Gibbons and Murphy (1992) 
arise from the external labor markets; however, similar arguments can be made 
in the internal labor markets where implicit incentives arise from the possibility 
of being promoted within the firm. Indeed, a model by Gibbs (1995) formalizes 
this idea and predicts that under certain conditions promotion-based incentives 
will act as a substitute for contractual incentives. 
To illustrate the intuition behind these predictions, here is a simple sketch of the 
model in Gibbs (1995). Consider a moral hazard problem where the firm employs 
a DM to execute a set of tasks, but the firm does not observe DM actions (only the 
outcome of DM actions, e.g. division and firm performance). The firm sets a 
compensation contract in order to induce the DM to exert effort and to maximize 
firm value. The DM has the following expected utility:                   
 ( )  with C’>0 and C’’>0.88 The DM derives utility from his or her income (W(e)) 
and the option of being the next CEO (        where P(e) is the probability of 
being promoted to CEO, and   is the utility derived from being promoted to CEO, 
                                                 
88 For ease of exposition, in Gibbs (1995) model I assume that the expected level of ability is 1 
(i.e.   1). 
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e.g. increase in wage, reputation, etc.). Both DM compensation and the probability 
of being promoted are positively associated to DM’s level of effort, e. There is also 
a certain cost, C(e), associated to his or her level of effort, which impacts 
negatively his or her utility. The compensation contract is a linear function of the 
firm’s performance measure:  ( )          , where b is DM base salary,   
represents the sensitivity of compensation to performance (i.e. the level of 
contractual incentives), and X is a noisy performance measure:          , 
with         
 ). It is important to note that in this model, firms can only design 
DM contract (i.e. choose b and  ) and can not influence implicit incentives 
derived from the possibility of being promoted to CEO. As argued in Gibbs 
(1995), the hierarchical and organization structure is set (at least for the short 
run) and thus the probability function, P(e), can be seen as quasi-exogenous (e.g. 
only one DM can be promoted to CEO, there is only one head of the segment and 
the span of firms’ activities is a rather long-term decision, etc.). In addition, Gibbs 
(1995) also argues that the levels of expected wages are likely to be determined 
by external market forces and thus firms have limited ability to influence the 
prize associated to the CEO rank position.89 The total incentives provided to the 
DM is captured by the sum of the contractual incentives, which are represented 
here by the sensitivity of compensation to performance ( ), and the promotion-
                                                 
89 This last point contrasts with assumptions in tournament-type models such as the ones in 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986). In these models, the prize associated with promotion 
and thus the design of the hierarchical structure is one of the central choice variables. Indeed, 
empirical studies, such as Boganno (2001) and Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009), when 
deriving their empirical predictions abstract from the choice of the level of contractual incentives 
and focus only on the determination of the prize structure. 
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based incentives, which, in this case, are the product of the marginal effect of 
effort on the probability of being promoted times the utility derived from being 
promoted (       ). It can then be shown that at the equilibrium the following 
condition holds:    1    (  )    . 90  In other words, under certain 
distributional conditions, it is optimal for the firm to provide lower contractual 
incentives when promotion-based incentives are greater. This represents the first 
hypothesis of this study. 
H.3.1: In presence of greater promotion-based incentives, firms will provide 
lower contractual incentives. 
According to the model, in order to identify cross-sectional variations in the level 
of promotion-based incentives, one needs to estimate either the marginal effect 
of effort on the probability of being promoted or the utility derived from (or the 
prize associated to) being promoted. These are difficult empirical tasks. In this 
paper, I use the probability of being promoted to gauge cross sectional variations 
in the level of promotion-based incentives. 
Assume a standard promotion rule such that                     ( ).91 
Under certain conditions, P’(e) increases in promotion probabilities (see Gibbs, 
1995). For instance, if   is distributed normally, then it can be shown that P’(e) 
                                                 
90 If there is no promotion-based incentives (i.e.   (  )     ), then    1 which is the 
standard result when both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral. One can then note that in 
the presence of promotion-based incentives, contractual incentives are lower (i.e.   (  )    
     1). 
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rises as P increases.92 In other words, the level of promotion-based incentives 
increases as the probability of being promoted to CEO increases. As a result, H1 
predicts that in firms in which it is more likely for the DM to be promoted to CEO, 
firms will provide lower contractual incentives. 
3.2.2 Firm- and Division-Performance-based Incentives 
While in the previous subsection I provide theoretical arguments regarding the 
level of incentives in the contract, here I focus on the types of incentives in the 
contract, and more precisely on the choice of performance measures. Consider 
again a moral hazard problem, but this time with a risk-averse DM as well as two 
performance measures, firm performance and division performance. According 
to the informativeness principle in Holmstrom (1979), performance measures 
that are more informative of DM actions (or effort) should bear larger weights in 
DM contract. Since the DM has complete oversight over division activities and 
does not bear overall corporate responsibilities (contrary to the CEO), on can 
argue that in general division performance should be a more precise measure of 
DM effort than firm performance. Firm performance includes performance of 
other divisions which are not under this DM’s control, and hence will lead to a 
noisier signal of DM effort. Therefore, division performance should bear a larger 
weight in DM contract. Note that if divisions’ activities within the firm are not 
                                                                                                                                            
91 The standard rule is used for the sake of simplicity. Similar conclusions can be reached under a 
tournament version of this model, such that there are multiple DMs and only the one with the best 
performance can be promoted. See Gibbs (1996) for a detailed discussion and derivation. 
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independent (i.e. the firm activities are to some extent integrated), then other 
divisions’ performance might be informative of DM effort.93 It follows that 
greater level of integration of firm’s activities should lead to greater weight 
placed on firm performance in DM contract. 
However, there exists a second rational for the use of firm-performance in DM 
contract, namely the adverse incentive costs associated with tying compensation 
to division performance, which is the focus of my second hypothesis. DMs with 
private information about their divisions may distort the information flow within 
the organization for their own benefits (see Milgrom, 1988, and Meyer, Milgrom, 
and Roberts, 1992, for arguments related to influence activities within the firm). 
For instance, in order to attract a larger fraction of firm’s budget, DMs might 
exacerbate investment opportunities in their own division at the expense of the 
other divisions in the firm. A larger weight on division-performance will 
exacerbate DM rent-seeking behavior while a larger weight on firm-performance 
will mitigate these adverse incentives. 94  Precisely, if the DM distorts the 
information flow and thus distorts firm investment policy, firm performance will 
decrease. Hence, if firms tie DM compensation to firm-performance, DM 
compensation will decrease if he or she engages into influence activities.  
                                                                                                                                            
92 This holds as long as P is less than 0.5 – it is realistic to assume that the unconditional 
probability of promotion is less than 0.5 (Gibbs, 1995). The level of promotion–based incentives 
would be highest at P=0.5.  
93 See results in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) regarding the use of aggregate 
performance measures when there are intrafirm interdependencies. See also Keating (1997). 
94 See Wulf (2002) for a study of the interplay between incentives arising from the budgeting 
decision and incentives from compensation. 
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In other words, there exists a tradeoff between tying compensation to division-
performance versus firm-performance. While division-performance might be a 
more precise measure of DM effort, firm-performance will increase DM private 
cost to engage into influence activities. 
H.3.2: Firms that are more vulnerable to within-organization conflicts will 
assign a smaller (larger) weight to division-performance (firm-
performance) in DM contract. 
When DMs in the firm face some common uncertainties, it would be optimal to 
benchmark division performance to the performance of the other divisions in the 
firm (Holmstrom, 1982). In that case the use of relative performance evaluation 
would lead to more efficient contractual terms. However, analogously to the 
previous argument, the use of relative performance evaluation could exacerbate 
DM adverse incentives. Relative performance evaluation would directly induce 
competition among the DMs and, thus, DMs have now some incentives to reduce 
the performance of the other divisions. Hence I expect firms in which within-
organization conflicts are more severe to rely less on relative performance 
evaluation in DM contract. 
H.3.3: Firms that are more vulnerable to within-organization conflicts are 
less likely to use relative performance evaluation across their divisions. 
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3.3 Methodology and Data 
3.3.1 2006 Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules and Data 
Collection 
In this paper, I take advantage of the 2006 Compensation Disclosure Rules to 
collect detailed information regarding the terms in DMs contracts. These 
disclosure rules were issued by the SEC in order “… to provide investors with a 
clearer and more complete picture of compensation to principal executive officers” (see 
Background and Overview Section in the SEC Release Nos. 33-8732A). Among the 
new requirements, firms are now required to provide detailed information regarding 
their choices of performance measures along with their assigned weights, payouts 
and target goals.95 Firms are also now required to disclose and discuss any 
ownership requirement. 
The data collection methodology is similar to the one employed in De Angelis and 
Grinstein (2012). I gather information from the 2008 proxy statements (i.e. for 
fiscal year 2007) and identify the performance measures used in DM contract 
along with their assigned weights. I collect these performance terms in the 
performance-based awards granted to the DMs. This allows me, for instance, to 
disentangle the fraction of DM awards tied to firm performance and division 
performance. I use the expected value of these awards (i.e. the payout of the 
awards if the target performance is achieved) to compute the fraction of awards 
                                                 
95 See De Angelis and Grinstein (2012) for a detailed discussion regarding these new 
requirements and the data collection methodology. 
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tied to different performance measures. In addition, I also collect information 
regarding the ownership requirements for the DMs and the CEO. 
De Angelis and Grinstein (2012) show that these disclosure requirements are 
binding and that firms provide more detailed compensation information 
subsequent to these rules. They also show that this new data is informative and 
that the contractual terms are binding. 
3.3.2 Data 
3.3.2.1 Sample Selection and Identifying the DMs 
The initial sample represents the 100 largest companies (in terms of market 
capitalization) in the U.S. in fiscal year 2007. However, compensation details need 
to be disclosed only for the top5 executives within the firm and thus not all firms 
publicly disclose DM compensation details. This data limitation has already been 
encountered in past studies (see, e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). To identify 
DMs within the organization, I follow previous studies, such as Aggarwal and 
Samwick (2003), and classify executives who bear direct divisional responsibility 
among top5 executives as DMs. In figure 3.1, I report the distribution of the 
number of identifiable DMs by firm. 
In my initial sample, 47 firms do not have at least one identifiable DM among 
their top5 executives.96 These firms are dropped out of the final sample. The 
                                                 
96 Aggarwal and Samwich (2003) report that 19% of the top 5 executives in their sample have 
divisional responsabilities. This represents about 0.95 DM per firm on average, which is similar to 
1.05 DM per firm on average in my sample. 
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number of identifiable DMs varies across firms. Most of the analysis focuses on 
the top DM within the organization. The DM who is granted the largest total 
awards is classified as the top DM. The focus on only the top DM has the 
advantage to alleviate part of the sample selection concerns owing to the 
variations of the number of identifiable DMs by firm. Finally, due to non-
identifiable contractual terms and missing variables, the sample size in the 
regression analysis varies from 38 to 52 firm observations. 
Figure 3.1. Distribution of the number of identifiable division managers by firm 
 
Figure 3.1 represents the distribution of the number of identifiable DMs per firm. 
 
 
 
3.3.2.2 DM Compensation 
There are two kinds of awards granted to DMs: time-vesting equity awards and 
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performance). The value of time-vesting equity awards is by design associated to 
firm performance and stock price performance. Performance-based awards, on 
the other hand, are associated to various performance measures (the 
performance terms are collected from these awards: most of the performance-
based awards tend to be associated to firm performance and accounting 
performance – see section 3.4.1 and the results in Table 3.3). In Table 3.1, I report 
the distribution of the different types of awards in DM compensation for fiscal 
year 2007. 
On average, each type of awards represents approximately half of the value of the 
total awards. For performance-based awards, I consider the expected value of the 
awards (i.e. the target payout). The payout of performance-based awards can be 
in cash, stock or options. Most firms tend to grant some cash performance-based 
awards: 47 firms grant some annual cash incentives plan and 18 firms grant 
some long-term cash incentives plan. The expected payouts for the long-term 
cash incentives plan tend to be greater than the ones for the annual cash 
incentives plan: 1.4 million dollars on average for the long-term plan while only 
1.1 million dollars on average for the annual plan. Equity performance-based 
awards tend to given in the form of stock awards: 29 firms grant some stock 
performance-based awards while only 2 firms grant some option performance-
based awards. On the other hand, among time-vesting awards, options awards 
tend to be predominant: 43 firms grant some options awards while only 34 firms 
grant some stock awards. 
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Table 3.1. Division manager compensation 
 
Table 3.1 describes DM base salary and the different components of DM awards granted 
in fiscal year 2007. I report the numbers of firms that grant the different types of awards 
as well as the summary statistics of the (target) value of these awards in thousands of 
dollars (for firms that grant these awards). 
 
Base salary and awards granted to the top division manager in 2007 
  
 
        
 
# Firms with  
 
Stats for firms with  
component > 0 (in k$) 
 
component > 0 
 
Mean Median SD 
      Base Salary 53 
 
709 692 233 
      Performance-based Awards 50 
 
2576 2089 2051 
  - Annual Cash Incentives Plan 47 
 
1123 749 1522 
  - Long-term Cash Incentives Plan 18 
 
1438 1213 1079 
  - Stock Awards 29 
 
1708 1450 1386 
  - Option Awards 2 
 
265 265 53 
      Time-vesting Awards 50 
 
2704 1926 2628 
  - Stock Awards 34 
 
2477 1251 2916 
  - Option Awards 43 
 
1582 1420 1545 
      Total Awards 53 
 
5302 4440 3477 
   (excluding Base Salary) 
                 
 
3.3.2.3 Independent Variables 
I use several explanatory variables to study the determinants of the design of DM 
contract. The number of business segments is a proxy for the complexity of firm’s 
activities as well as for the vulnerability of the firm to within-organization 
conflicts (Stein, 1997). I also use the natural logarithm of a firm’s assets to 
measure firm size and the natural logarithm of firm age (defined by the year the 
firm was founded) to capture firm maturity. I employ two different variables to 
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measure the probability of promotion to CEO. The first one is the natural 
logarithm of CEO age at the end of 2007. Older CEOs are more likely to retire 
soon. The second variable is the proportion of new CEOs who received an 
internal promotion (i.e. CEOs who were already employed by the firm as opposed 
to an external hiring) among all new CEOs in the same industry between 1993 
and 2005. In industries with larger proportions, it is more likely that an insider 
will become the next CEO and, thus, the perceived probability of promotion to 
CEO is higher. I collect this information from Table 3 in Cremers and Grinstein 
(2011). The last variable is the fraction of outstanding shares held by outside 
shareholders who hold more than 5% of the total number of shares outstanding. 
This variable captures ownership concentration and will be used as a control 
variable in this study. Past studies, such as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), 
have shown that ownership characteristics are important determinants of 
executive compensation policies. The data for the independent variables are 
extracted from Compustat and Corporate Library. The explanatory variables are 
from fiscal year 2006 (unless stated otherwise). Table 3.2 provides some basic 
descriptive statistics of the independent variables. Sample firms represent the 
largest firms in the US with total assets of approximately 60 billion dollars in 
2006 on average. They also tend to be complex with multiple lines of business: 
the average (median) number of business segments is 3.25 (3). In addition, the 
sample firms are also very mature: on average they have been running for at least 
62 years. The CEO is on average 58 years old and the proportion of insiders 
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among new CEOs is on average 68%. The standard deviations of these two 
variables are 5 and 12% respectively, which suggest that the perceived 
probability of promotion to CEO varies greatly across the sample firms. 
Table 3.2. Independent variables: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in this study. 
The explanatory variables are from fiscal year 2006 (unless stated otherwise). # Bus. 
Seg. represents the number of business segments. Log Assets is the natural logarithm of a 
firm’s total assets (in millions dollars). Firm Age is equal to 2007 minus the year the firm 
was founded. CEO Age is the age of the CEO at the end of fiscal year 2007. Prop. Insider 
among New CEO represents the proportion of insiders from the same industry among all 
new CEOs for each industry between 1993 and 2005 (Cremers and Grinstein, 2011). 
Block Ownership is the ratio of shares held by the shareholders who held more than 5% 
of total number of shares outstanding to the number of shares outstanding. 
 
Independent variables: Descriptive statistics 
     
 
Mean Median SD # obs 
     
# Bus. Seg. 3.25 3.00 2.12 52 
Log Assets 11.00 11.70 1.25 52 
Firm Age 62.33 53.50 46.29 52 
CEO Age 57.88 58.00 5.23 52 
Prop. Insider among New CEO 68% 69% 12% 52 
Block Ownership 10% 6% 15% 52 
          
 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Terms of DM Incentive Compensation Contracts 
In Table 3.3, I report the summary statistics regarding the terms of DM incentive 
compensation contracts, such as the level of ownership requirements, the type of 
performance measures as well as the length of the performance horizon used in 
the performance-based awards.  
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Table 3.3. Contractual terms of division manager incentive compensation 
 
Table 3.3 describes the terms in DM contract. Panel A reports summary statistics 
regarding ownership requirement. Panel B and D report the number of firms using 
different types of performance measures as well as basis statistics regarding the weight 
associated with these measures. Panel C provides basic statistics about the performance-
vesting horizon. 
 
Panel A: Ownership requirement for the top division manager 
 
# Firms with  
 
Stats (in k$) 
 
requirement 
 
Mean Median SD 
Ownership requirement 45 
 
2814 2400 1487 
Panel B: Firm- and division-performance-based incentives 
# of firms with identifiable performance terms 
   
38 
 
# Firms with  
 
Associated weight among users 
 
performance terms 
 
Mean Median SD 
Firm-performance 36 
 
82% 83% 19% 
  - Annual Cash Incentives Plan 28 
 
65% 50% 28% 
  - Long-term Cash Incentives Plan 17 
 
100% 100% 0% 
  - Stock Awards 23 
 
97% 100% 10% 
  - Option Awards 2 
 
100% 100% 0% 
Division-performance 28 
 
32% 25% 25% 
  - Annual Cash Incentives Plan 27 
 
69% 60% 24% 
  - Long-term Cash Incentives Plan 0 
 
N/A N/A N/A 
  - Stock Awards 2 
 
33% 33% 11% 
  - Option Awards 0 
 
N/A N/A N/A 
Panel C: Performance horizon 
 
# Firms 
 
Mean Median SD 
Performance horizon 38 
 
2.05 2.29 0.63 
Panel D: Type of performance measures 
 
# Firms with  
 
Weight among users 
 
performance terms 
 
Mean Median SD 
Stock price 13 
 
41% 39% 21% 
Accounting performance 38 
 
77% 88% 25% 
Non-financial measures 23 
 
14% 9% 17% 
Relative performance evaluation 
  - Firm Performance 16 
 
41% 37% 22% 
  - Division Perf. (within the firm) 0 
 
N/A N/A N/A 
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I can identify the level of ownership requirements for 45 firms and the type of 
performance measures with their assigned weights for 38 firms. On average firms 
require their top DM to hold 2.8 million dollars worth of shares. The median 
value is 2.4 million dollars. These ownership requirements vary extensively 
across firms: the standard deviation is 1.5 million dollars. Most firms use firm-
performance terms in the performance-based awards (36 firms out of 38). When 
they use firm-performance terms, they assign on average 82% of the expected 
value of the performance-based awards. Many firms also tie explicitly vesting 
conditions to division performance (28 firms out of 38). Division-performance 
terms tend to be used mostly in annual cash incentives plan. Only 2 firms use 
division-performance terms in their stock performance-based awards. By 
consequence, division-performance terms tend to be over one year performance 
horizon. When they use division-performance terms, firms assign on average 
32% of the expected value of the performance-based awards. The weights 
assigned to division-performance tend to vary across firms: the standard 
deviation is 25%. 
I also observe that on average firms employ a 2 year performance horizon in DM 
contractual terms. Firms tend to favor the use of accounting-based performance 
measures over stock-based performance measures. This result is consistent with 
results regarding CEO contractual terms (see De Angelis and Grinstein, 2012). It 
is also consistent with results in Bouwens and Lent (2007) who use survey data 
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and document that stock-based performance measures play a minor role in 
determining annual bonuses of business managers in the Netherlands. 
I find that 16 firms (out of 38) use relative performance evaluation when 
assessing firm performance. In other words, about 42% of the sample firms 
explicitly benchmark firm performance. On the other hand, no firm uses relative 
performance evaluation when assessing division performance. Hence I can not 
directly test H3 since there is no cross sectional variation in the use of relative 
performance evaluation across firm’s divisions. However, this last result suggests 
that firms do not explicitly induce competition among their divisions and is 
consistent with the notion that influence costs are an important consideration 
within the organization. 
Even though the main analysis is focused on the top DM, I also collect information 
regarding the other DMs (when information is available, see Figure 1). On the one 
hand, I find that levels of contractual incentives vary across DMs: out of the 40 
firms which exhibit two or more identifiable DMs, 36 firms grant awards with 
different (expected) value across their DMs. On the other hand, the performance 
terms tend to be similar across different DMs within the company: only one firm 
in my sample use different performance terms (i.e. weights assigned to firm and 
division performance) across their DMs. 
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3.4.2 DM Contractual Incentives and Promotion-based Incentives 
In this subsection, I aim to investigate the interplay between incentives present 
in DM contract and promotion-based incentives in place. In that respect, I 
measure the contractual incentive gap between the CEO and the top DM. Since 
the CEO is at the top of the corporate hierarchy, it precludes the presence of any 
promotion-based incentives for him or her (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988). I 
use the ratio of CEO contractual incentives to DM contractual incentives. Firms 
with greater ratios provide lower contractual incentives to their top DM (relative 
to their CEO). In addition, another advantage of employing this ratio is that it 
controls for potential firm fixed effects in the provision of employee incentives. 
To estimate the level of contractual incentives, I use two different measures. The 
first one is the level of ownership requirements. The second measure is the 
expected value of all awards granted to the agent. Higher ownership 
requirements or more awards increase the level of contractual incentives as well 
as signal more willingness to tie the agent’s wealth to shareholders’ interests. The 
distributions of the two measures of contractual incentive gap are reported in 
Figure 3.2. 
Firms tend to provide significantly more contractual incentives to the CEO. I 
observe that on average the ownership requirements (target incentive 
compensation) are 3.5 (3.2) times larger for the CEO than for the DM. The 
contractual incentive gap varies extensively across firms and the two 
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distributions are close to normal-shaped. The ratios of ownership requirements 
(total awards) of the CEO to the DM vary from 1 to 6.6 (0 to 10.4). 
Figure 3.2. Distribution of the Contractual Incentive Gap 
 
Figure 3.2 represents the distributions of (i) the ratio of CEO ownership requirement to 
DM ownership requirement, and (ii) the ratio of CEO total awards to DM total awards. 
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I then investigate the determinants of these cross-sectional variations. Using OLS 
regressions, I study the relationship between these ratios and the perceived 
probability of promotion to CEO. According to the promotion-based incentives 
hypothesis (H1), I expect a positive relationship. In other words, when it is more 
likely for the DM to be promoted to CEO, I expect firms to provide less 
contractual incentives to their DM relative to their CEO (i.e. a higher ratio). The 
results are reported in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Determinants of the Contractual Incentive Gap 
 
Table 3.4 shows results of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the ratio of CEO 
ownership requirement to DM ownership requirement, and the ratio of CEO total awards 
to DM total awards. The independent variables are defined in Table 3.2. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates that the p-value is less than 
0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and * that it is less than 0.1. 
 
  Ownership requirement (CEO) / Total Awards (CEO) / 
 
Ownership requirement (DM)  Total Awards (DM) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    Log CEO Age 3.43* 3.76** 7.91* 8.43** 
 
(1.78) (1.78) (4.01) (3.98) 
Prop. Insider among New CEO 1.68 1.52 1.51 1.30 
 
(1.26) (1.33) (2.04) (1.91) 
Block Ownership 
 
1.69** 
 
3.16** 
  
(0.76) 
 
(1.23) 
Constant -11.60 -12.99* -29.84* -32.15* 
 
(6.99) (7.00) (16.22) (16.11) 
     Observations 45 45 52 52 
R-squared 0.110 0.160 0.154 0.217 
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There is a positive and significant relationship between both ratios of incentives 
gap and CEO age.97 In firms with older CEOs (i.e. more likely to retire soon), 
firms provide less contractual incentives to their DMs. Although not significant, 
the coefficient of the proportion of insiders among new CEOs is also positive, 
which is consistent with the promotion-based incentives hypothesis (H1). DM 
contractual incentives tend to be lower in industries where new CEOs are likely 
to be recruited from within the firm. The results are robust to the addition of 
ownership characteristics, which exhibit a positive and significant coefficient. 
These results suggest that when the probability of promotion to CEO is lower, 
firms tend to provide greater contractual incentives to their DMs, which is 
consistent with the prediction that promotion-based incentives can act as a 
substitute for contractual incentives. 
3.4.3 Division-Performance-based Incentives 
In this subsection, I measure the level of division-performance incentives in DM 
contracts as well as study the determinants of the presence of these incentives. 
As discussed previously, some of the performance terms are associated directly 
to division-performance while other performance terms are tied to firm-
performance. To measure the level of division-performance incentives in DM 
contract, I estimate the portion of the contract that is directly associated to 
                                                 
97 Using the outcome of compensation (i.e. the amount paid ex-post and not the expected value 
ex-ante) and looking at all the executives, Boganno (2001) and Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 
(2009) find a negative relationship between pay gap and CEO age. They view the pay gap as a 
lottery prize that could be won if promoted to CEO rank and investigate implications from 
corporate tournament theories (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
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division-performance. I first compute the value-weighted average of the 
performance measures associated to division-performance across all 
performance-contingent awards. Therefore, in the instance of multiple 
performance-based awards, for each award I identify the portion of performance 
terms tied to division-performance, and then use the expected value of these 
awards to compute the value-weighted average.98 Then I also take into account 
time-vesting awards, which are by definition associated to firm-performance, and 
compute the value weighted average across all the awards granted to the DM. I 
use two measures, one considering only the performance-based awards, and the 
second one considering both performance-based awards and time-vesting 
awards. I report the distribution of these two measures in Figure 3.3. 
Both distributions are right-skewed with a mass of observations close to zero. 
When considering only performance-based awards, the mean is 25%, the median 
is 17%, and the values range 0 from to 100%. When considering both 
performance-based awards and time-vesting awards, the mean is 11%, the 
median is 8%, and the values range from 0 to 63%. 
 
  
                                                 
98 In the case of performance-based stock awards, this measure represents an upper-bound of 
the portion of the value of the awards associated to division-performance since the value of the 
stock is associated to firm performance. However, only two firms grant performance-based stock 
awards and use division-performance terms (see Table 3.3) and, thus, this potential over-
estimation is limited. 
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Figure 3.3. Distribution of explicit division-performance-based incentives 
 
Figure 3.3 represents the distributions of the value-weighted average of the performance 
measures associated to division-performance across (i) all DM performance-contingent 
awards and (ii) all DM awards. 
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These two distributions show that division-performance incentives play a minor 
role in DM contractual incentives and that firms tend to favor firm-performance 
incentives. These results along with the non-use of relative performance 
evaluation across divisions within the firm are consistent with the notion that 
influence activities are important considerations in the design of DM contracts. 
Even though I measure that the portion of DM contract associated to division-
performance is low, it is difficult to conclude that these low estimates are the 
result of influence activities considerations and adverse costs associated with the 
use of division-performance. For that purpose, I study the determinants of the 
level of division-performance incentives. I regress the portion of DM contract 
associated to division-performance to several firm characteristics such as the 
number of business segments, firm size and firm age. The results are reported in 
Table 3.5. 
Since both measures of division-performance incentives are bounded between 
zero and one, with a mass of observations at zero, I use Tobit regressions. The 
coefficient of the number of business segments is negative and significant. The 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables are not significant. The results are 
robust to the addition of ownership characteristics as well as to the use of OLS 
regression. These results are consistent with the influence activities hypothesis 
(H2). Firms with more business segments are more vulnerable to within-
organization conflicts (Stein, 1997) and thus avoid the use of division-
performance incentives due to the adverse costs associated with them. These 
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results confirm that influence activities considerations are important factors in 
firm’s compensation policy. 
Table 3.5. Determinants of the Use of Explicit division-performance-based incentives 
 
Table 3.5 shows results of Tobit and OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the 
value-weighted average of the performance measures associated to division-
performance across all DM awards, and the value-weighted average across all DM 
performance-contingent awards. The independent variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates that the p-
value is less than 0.01, ** that it is less than 0.05, and * that it is less than 0.1. 
 
 
Dep. Var.: Weight assigned to division performance 
  Total Awards Perf.based Awards 
VARIABLES Tobit Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit OLS 
              
# Bus. Seg. -0.02* -0.02* -0.02** -0.03 -0.04 -0.03* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log Assets 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Log Firm Age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
Block Ownership 
 
0.01 -0.01 
 
-0.08 -0.11 
  
(0.13) (0.11) 
 
(0.23) (0.19) 
Constant 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.39 0.41 0.58 
 
(0.27) (0.26) (0.22) (0.63) (0.61) (0.52) 
       Observations 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared     0.107     0.070 
 
3.5 Conclusion and Further Research 
In this paper, I investigate how firms design DM incentive compensation 
contracts. I take advantage of disclosure requirements issued in 2006 by the SEC 
and hand-collect information regarding the contractual terms that govern the 
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level and types of DM incentives, such as ownership requirements, target 
incentive compensation, and choice of performance measures with their assigned 
weights. 
The analysis is twofold. First, I investigate the level of incentives present in DM 
contracts and whether firms consider the presence of implicit incentives when 
designing the contract. I find that when the probability of promotion to CEO is 
lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and DM compensation 
incentives are greater, which suggest that firms take into account promotion-
based incentives when setting the level of DM contractual incentives. 
Second, I study the pay-performance terms and measure how compensation 
incentives are tied to firm performance and division performance. I find that 
most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance, 
whereas division performance captures only a small portion (11% on average). 
In addition, division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex 
firms, when within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. 
Furthermore, I do not observe the use of relative performance evaluation across 
divisions. Overall, these results support the argument that influence costs are 
important considerations in designing DMs contracts (Milgrom, 1988, and Meyer, 
Milgrom, and Roberts, 1992) and suggest that firms assign a large weight on firm 
performance in order to reduce DM adverse incentives to engage in influence 
activities or to distort information flow. 
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To further understand how firms design DM incentive compensation contracts, it 
would be interesting to study the interplay between monitoring technologies and 
DM contractual incentives. For instance, better monitoring technologies would 
reduce DM’s ability to manipulate information flow and, thus, one would expect 
that firms will increase the weight associated to division performance (i.e. 
decrease the weight associated to firm performance) in DM contract. Findings in 
my first essay (De Angelis, 2011) can be related to this argument and are 
encouraging regarding the importance of monitoring technology in the inner 
workings of the firm.99 Finally, as mentioned recently in Fernandes, Ferreira, 
Matos, and Murphy (2012), few studies have examined international differences 
in the structure of executive pay. Non-US firms tend to exhibit different 
ownership and board characteristics,100 which are likely to lead to different 
implicit incentives in place than the ones in US firms. For instance, in family- or 
government-controlled firms, CEO succession might already be planned or the 
result of political games, which would considerably limit promotion-based 
incentives. Using international data and taking advantage of cross-country 
governance variations could help to further shed light on the effect of promotion-
based incentives in setting the level of contractual incentives. 
  
                                                 
99 Results in De Angelis (2011) suggest that monitoring technologies have a direct effect on the 
extent top management rely on accounting performance reported by the DMs in capital allocation 
decisions. 
100 For instance, firms in continental Europe tend be more controlled by a family or the State (see 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999). 
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